

Security Issues in the post September 11th world

Vice-Amiral Giraud

Japanese Institute for International Affairs

Tokyo - October 18th

Mr Ambassador, ...

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very happy and very honoured to be here with this distinguished audience of Japanese officials from the Gaimusho, Defense Agency and other institutions together with Researchers of Institutes. I would like especially to thank the Japanese Institute of International Affairs for his occasion to talk about security issues in the post September 11th context.

The attacks of September 11th struck us with horror.

We will remember for a long time these events, all the victims of that tragic day and also the many marks of solidarity conveyed throughout the world to our American friends.

These attacks have had immediate implications: the war to defeat Al-Qaida and its networks was conducted in Afghanistan. It will be pursued elsewhere in the world because this plague needs to be eradicated.

France immediately supported the United States in this struggle.

Our forces participated actively in the military operations in Afghanistan by solidarity and by conviction of the necessity to eradicate quickly the networks of the international terrorism.

But the repercussions of September 11th 2001 go well beyond these military operations in central Asia: they are of a global nature and will have important consequences on our Security strategies.

Our perception of risks and threats strongly evolved after September 11.

We now understand that our developed societies are particularly vulnerable to aggressive and determined groups. We also understand that terrorist violence will continue and take many forms.

Extremist groups will take full advantage of opportunities provided by technology, new means of communication and by the general environment of freedom of our liberal societies.

We will face dangerous threats.

Our sense of safety and security has disappeared.

We were probably never totally safe but **this reality takes today a new meaning**; it will have **long lasting repercussions** on our Security concepts and strategies.

The United States reacted strongly.

While launching a large-scale Military operation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, they redefined their strategy, developed new concepts, **issued a new preventive doctrine**.

If we support the struggle against terrorism, the new ideas of preventive Military operations raises many questions for us.

In this context of uncertainties where the conditions of the international security seem more difficult to establish there is a strong need for new thinking before elaborating new strategies :

- We should first **reassess our perception** of the nature of risks and threats ;
- We should then **analyse** current trends in **Security and Military strategies** and try to **find the best ways to conciliate efficiency** and the **acceptance by the international community**;
- We cannot hope to face these new challenges **without a strong support from a large coalition of nations**.

Facing up to these evolutions and challenges, **each of our nations has to find the right answers** at the **national level** and also in the **multinational frameworks** to which we belong.

Today, I would like to address this topic in summarizing the various responses already set or under preparation:

- At the French level,

- In the international frameworks to which we belong, namely the European institutions and the Atlantic Alliance,
- And, last but not least, at the level of the **international community** and the **United Nations**.

1) National answers

a) At the national level, our priority is to take account of the evolution of the international context and of the nature of threats. This was done **in our major Defense planning exercise** conducted **every five or six years**. **A new Military programme law was prepared during the last 12 months.**

The French government has updated its Defense choices.

New orientations have been set for the period 2003 to 2008, which is the period covered by this new Military programme law approved by the government on September 11th 2002, a symbolic date as you understand.

Our Defense strategy remains based on the fundamental principles embedded in the 1994 White paper updated in 1996 with the objective of achieving the large reform and upgrading of our armed forces over the period to 2015.

The first stage of the reform, based on ending the draft and having a fully professionalized career military, was achieved in 5 years from 1997 to 2002.

Today our strategy and the model of Army "2015" are being adjusted to answer to the new threats and challenges.

We recognise that it will be necessary to face threats of asymmetric nature, more than it was the case in the past. These threats include, among others, international terrorism and a variety of proliferation's phenomena that lead to increased risks of use of radiological, biological, chemical or nuclear means or weapons.

It is likely that these threats can strike our territory.

Our territorial organisation is basically well shaped to respond since it is based on a regional response under a strong central direction, but the modalities and the means to respond need to be updated.

Therefore, we are revising Defense and civil protection plans at a governmental and interministerial level to adjust our responses and modernise or increase the means allocated to the protection of the territory and of the populations. This is a task where all ministerial department are involved. The Ministry of Defense missions include especially the protection of air and maritime approaches.

These threats can also aim at our armed forces when they are deployed overseas.

The development of asymmetric threats leads our Ministry of the defence to prepare new means of protection for our forces. New programmes have been introduced in the new Military programme law. They include special efforts in the field of biological Defense and a first programme of theatre missile Defense against missiles of a reach of the order of 600 km.

b) If we improve specific means to respond to asymmetric threats like biological, chemical attacks, our strategy has a wider scope. It is based on a global concept where military means are only a part of the whole.

First, the French approach to international security and Defense is based on a global concept, enshrined in a 1959 "ordonnance".

National answers to threats to our security combine a large variety of responses including diplomatic means, police and judicial responses, the use of international instruments, and, in the last resort, the use of force and Military action.

Second, in what concerns our military strategy, our defence is organised and based on **four major functions or strategic modalities**:

- **Nuclear deterrence**, which constitutes our ultimate guarantee to protect our vital interests,
- **Prevention** which allows to monitor threat evolution through intelligence and to engage unstable regions through Defense diplomacy,
- **Projection and action** through which we are able to project in the distance a substantial volume of Military forces to participate in crisis management operations, mostly in the a multinational framework and under UN mandate or, sometimes, in a national only framework.
- **Protection** which aims at protecting our territory and its approaches.

c) The French President and the government have taken a strong commitment to increase French Defense spending.

The past decade was perceived, wrongly, as a new era of peace dividends. This was translated, as it was also the case for most of our partners and allies, **by a very significant fall in our Defense spending.**

The new Military programme law marks the strong determination of the French authorities **to reverse this trend** because international instability remains high and our security interests can be threatened.

The new law, which reflects the will of the President of the Republic, marks a major break : over the next six years, the **capital resources** allocated to Defense investments **will be increased by 14 % on average** compared with **previous budgets voted** on in the period **1997-2002.**

This increase is justified by:

- The international context and the evolution of the threats
- The need to accelerate the modernisation of our forces
- The political will to restore the operational capability and availability of our armed forces

Priorities will be the acquisition and development of major key defense programs.

These **major programs will see their resources heightened by 20 %** on average over the period 2003-2008 compared to resources assigned in the finance law **for year 2001.**

Priorities in equipment are put on the four big « strategic functions » on which our defense strategy is based : deterrence, prevention, projection - action, and protection.

Our deterrence force will continue to be modernized.

Prevention will represent about 8 % of the major defense programs.

Our strategic intelligence capabilities will be strengthened with the deployment of new observation satellites and increased cooperation with Germany and Italy to connect our systems and receive satellite images from each other.

Projection and combat capabilities will have the biggest part of the effort.

This domain **will represent almost 60 %** of the financial effort assigned to the major defense programs.

Protection will represent 18 % of the resources assigned to major programs.

New defense capabilities to fight against nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical risks will be implemented. A program of theater antimissile defense will be launched.

d) The French armed forces will in this way see their capabilities modernised and increased. They will be able to continue to be deployed abroad in large numbers as they have been for the last few years.

In the logic pursued when we decided to fully professionalise our armed forces, our Military have been widely engaged abroad for the last few years.

They are mostly deployed within the framework of international coalitions and for the purpose of peace operations, but they can also be occasionally used in a strictly national frame, for instance with regard to our Defense agreements in Africa or in the Middle East.

For the last 2 years, France deployed overseas, on average and in an almost continuous way, 18.000 Military servicemen in addition to those based permanently in our overseas territories.

About half of these 18.000 servicemen are prepositionned forces, a third of them in Africa and about 1000 in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, the rest being in Germany. Our forces deployed in Ivory Coast have recently been strengthened at the level of 1000 men because of the present crisis situation in this country and to bring assistance to French or foreign nationals.

The other half of the 18.000 is deployed within the framework of a **large number of small to medium size UN operation**, in **Afghanistan** where we have today 500 Military, and in the **Balkans**.

With 7000 people, **our participation to the stabilisation of the Balkans is the strongest contingent** representing about 15 % of the total¹ of the international Military presence in the region.

After the United States and the United Kingdom (with their still large presence in Germany), **France is the third nation of the western world by the dimension of its outside military commitments.**

The intensity of our commitment in the operations Enduring Freedom was very high. This is an important point worth emphasising. It shows how closely our forces have been working with American forces in Afghanistan.

At the "peak" of our participation, about (3000) military were deployed, the biggest part being within the framework of our naval action force projected in the Indian Ocean.

The carrier group Charles de Gaulle fulfilled 10 % of the combat missions and up to 30 % of aerial surveillance (2 HAWKEYE E-2C) of Enduring Freedom during its presence of ****4**** months in the region.

2) The response of the European Union

Confronted by this rapid evolution of risks and threats, the European Union has responded by concentrating first on the police and judicial dimensions in order to reduce drastically international terrorist activities.

a) The European Union has already set up and implemented a large number of measures to respond to international terrorism.

Following to September 11th, an action plan was adopted by the Fifteen nations to fight against terrorism. This plan comprises 64 measures, the majority of which are embedded in the third "police and judicial" pillar of the Union Treaty.

Among these measures, I shall quote the **organization of systematic exchanges of information** regarding terrorist activities, a **new European warrant for arrest**, a

¹ 2000 for the SFOR in Bosnia, for the total of 16 000 - 5000 for the KFOR in Kosovo on a total of 32 000 - 200 in Macedonia for a total of 1000.

European common definition of terrorism, measures to strengthen the fight against financial aspects of terrorism, the development of the Shengen information system and the deepening of controls at the outside borders of the Union.

These measures have their scope embraced in what we call the 3rd pillar of the Union. I Will come that notion of pillar again in a few moments.

Other measures relate to the "1-st pillar" like the reinforcement of air safety on the basis of common standards.

c) At his stage, perhaps should I describe the European Union in some more detail before reaching the topic of European defense.

The European Union covers three major domains which our jurists usually call the three "pillars".

Two of these pillars, **the first one** - which covers mainly **economic and financial aspects** - and **the third** - which covers **police and judicial dimensions** - are of **civil nature**. They are the **main instruments concerned** for the implementation and the development of the **antiterrorist fight**.

The second pillar covers Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP).

This second pillar, which is still largely to be built, include a civil diplomatic dimension (foreign Policy) and a Military dimension, that we usually call European Defence or "Europe de Défense".

The European Defense, which was slow to start for many years, **made major steps forward from 1998 onwards** following to a strong impulse built on a Franco-British accord in Saint-Malo.

The major result is the consensus of the Fifteen member states in **adopting a common objective for the constitution of a European Rapid Reaction Force that can be deployed in 60 days for a year with a strength of 60.000 men.**

Besides this very concrete objective, **new mechanisms were created in Brussels** to allow to the European Union to decide, to plan and to deploy the Rapid Reaction Force.

- **A Political and Security Committee**, which gathers the 15 ambassadors representing member states, is now in charge of making the decisions.

- **A Military Committee**, gathering the representatives of the 15 Chiefs of Joint Defense Staff, is in charge of **advising the political security Committee** on Military options.

- **A European Military Staff** is in charge of assisting the Military Committee in the evaluation of situation and the analysis of the options.

c) What are the missions of the European Reaction Force and when will it be operational?

The missions of the European cover a large spectrum **from humanitarian missions to Peace making Operations**. We call them Petersberg missions because they were agreed at a European Summit in Petersberg, in Germany,.

The EU missions **do not yet include high intensity combat operations** of the kind we encounter for example in a Regional conflict, but this is the next step which we are pressing our partners to take.

The European force was declared operational in December 2001 at the Laeken Summit.

But a number of important capabilities are still lacking. Another caveat is due to the fact that a majority of Europeans attach a specific importance to the implementation of an agreement concluded between NATO and the EU called Berlin plus.

I will perhaps not go into details about this point. Technically the European Union lacks certain capabilities which are available in NATO like Military planning facilities, and a number of communication and air surveillance assets.

As you may know, **France advocates strongly that the European Union uses quickly its Military capacities** for example by taking the commanding role after the departure of NATO from Macedonian (TFF) in Macedonia.

We believe that the sooner we start to use the considerable assets of European nations both military and civilian, **the greater will be Europe's distinctive contribution to peace and stability.**

Politically and practically, the commitment of the Europeans has strong implications.

The Europeans have all to respond to the financial challenge presented by the decisions to create the 60.000 men strong reaction force.

There are still numerous capability gaps to be filled before its Force is fully operational for the whole mission spectrum.

These gaps mainly consist of strategic transport assets, means of communication, information and intelligence.

It will cost a lot of money to provide the necessary means. But we will, I am sure albeit it will take time, succeed.

d) You perhaps have heard or some sort of opposition between European Defense and NATO.

I would not deny that **there can be political differences among Europeans in appreciating the need and the urgency of the European reaction force or European Defense.**

This is true.

But beside that political issue, **the strong reality is that the European Military forces that constitutes the European Defense and the European part of NATO are very similar if not the same**, taken apart the fact that NATO allies are not members of EU and reciprocally, but these nations do not provide a lot of rapidly deployable forces. Without Europe, NATO would be half of what it is today in terms of available forces.

You may have difficulty in Tokyo to appreciate the point and measure all the nuances of the articulation between European forces and forces of NATO.

The forces are largely the same, but the decision making process are different and separate.

Therefore, the heart of the debate among Europeans and with the US has been focusing for some years on **whether it is necessary or not to duplicate at the level of the EU** the centres of commands, economic planning and communication of NATO.

[This debate comes from the fact that **NATO possesses two characteristics which do not facilitate the deployment of the European Defense and of the European Force**: NATO was created in 1949 and is largely developed, single issue (security) organisation.

It has the weight of a long established organisation. NATO possesses a large number of personnel and a few strategic assets in the field of planning, communications, air surveillance (AWACS).]

If a number of our allies remain rightly reluctant to duplicate NATO assets in their entirety, **France is advocating for a duplication of some important key assets in order to allow to the EU to act militarily, in time, when it is necessary.**

It is not a question of competing with NATO or of acting against the interests of the United States.

But it is necessary in our view to make the Europeans more strongly aware of their responsibilities vis-à-vis their own security and with regard to international security in general.

If they were capable of deciding and acting by themselves, they would be more inclined to share the burden of international security as the United States says and wishes.

To conclude on this topic of a the European Defense and Security Issue :

European Defense is a long-term job that we wish to conduct in good harmony with the United States and NATO, taking also into account the fact that **a majority of European nations share the view of the need to combine Diplomacy, Soft and Hard Security in a measured way.**

3) The Responses of the Atlantic alliance

a) As a preliminary point relating to the relationship between NATO and France, I think it is **useful to remind** the audience, because it is sometimes not correctly understood, that **France never left the Atlantic Alliance** since its signature of the Washington Treaty in of 1949, which institutes, in its article 5, the mutual assistance principle in case of aggression of one of its member.

We have always been and remain fully committed to the defense of our Allies, as the North Atlantic Treaty requires.

But France withdrew in 1966 from the integrated Military structure of NATO because belonging to this structure **implied an automatic military response** including nuclear of NATO as a whole to an attack.

We were not prepared to accept the principle of the automatic response.

But, we remained fully committed to the political commitments of the Alliance and its transatlantic dimension and **have always been represented in its key organs, excluding the integrated command structure** already mentioned.

In the second part of the Nineteen-Nineties (1990's), we got closer to NATO's military structure without joining it, following to the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia and our Military contribution and commitment in the region.

With the approval of the US and the Allies, **we made an arrangement** to participate **fully in all meetings at the Head of states level and at Ministerial level**, except the few meetings related to NATO Defense planning.

The next summit of the Head of states of the alliance, in which France will participate, will be held in Prague on November 21-22, 2002.

The agenda will cover mainly **NATO enlargement** (7 countries + Albania .etc.), the **reorganisation of the command structures**, the setting up of **a NATO Response Force**, a **new Defence Capabilities Initiative** aimed at strengthening European capabilities with a specific accent on **war against terrorism** and **rapid deployment capabilities**.

* * *

NATO enlargement will be wider than expected 2 years ago. There are seven prime candidates for membership, and France supports the enlargement of NATO to include all of them, France has been for some time supporting the idea of including nations like Romania in the Eastern Balkans so as to strengthen security and stability in South East Europe. A decision by the Alliance at the Prague Summit in favour of a broad enlargement will be welcomed by France.

The reorganisation of the command structures responds to the **need of a more reactive, more responsive, NATO** able to engage in a **large variety of crisis situations** where the security interests of the Allies are at stake.

It will probably lead to a lighter and reduced structure that will also take into account changes occurring in the US command organisation. NATO's Command Structure still reflects many of the features and procedures of the Cold War. We believe that the Alliance needs to modernise itself, by reducing further its extensive and now unnecessary layers of Command, designed for responding to a major attack from the East which we believe is improbable in the foreseeable future. For example, we expect a confirmation of the **disappearance of the second strategic command, SACLANT**, based in Norfolk on the US West Coast.

A major US proposal for the Summit is the creation of a new NATO Response Force that would be capable of rapid deployment over long distances, around the world. This is another move in the direction of a flexible military tool highly responsive. It would be equipped with up-to-date technology. It would be a highly capable intervention force able as the US imagine it of operating alongside US forces. The aim is to have it ready for the year 2006.

I will perhaps not go into more details on the discussions at NATO on these proposals at this stage.

Much debate has yet to take place to prepare the Prague Summit and I already covered part of the topic when I explained the main challenges for the Europeans.

The success of the Prague Summit will depend largely in the response of its European members. Prague presents us with many challenges. These challenges

are partly of a financial order and oriented towards an increase in projection and combat capabilities and **partly in the field of organisation**.

Improving projection capabilities is an expensive business. But the challenges are not impossible. **Drastic improvements are needed in the way Europeans spend their money** and avoid duplications in certain areas, like in ground forces, and put a priority **in other areas** like air transport and communications.

c) France is supporting the Prague initiatives as long as they allow NATO to be more responsive and to adapt to new challenges. But we insist on the **respect of a number of key principles** that we see **as essential**.

We are not opposed to the concept of a NATO Response Force and we will support NATO Military operations in this framework.

But we see NATO intervention as a case by case question and we will commit ourselves to a specific operation if it respects three main conditions:

- **NATO should act on a legal base in conformity with the United Nations Charter.**
In practice, it can be either under **legitimate Defense** (article 5 of the Treaty of Washington) or **under a UN mandate** (Bosnia in 1995,
- The **opportunity** and the **need** for a **NATO Military action in the specific crisis under consideration** are to be recognised and agreed by the members of the Alliance ;
- **NATO has the appropriate Military means** to fulfil the **political objectives of the operation**

c) As a faithful ally, France supports the transatlantic relationship in a co-operative way.

France is associated with most of the debates in NATO, except those few related to defence planning and the technicalities of the integrated structure. **We also wish to play our full role in the new phase of restructuring of NATO, which** is going to take place in the years to come.

But we continuously insist on the need to **commit our forces only after a political agreement has been reached**, on a case by case basis, at the level of the Atlantic Council. This means no automatic commitment, and no automatic response to events. France thus remains consistent with its longstanding policy, that there should be no action by NATO without full and proper debate and consultation.

Here I would like to emphasise one point. France is committed to both projects – modernising NATO and constructing a real European Defense. We do not see them in any way as competitive, nor do we think that that one process should dominate the other.

Appropriate **arrangements have therefore to be found** so that the new NATO response force will not reduce the dynamic of the European Reaction Force, which is a complementary project. As I said a moment ago, the stronger the Europeans, the more effective will NATO be.

I am confident that these aims can be reached by sufficient consultations between the two organisations.

4) Responses of the United Nations and the international community

a) The United Nations have also to adapt to the new security context which is characterised by new threats, requires military alliances to work more in a new flexible coalition mode.

The superiority of the American power can sometimes bring nations to lose their sense of belonging to a world community, or feel unable to play a significant role in the debate on international security issues.

Paradoxically, the new challenges require even greater international cooperation than before. The struggle against terrorism and against the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction need improved responses from the international community.

b) Military power will remain certainly a major element structuring international relations.

It is not only a reality but also in some respects a factor for change and dynamism. We still need military forces to protect vulnerable states against aggression, including terrorist aggression.

However it is neither possible nor desirable to conclude that the force in itself will be enough to settle crisis situations.

Military force alone will be vain if it is not accompanied with increasing requirements in democracy, in the respect for the rule of law and the implementations of longer term stabilisation policies.

The temptation to solve complex problems by exclusively military means should be avoided.

As we have seen, particularly in the Balkans, the phases of reconstruction after any crisis situation are important if not essential – more important even than the military phase. I should add here that France is very conscious and grateful for the considerable help that Japan has given to Japan's significant financial contributions to the reconstruction of the Balkans.

But sometimes, the use of force to end a crisis becomes necessary and unavoidable. Confronted with new threats, the modes and the means used by the Military tend to evolve.

The **speed of reaction**, the **efficiency of the strike** over long distance is turning military action increasingly into **a step on the search for negotiated solutions** or the management on the ground of the situations of conflict.

Such actions can sometimes be necessary. But, in our view, there is a risk of slipping towards very aggressive strategies, in particular when some evoke strategies of preventive action

c) We share, I believe, in Japan and in France, this deep conviction that UN is an essential institution as pivot and guarantee of the international law.

[**The debate** on the need or not to launch **a military operation against Iraq** illustrates the new questions put to the international community].

The role of multilateral institutions must be increased. But, the difficulty of overcoming the problems linked for instance with proliferation should urge the international community to find the way of improving the effectiveness of treaties and regulations agreed in this field.

We may have to **find more informal ways, more ad hoc mechanisms to engage with nations** that tend **not to respect rules**, and avoid using military force unless where absolutely necessary.

This is not just wishful thinking.

Real crises show the need for the modernisation of international mechanisms.

It is essential that a wide part of the international community, and, if possible, the international community in general, **unites to fight against international terrorism**.

More generally **we have to fight against the growing threats coming from various proliferations** that might lead one day to the use of mass destruction means by determinate extremist groups.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this speech, I described in some detail how we are looking (in France, in Europe and NATO) for new answers to the new strategic questions that confront us.

- **To conclude, I would like to say that we share in our two countries, a number of interests and concerns.**

You are, as we are, strongly committed to your alliance with the United States.

You are, as we are, confronted with the need to adapt our responses to the future threats to our regional security.

In addition to the major terrorist developments in Southeast Asia, North Korea represents a long lasting challenge for you and for the international community.

According to a number of (American) experts, North Korea seems to continue its effort to develop weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons.

Moreover, it is very difficult to evaluate the risk of the autocratic regime in Pyongyang using such weapons.

In the Near and Middle East, we are also facing major risks linked either to unresolved crisis situations or to the continuing development of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Difficult discussions are under way, as you know in New York regarding the future of Iraq.

- **We know that the world faces today major challenges.**
- **But it may well be that we are reaching a crucial point, which will have heavy implications for you in Asia as well as for us in Europe.**
- **At world level, three major changes seem to have the potential longlasting consequences:**

- **we have definitely left the bipolar world without having still entered a multipolar system.**

During the cold war, the Soviet Union created a constraint. It was not a constraint that we wanted; but it de facto **limited the risks of adventurous military actions**. Such constraint has vanished and is not yet replaced by a new balance of power.

- **the asymmetric threats can strike in a much more immediate way than was the case in traditional confrontations.**

The nature of today's threats encourages either the **temptation to withdraw into national politics** and allow international politics to develop according to their own logic, or the **temptation to act unilaterally** and in a pre-emptive way.

- **the United States have an overwhelming military power. They have the possibility and the means to conduct wars alone without the military support of their Allies.**

These changes introduce a strategic rupture with regard to the last fifty years.

We may be reaching a point where the international system faces a destabilisation process initiated **by new practices in the use of force.**

Facing such a risk, it seems essential that our two countries and a large part of the international community remain attached to a number of key principles:

- **First, it is necessary to continue to provide the maximum space possible for multilateralism.**

We practise multilateralism within the European institutions and the Atlantic alliance.

You practice it within the framework of your strategic relations with the United States, Korea and China, although in a less formalised way compared with our European way.

This multilateral approach seems essential to alleviate the risks of unilateral action and also to help the necessary convergence of political wills to fight together against the asymmetric threats. It is our view in Europe that multilateralism strengthens the fight against terrorism, because only international cooperation can reduce the potential of transnational terrorist networks.

- **Secondly, we need to continue to resort to all diplomatic, economic instruments and tools of influence before resorting to force.**

The Japanese government also promotes non-military options in his relationship with North Korea.

- **Thirdly, the use of force, for which our armies should always be ready (it is part of their missions), should remain the means of last resort, when alternatives have no chance of success.**

- **In addition** to this fundamental rule of the international system based on The United Nations charter, when the use of force is considered, it is indispensable that the military planning be prepared on the basis of **scenarios discussed in multilateral format**.

These scenarios of action should have been beforehand under weighed so that the choice goes to the one that will offer the best chance of success in the short and medium term: it is often the middle term that makes the difference between the good plan and the bad one.

[Ladies and] Gentlemen: I thank you for your patience in listening to my analysis of the challenges that face us. I have spoken from a French and European perspective. But as I have tried to show, these challenges and dangers are of a global nature. No-one can escape the consequences of the major changes in the strategic context that we are now experiencing.

However, as I have also tried to show, there are many points in common between us in Europe and you in Japan. We both contribute significantly to global stability through development and stabilisation programmes through the United Nations and other organisations; we are both engaged in active multi-lateral diplomacy; and we both believe that intensified international cooperation can help defeat asymmetric threats and protect our peoples against the new dangers. We have much in common. We must continue to work together to create a safer and better world.