International Workshop

“External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership”

国際ワークショップ

「中国新政権の対外戦略」

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
February 9–10, 2004　Tokyo, Japan

財団法人　日本国際問題研究所
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はじめに

近年中国は、ASEAN 諸国や中央アジア諸国に対し、寛容さを印象付けて積極的接近を図る善隣外交を急速に進め、特に東南アジア地域においては、ASEAN 諸国が強力に進めようとしてきたASEAN+3 の協力の枠組みに対し、日本が米国の不参加を理由に消極姿勢をとってきた中で、中国は逆にこれを積極的に支持し、東アジア共同体の形成に中国はリーダーシップを発揮する用意があることを効果的に印象付けてきている。

しかしその陰で、中国は、台湾に対しては寛容さを感じさせない怜悧な姿勢を崩さず、日本については、むしろそのマイナスイメージの浸透を狙う外交を展開しているかのように窺える。米国に対しては、対テロ戦争や対北朝鮮政策で協力姿勢をアピールし、米国債の大量購入などを通じ、関係改善に向けた巧みな外交を展開しているが、人権擁護の分野では依然として米国からの批判を受けて、鋭く対立している。

軍事面においても中国は、経済力の飛躍的向上を背景に、戦闘機、海軍艦船、長短射程ミサイル、戦車などの装備の分野で、近年近代化を急速に進めてきており、我が国周辺海域においても、海洋調査の名目で水深測定などを行っており、これは将来の中国潜水艦の活動に関係するものとの見方がある。

更に近年の中国の外交政策では、その政策決定とそれを実施に移す時間的早さが注目されており、それを可能とする方策として、シンクタンクが政治指導者に提示する政策提言が、速い政治決断を促す上で大きな役割を果たしているのではないかと見られているところ、今回の会議を踏まえ、今後その仕組みについても、十分な吟味が必要な時期が来ているように思われる。

いずれにせよ、中国が今後如何なる意図を持って、如何なる外交政策を展開するかは、我が国をはじめとする東アジア全体の安定と繁栄にとって重大な影響を与えかねないことから、当研究所としては、冒頭のテーマを、我が国の今後の外交姿勢を考える大きなテーマの一つとして捉えている。

そのような問題意識を有しつつ、当研究所は、2003 年度の外務省からの補助金による研究プロジェクトの一つとして、胡錦涛率いる新指導部の下での中国の対外政策の新たな狙いについての分析を試みるべく、2004 年 2 月 9、10 両日、当研究所内において、「中国新政権の対外戦略」と題するワークショップを、内外の研究者の参加を得て開催した。

このプロジェクトは、高木誠一郎客員研究員が主査を務め、運営を益尾知佐子研究員が担当したが、会議での報告者の方々からは、会議での議論を踏まえ、各々の担当の部分について論文形式のドキュメントを作成していただき、それらのドキュメントを集積した形で本報告書が出来上がった。ここに改めて、ご寄稿いただいた方々に、特に謝意を表したい。

なお、本報告書の中で表明されている見解はすべて参加者や報告者の個人のものであり、その所属する組織の意見を代表するものではなく、また当研究所の総意というわけでもないことをお断りしておきたい。

2004 年 3 月

財団法人　日本国際問題研究所
所長　宮川眞喜雄

Introduction

China in recent years has accelerated its good neighbour policy towards the countries of ASEAN and Central Asia, giving an impression of tolerance, to woo an affection of those nations. Especially in Southeast Asia, with Japan in the absence of US participation having adopted a passive stance towards the ASEAN+3 framework strenuously promoted by the ASEAN countries, China has actively supported this framework and effectively bolstered the image that it is prepared to exercise leadership in the formation of an East Asian Community.

Behind these benign attitudes, however, China has not backed away one bit from its shrewd stance of appearing to show no flexibility on the issue of Taiwan; indeed, China seems to be pursuing a foreign policy aimed at propagating the negative image of Japan. At the same time, China is working to improve ties with the US by cooperating in the war on terrorism and in measures taken towards North Korea as well as through skilful diplomatic measures such as large-volume purchases of US government bonds. In the area of human rights protection, however, China continues to be subject, and to object sharply, to criticism from the US.

On the military front as well, China has pursued rapid modernization of its fighter aircraft, naval vessels, long-range missiles, tanks and other armaments against a backdrop of dramatic improvements in its economic strength, and it has been conducting sea depth measurements relevant to future submarine deployment under the guise of oceanographic surveys in the waters surrounding Japan.

Furthermore, China's foreign policy decision-making in recent years and the speed with which decisions have been implemented have attracted attention. In light of the major role played by think tanks in presenting policy recommendations to political leaders and thereby assisting in quick political decision-making, this workshop suggests that sufficient deliberations should be made sooner rather than later on the role of think tanks and the newly developed decision making processes.

In any case, the future intent and foreign policy of China cannot help but have a tremendous impact on the stability and prosperity of Japan and the entire East Asian region, and our institute regards the title topic as a key focus in the development of Japan's future foreign policy stance.

With an FY2003 subsidy provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Institute of International Affairs held at its office on February 9 –10, 2004 a workshop entitled "The External Strategy of China's New Leadership" as a Study Group Project. Researchers from both Japan and abroad attempted in this workshop to analyze the hidden and real objectives of Chinese foreign policy under the new leadership headed by Hu Jintao.

Supervised by Seiichiro Takagi, an adjunct research fellow, and administered by Chisako T. Masuo, a research fellow, the project culminates in this report, a compilation of essays prepared by the workshop presenters on their respective topics in light of the workshop discussions. We would like once again to express particular appreciation to those persons submitting these essays.

Please note that the views expressed in this report are those of the individual participants and presenters and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations with which they are affiliated or the general consensus of this institute.

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Makio Miyagawa, Director

March 2004

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司会:高木誠一郎 （日本国際問題研究所／青山学院大学）

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　　ギルバート・ロズマン （プリンストン大学）
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　　徐昕 （立命館アジア太平洋大学）
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Agenda

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9:30 **Opening Remarks**
by Makio Miyagawa (JIIA)

9:40 **Session I: External Policy Formation Process of the Hu Jintao Administration**
Chair: Seiichiro Takagi (JIIA/ Aoyama Gakuin University)

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Theme II: China's Approach to Multilateralism
Speaker: Xu Xin (Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University)
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Speaker: Lai Hongyi (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore)

12:30 Lunch at "Keyaki "Restaurant, 33F Kasumigaseki Bldg.

14:00 **Session II: China's Relations with Other Countries**
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Theme I: Policy toward the United States
Seiichiro Takagi (JIIA/ Aoyama Gakuin University)
Theme II: Policy toward East Asia (especially toward the Korean Peninsula)
Speaker: Jae Ho Chung (Seoul National University)
Theme III: Policy toward Southeast Asia
Speaker: Chulacheeb Chinwanno (Thammasat University)
Theme IV: Policy toward Japan
Speaker: Chisako T. Masuo (JIIA)

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9:30 **Session III: The Defense Aspects of China's Security Strategy**
Chair: Seiichiro Takagi (JIIA/ Aoyama Gakuin University)

Theme I: Party-Military Relations: Present and Future
Speaker: David Shambaugh (George Washington University)
Theme II: PLA Modernization
Speaker: Srikanth Kondapalli (IDSA)
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Speaker: Ryo Asano (Himeji-Dokkyo University)

12:20 **Concluding Remarks**
by Makio Miyagawa (Director, JIIA)

12:30 Lunch at "Keyaki "Restaurant, 33F Kasumigaseki Bldg.

(At JIIA Conference Room)

参加者リスト

報告者

浅野亮	姫路獨協大学教授
チュラチーブ・チンワノ	タマサート大学助教授
鄭在浩	ソウル国立大学教授
頼洪毅	シンガポール国立大学東アジア研究所研究員
スリカンス・コンダパリ	インド防衛問題研究所研究員
益尾知佐子	日本国際問題研究所研究員
ギルバート・ロズマン	プリンストン大学教授
デービッド・シャンボー	ジョージ・ワシントン大学教授
高木誠一郎	日本国際問題研究所客員研究員／青山学院大学教授
徐昕	立命館アジア太平洋大学助教授

参加者:

北村隆則	日本国際問題研究所主任研究員
松田康博	防衛庁防衛研究所主任研究員
松本はる香	日本国際問題研究所研究員
宮川眞喜雄	日本国際問題研究所所長
中居良文	学習院大学教授
岡部達味	東京都立大学名誉教授
笹島雅彦	日本国際問題研究所特別研究員
高原明生	立教大学教授
趙宏偉	法政大学教授

オブザーバー:

松本修	防衛庁情報本部分析部三等陸佐
富田昌弘	外務省アジア大洋州局中国課地域調整官
張　妍	中華人民共和国駐日本大使館三等書記官

（アルファベット順）

Participants List

Speakers:

Ryo Asano	Professor, Himeji-Dokkyo University
Chulacheeb Chinwanno	Associate Professor, Thammasat University
Jae Ho Chung	Professor, Seoul National University
Lai Hongyi	Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
Srikanth Kondapalli	Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
Chisako T. Masuo	Research Fellow, JIIA
Gilbert Rozman	Professor, Princeton University
David Shambaugh	Professor, George Washington University
Seiichiro Takagi	Adjunct Research Fellow, JIIA; Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
Xu Xin	Associate Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

Participants:

Takanori Kitamura	Senior Research Fellow, JIIA
Yasuhiro Matsuda	Senior Research Fellow, The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS)
Haruka Matsumoto	Research Fellow, JIIA
Makio Miyagawa	Director/Senior Research Fellow, JIIA
Yoshifumi Nakai	Professor, Gakushuin Universtiy
Tatsumi Okabe	Professor Emeritus, Tokyo Metropolitan University
Masahiko Sasajima	Senior Research Fellow, JIIA
Akio Takahara	Professor, Rikkyo University
Zhao Hongwei	Professor, Hosei University

Observers:

Osamu Matsumoto	Major, Japan Defense Agency
Masahiro Tomita	Senior Regional Coordinator, China and Mongolia Division, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Zhang Yan	Third Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Japan

(In Alphabetical Order)

概要

この国際ワークショップを通して、ほぼすべての参加者が一致したのは、中国の対外戦略がこの数年大きな変化を遂げつつあるという点であった。中国は、90 年代における外交的失敗を認識し、責任ある大国としての自覚をもって既存の国際社会の中でより活発かつ建設的なアクターになろうとしている。それは中国が、経済発展を最大目標として掲げ、米国との対決を回避し国際環境の安定を保ちながら国力を向上させることが自国にとって望ましいと考えているからである。中国国内では、過去に比べると情報フローが健全化し、政治的自由化が進んでいる。また中央指導者や官僚組織が外部の研究所や学者の意見を吸収しながら重要な対外政策を決定する傾向が強まっている。さらに、国内社会の成熟にあわせて党・国家・軍の機構が改編され、政策決定の制度化が進んでおり、政策の決定や執行に関わる手続きが重視されるようになっている。以上のような変化が、中国が対外認識を変容させていく国内的環境を整え、そして対外戦略をより安定的な方向に転換させる要因となっている。この傾向は 90 年代末から存在していたが、胡錦濤政権が「和平崛起（平和的台頭）」を提唱したことで、今後も長期的に継続し強まっていくであろう。

しかしながら、中国の対外戦略を各側面から検討していくと、胡錦濤体制下の中国は大局的・包括的な対外戦略を描くにはいたっていないということができる。89 年の天安門事件後、鄧小平は「韜光養晦、有所作為（能力を見せるな、できることから行え）」という外交指示を出した。挑戦しやすい課題から処理していった結果、中国の現在の対外戦略は進歩的な要素と古めかしい要素が複雑に入り乱れる状態になっている。例えば東南アジア諸国との関係においては相互信頼のレベルが近年飛躍的に向上しており、マルチラテラルな交流が軍事面にも拡大されようとしている。対米関係はかつてと違って慎重かつ巧妙にハンドリングされており、これまで外交上の禁区であった北朝鮮問題の解決にも積極的な姿勢を見せている。それにもかかわらず、日本と台湾に関してはいまだに政策転換が見られない。多少の姿勢の変化はあるが、歴史問題や統一問題でいまだに古くからのスローガンが繰り返されており、新しい試みへの道のりは遠い。さらに、対外政策を執行していく上で政治面・経済面・軍事面・社会面の各要素が統合されておらず、時に中国国内の各方面の責任者が対外的に矛盾する行動をとることがある。

このワークショップで大きな論点のひとつとなったのは、将来的な日中関係のあり方であった。東アジア地域は、マルチラテラリズムによって地域主義を発展させ、東アジア共同体を創出するという方向に進みつつある。このような戦略的・大局的な観点から、多くの論者が現在の日中関係に対して懸念を表明した。ある論者は、中国では日本との関係について、①歴史問題克服派、②日本無視派、③形式的交流派（マルチの交流は行うがバイの交流はできるだけ避ける）、④経済積極・政治消極派、⑤日本侮蔑派、が存在すると論じ、そのうち②と③が主流であるとした。胡錦濤政権は幾度となく日本との関係改善を示唆しているが、近年中国では歴史問題をめぐって対日世論が過激化し、指導者の政策オプションの幅を制約し始めている。この状況について、基本的には中国の国内問題であって中国自身が解決すべきだという意見もあった。しかしながら、日中関係の改善のためには両国の共同の努力が必要だと強調する論者も多かった。日中以外の第三国の参加者からは、最近の日本側の対中世論は中国以上に感情的であり、それが中国側の対応をさらに難しくしているという批判もあった。

このワークショップは、日中関係に次のような示唆を与えている。今日の日本が向かい合っているのは、独裁的社会主義体制から脱皮し、新しい国家を生み出していくためにさまざまな試行錯誤を続ける中国である。この中国と共存し、より安定し繁栄する東アジアを創出していくためには、日本は大局的視野に立って中国と各方面の戦略的利益を共有していくべきである。しかし同時に、政府間関係でなく社会のレベルでも良好な関係を築いていかねば、両国国内のナショナリズムからの反撃によって、戦略的努力は道半ばにして挫折する可能性が高い。今後日中両国は、両国関係の重層化をはかり、社会レベルにおける共同体意識の醸成にも注意を向けていくべきであ

る。

第 1 セッション「胡錦濤政権の対外政策形成過程」

トップバッターとして議論の口火を切ったギルバート・ロズマン教授は、中国外交は 1990 年代には何度も失策を繰り返したが、特に 1999 年以降の政策調整期を経てより現実的なアプローチを採用するようになったため、胡錦濤政権は比較的良好な内外環境の中でスタートすることができたと指摘した。その上で、最近の中国の対外政策には、大国間のパワーバランスの中で控えめな姿勢をとり、地域主義を育み、ならず者国家を沈静化させ、グローバリズムの優等生となり、国内ナショナリズムをコントロールしようとしているという特徴が見られると指摘した。また、現在の外交政策の基本路線は今後も長続きするであろうと主張した。

中国のマルチラテラリズムへの取り組みについて、徐昕助教授はまず、昨年中国初の宇宙飛行士・楊利偉氏が、宇宙船の中で中国国旗と国連旗を手にして映した写真を紹介した。中国がマルチラテラリズムに取り組むようになったのは当初は中国脅威論への対処のためであった。しかしエリートの対外認識が発展したのと並行して、9･11 事件後はマルチの枠組みへの参加を国際的活動の一般的原則としてより重視するよう傾向を強めている。ただし台湾問題の存在が中国の取り組みの限界を呈している、と論じた。

頼洪毅教授は、中国の最近の対外政策形成過程を分析した。大国、周辺国、また核問題やテロリズムなどに関する敏感なイシューについては中央指導者が決定するが、それ以外の外交案件については官僚の発言権が強まっていることを指摘し、また対外政策のアイディアを提供する主体が多様化しているとした。さらに、都市の知識階級を中心とする世論が指導部の対外政策のオプションを狭めていると論じた。

以上を踏まえ、討論では、中国が 90 年代の後半以降に対外認識を大きく転換させていたことが、胡錦濤政権の「和平崛起」論提唱への複線となっていることが指摘された。対外政策決定のプロセスは未だ効率的とはいえないが、インフォーマルな情報ネットワークが活用された江沢民時代と比べ定型化が着実に進んでいるとされた。他方、中国外交部においても外交部と学者との意見交換が定期化されており、また共産党中央政治局で国際問題に関する学者のブリーフィングが近々開始されるという指摘もあった。このように、全体的には対外政策形成において専門家の意見が重視される傾向が強まっている。また、中国では情報フローが増大しまた健全化してきており、国際情勢・各国情勢に関する正確で迅速な情報が他国と同等あるいはそれ以上に入手しやすくなっているという論者もいた。中国世論については、日本側の複数の参加者が中国政府はネット上で政権批判を禁じながら擬似インテリによる対日批判は容認していると指摘したが、日本の中国への対応も中国が新しい対日政策を打ち出すのを困難にしているという意見もあった。

第 2 セッション「中国と諸外国との関係」

中国の対米政策を論じた高木教授は、米中関係は国内政治の動向に左右され、悪化と改善の波を繰り返していることを指摘した上で、反中的なブッシュ政権の誕生後まもなくは中国の抑制的な対応によって米中間の穏やかな関係が維持されていたと論じた。9･11 事件が起こると、中国はこれを米国との関係改善の機会ととらえ、北朝鮮核問題や反テロ戦争での協力を前面に打ち出すことで経済や台湾が米中間で問題化することを避け、米国の対中政策の軟化に成功したと述べた。

鄭在浩教授は、朝鮮半島政策は胡錦濤政権の誕生後最も明確に変化した対外政策であると主張した。北朝鮮核危機が再燃した 2001 年秋の時点では、中国は米国の北朝鮮政策を支持していなかった。しかし米国と北朝鮮との関係が壊滅的になってきているという認識に基づいて、3 月初めには党中央委員会に朝鮮問題領導小組を結成し、この問題に積極的に介入する姿勢に転じ

た。鄭教授は、現時点では中国のこの行動が本質的な対外思想の変化か単なる戦術なのかを判断するのは早急だが、前者である可能性が高いと論じた。

中国の東南アジア政策を論じたチンワノ教授は、1990 年代半ばにスプラトリー諸島をめぐる領土紛争が問題化し、東南アジアでは中国脅威論が高まっていたことを指摘した。その上で、外交経験を積んだ中国が 90 年代の末から ASEAN というマルチメカニズムを通して東南アジア各国との関係強化を図ったため、現在では東南アジア諸国は中国に対して非常に好意的になっていると述べた。ただし、中国は現在大国としての意識の強化を図っており、これが東南アジア諸国にとって将来的にどのような意味をもたらすのか、今後見極めていく必要があると論じた。

中国の対日政策を論じた益尾研究員は、胡錦濤政権誕生後の中国では、明確な対日政策の転換がないまま学者・知識人のレベルで対日新思考をめぐる論争が起きていること、さらに社会レベルで発生する小さな事件がインターネット上で強硬な反日世論を再生産していることを指摘した。その上で、現在中国に根強い日本観の原型は中国建国後まもなく共産党指導者によって政治的目的のために作られたものであると論じ、現在の対日政策を変更することは中国指導者にとって国内的な難問であると論じた。

以上の指摘を受けて、全体討論では以下が論点となった。まず、中国と各国・各地域との関係は、現在は安定と協力が主軸であると多くの論者が指摘した。その上で、米中関係については、ブッシュ政権の登場によって米国内で 89 年から継続していた中国論争が終焉し、中国との協力を中心とする関与政策が確認されたという意見と、判断を下すのはまだ早急であるという意見が表明された。また中国の立場からは、ユーゴスラビアの中国大使館爆撃事件後、米中関係は場合によっては非常に悪くなりうるという認識が国内で生まれ、中国が対米政策を慎重に取り扱う契機となったという指摘があった。中国と朝鮮半島の関係については、中国側の最近の変化は北朝鮮の核武装というより地域情勢の不安定化に基づくものであると論じられた。また、韓国における近年の反米感情や高句麗問題についても触れられ、中国と南北朝鮮の間でも将来的には各国のナショナリズムが火種になる可能性があると指摘された。東南アジアとの関係については、ARF において、中国が軍事交流や共同演習といった敏感なイシューについても他国以上に協力を推進しようとしていることが強調された。

しかしながら、このような新しい中国外交のあり方とは対照的に、日中関係については、中国では日本との関係改善には消極的な勢力が主流であるという点が強調された。日本側からは、日本は歴史問題の解決に対してできうる限りのことはほとんどしてきたという意見が提起されたが、他方で今後の日中関係の改善には双方の協力が欠かせないという主張もなされた。より広い観点から日中関係をとらえ、長期的にいかなる東アジア共同体を構築していくのかが重要であり、日中関係は地域協力といったより大きな戦略的枠組みから対処すべきであるという意見もあった。並行して、二国間の交流は各層で確実に増大しており、今後は政府間だけでなく両国の社会の間で問題解決が目指されるべきであるという主張もなされた。

第 3 セッション「中国の安保戦略における国防」

シャンボー教授は、文官と軍人の役割分担という視点から中国の党軍関係を論じた。2002 年の党 16 全大会では中国人民解放軍の指導部は徹底的に入れ替わったが、これは軍の専門化と制度化が進み、人事異動の面でも党以上に手続きが重視されるようになっているためである。党中央からは軍経験のある指導者がほとんどいなくなり、これまで不明確であった中共と人民解放軍の関係が分岐する傾向が見られ、軍の事実上の国家化が進んでいる。胡錦濤は、かつて江沢民が行ったように、より積極的に軍との関係を構築していくべきである。

コンダパリ博士は、1980 年代半ば以降進展した中国人民解放軍の近代化について、戦略、軍隊の構成、兵器、軍隊の教育・訓練・演習など、多様な側面を包括的に論じた。これによって、約 20 年の間に解放軍が外国から武器や技術を購入しながら大幅な近代化を遂げてきたことが証明された。現在のところ、解放軍の戦略的重点は台湾海峡を中心として尖閣諸島からスプラトリー諸

島におよぶ中国南海周辺に置かれている。ただしこれと平行して、中国は局地戦争に勝利するための努力も続けており、全体として地域の安定を脅かす存在となっていると主張された。

中国の脅威認識について論じた浅野教授は、鄧小平時代の中国は小康社会の達成のために米国との対抗を回避する抑制的な外交政策をとっており、江沢民も基本的にはこれに習ってきたが、国力の増大に伴って中国では国際社会に対してより大きな貢献をするべきだという意見が増大してきたと指摘した。しかし現在のところ、中国はライバル国との間で戦略的な力を持てるほど強大ではなく、また政治・経済・社会など多方面の戦略の調整が進んでいないため、国際関係の改変への意図は強いが能力は小さい。そのため中国は、戦略ゲームをめぐる競争の中でバランスポイントを見つけていかねばならないと主張した。

討論においては、複数の論者がまず、中国の国防を分析する際には、解放軍が持っている希望を現実との差をしっかりと認識すべきであるとした。その上で、中国の指導者が 90 年代の諸外国における中国脅威論の高まりを警戒し、特にこの 3 年ほどは人民解放軍で「慈悲深いイメージ（benign image）」（シャンボー教授）を向上させる積極的な努力が行われてきたことが確認された。現在では、インド、ベトナム、日本、台湾以外の周辺国からは中国脅威論はほとんど聞こえてこなくなっている。これは胡錦濤政権の「和平崛起」の提起とも軌を一にしている。その一方で、台湾付近での軍備増強、中国海軍による日本近海の科学調査など、人民解放軍の動向を懸念する意見も表明された。これらの現象をどう理解するかについては、特に文官−軍人関係の変容に焦点が集まった。すなわち、軍の専門家が進んで党と軍の機能が二分化するのと同時に、国防関連の活動についてはアクター間での役割分担が進んでいる。例えば日本近海における科学調査は通常は海軍の指令の下で行われており、外交部には取り締まりの権限がなく、政治問題化したときのみ指導者が介入を行う。ミサイルについては情報を持っているのは中央軍事委員会の指導者のみであり、文官指導者は自国の軍事状況を掌握していない。その結果、一方で人民解放軍の事実上の国軍化が進むのと同時に、他方で専門性の高い案件については党や国家指導者の統括が及ばなくなっていると指摘された。

（益尾知佐子）

Overview

One point on which almost all of the participants in this international workshop could agree was that China's external strategy has seen tremendous changes over the past few years. Recognizing its diplomatic failures in the 1990s and regarding itself as a responsible major power, China is seeking to become a more positive and constructive actor within the existing international community. China holds economic development as its highest priority, and hopes to enhance its national power while avoiding confrontation with the US and maintaining a stable international environment. Comparing to the past, China enjoys a healthier flow of information, and political liberalization is slowly moving ahead. There is also an increasing tendency for central government leaders and bureaucracies to absorb the views of outside research institutes and scholars when making important foreign policy decisions. As the domestic society matures, the party, state, and military are being reorganized, progress is being made in the systemization of policymaking. Greater emphasis is being placed on the procedures for deciding on and executing policy measures. The aforementioned changes have become factors in China creating a domestic environment that is altering perceptions of the outside world and steering foreign policy strategy in a more stable direction. This trend has been in place since the end of the 1990s. With the proposal of "peaceful rise" (heping jueqi) of China by the Hu Jintao administration, it is likely to grow even stronger over the long term.

Upon examining China's external strategy from various perspectives, however, it becomes clear that China under the Hu Jintao administration has not yet drawn up a broad and comprehensive external strategy. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, Deng Xiaoping gave foreign policy instructions to "conceal your capabilities, and start with what you can do" (taoguan yanghui, yousuo zuowei). As a result of first addressing those issues that present easier challenges, China's current external strategy has become a mixture of progressive and archaic elements. In China's relations with Southeast Asia, for instance, the level of mutual trust has improved dramatically in recent years and multilateral exchange is also being expanded in military affairs. Unlike earlier, relations with the US are now being handled carefully and skillfully, and China has even adopted an active posture toward the resolution of the North Korean issues, a realm of diplomatic taboo thus far. Nevertheless, there has still been no apparent policy transformation with regard to Japan and Taiwan. Despite some modifications in China's stance, the same old slogans are repeatedly heard on historical issues and reunification, and China is still far from taking any new initiatives here. Furthermore, there has not been firm integration of political, economic, military, and social elements in implementing external policies, and responsible officials in different fields have at times acted counter to each others.

One major topic of discussion in this workshop was the outlook for Japan-China relations. East Asia continues to move toward a multilateral regionalism and the creation of an East Asian community, and many discussants expressed concern about current Japan-China relations from this strategic and comprehensive perspective. One discussant argued that Chinese opinions on relations with Japan can be divided into five categories; (1) the overcome historical-issue school, (2) the ignore Japan school, (3) the proforma interaction school (engaging in multilateral frameworks but avoiding bilateral exchange as far as possible), (4) the school of promoting an economically active but politically passive policy, and (5) shame Japan school, with (2) and (3) constituting the mainstream. The Hu Jintao administration has shown willingness to improve relations with Japan many times. However, Chinese public opinion toward Japan has become radicalized in recent years, particularly with regard to historical issues, and this has begun to restrict the breadth of policy options

available to the national leaders. Some discussants argued that this is a domestic issue whose resolution should be left to China, but many discussants emphasized that joint efforts by both countries are needed to improve Japan-China relations. Certain participants from third nations other than Japan and China critically noted that recent public opinion in Japan toward China has been even more emotional than in China, complicating matters for the Chinese side.

This workshop offered the following suggestions on Japan-China relations. Japan is facing a China that is shedding its autocratic socialist system and attempting through trial-and-error to create a new state. To co-exist with this China and to create a more stable and prosperous East Asia, Japan should share a variety of strategic interests with China from a comprehensive viewpoint. At the same time, though, such strategic efforts will end up half-done and frustrated by nationalist counterattacks from within both countries if good relations are not constructed between the two peoples as well as their governments. Both Japan and China should pursue multi-faceted bilateral relations and give due attention to fostering a sense of community among the general public.

Session 1: "The External Policy Formation Process of the Hu Jintao Administration"

Professor Gilbert Rozman opened the debate by pointing out that Chinese diplomacy had experienced repeated policy failures throughout the 1990s but had become more practical through the policy adjustment phase from 1999 on, allowing the Hu Jintao administration to take office in a relatively favorable domestic and international environment. He remarked that recent Chinese foreign policy has been characterized by efforts to adopt a moderate stance within a great power balancing, to forge regionalism, to calm down rogue states, to become a good student of globalism, and to control domestic nationalism. He then argued that China was likely to follow its present foreign policy course far into the future.

On China's approaches toward multilateralism, Dr. Xu Xin first presented a photograph taken of China's first astronaut, Yang Liwei, holding up PRC's and UN's flags inside his spacecraft. He stated that China had taken its initial steps toward multilateralism to counter the China threat perceptions in overseas. In parallel with development in the elite's views on the outside world, China has since the 9-11 attacks been placing greater emphasis on participation in multilateral frameworks as a general principle for international life. He then noted, however, that the ongoing Taiwan issue illustrates the limitations of China's approaches.

Professor Lai Hongyi analyzed China's recent external policy formation process. He pointed out that, while the central leaders make decisions with regard to major powers and neighboring countries as well as sensitive issues such as nuclear and terrorism, bureaucrats have come to have a greater say on foreign policy matters other than these. China has more variety of idea providers on foreign policies than before. He also argued that public opinion represented by the urban intellectuals was constricting the foreign policy options of the leadership.

In the discussions participants indicated that the major changes in China's international perspective since the latter half of the 1990s led the proposal of "peaceful rise" of China by the Hu Jintao administration. Although the foreign policy decision-making process cannot yet be called efficient, there is much more systemization in this process than in the Jiang Zemin era, when informal information networks were utilized. It was also acknowledged that opinions are now regularly exchanged between the Chinese Foreign Ministry and scholars, and that scholars have recently begun offering briefings on international issues at the Communist Party's Central Politburo. Overall, the opinions of

experts come to attach more and more importance in foreign policy formation. One discussant claimed that an increased and healthier flow of information is now available in China, making timely and accurate information about the international situations as or even more accessible than in other countries. On Chinese public opinion, several participants from the Japanese side noted that China tolerates online attacks on Japan by pseudo-intellectuals (Dr. Okabe) even while banning Internet criticism of the Chinese government, but other participants replied that Japan's responses towards China have made it difficult for China to adopt a new policy toward Japan.

Session 2: "China's Relations with Other Countries"

Professor Takagi, who discussed China's policy towards the US, began by remarking that US-China relations are influenced by domestic politics and thus fluctuate between deterioration and improvement. He then argued that China adopted a restrained approach in order to maintain US-China relations when Bush administration took office. He mentioned that China recognized the 9-11 attacks as an opportunity for improving relations with the US. China had successfully avoided confrontation on economic and Taiwan issues and softened US policy towards China by emphasizing cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issues and the war against terrorism.

Professor Jae Ho Chung asserted that China's policy toward the Korean peninsula had undergone the most obvious changes in diplomacy since the start of the Hu Jintao administration. When crisis flared up once again on the North Korean nuclear development in the autumn of 2001, China did not support the US' policy toward North Korea. Regarding the relations between the US and North Korea becoming disastrous, the Central Committee of CCP created the "Leadership Small Group on the North Korean Problem" in early March and adopted a stance of more actively intervening in this matter. Professor Chung stated that it is still too early to judge whether this action by China denotes a substantial change in diplomacy or is simply a tactical move, but that the former is more likely.

Professor Chinwanno, who discussed China's policy toward Southeast Asia, observed that the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands became a contentious issue in the mid-1990s, bolstering the views of those in Southeast Asia who saw China as a threat. Nevertheless, with the accumulation of diplomatic experiences, China sought to strengthen its relations with Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN's multilateral mechanism from the end of the 1990s. As a result the countries of Southeast Asia began to hold much better views on China today. China is endeavoring to establish a firmer presence as a great power, however, and Professor Chinwanno thus contended that the future significance of this for Southeast Asia must be ascertained.

Discussing China's policy towards Japan, Ms. Masuo pointed out that a debate over "the new thinking" on Japan has taken place in China among scholars and intellectuals since the start of the Hu Jintao administration. However, it was not accompanied with clear changes in the country's policy toward Japan. In the same time, minor incidents at the social level have renewed extreme anti-Japan sentiment especially on the Internet over and over again. She argued that the prototype for this deeply rooted Chinese perspective on Japan was formed by the Communist Party leaders for political objectives shortly after the establishment of the PRC, and that changing the country's present policy toward Japan presents a difficult domestic challenge for China's leaders.

Given the aforementioned, several points were debated in the general discussion. First, a number of discussants noted that relations between China and other countries/regions were currently focused on stability and cooperation. In addition, some

opined that the debate on Sino-US relations that had been ongoing since 1989 drew to a close with the start of the Bush administration, when a policy of engagement centered on cooperation with China was confirmed; others insisted that it was still too early to judge. Attention was called to the emergence in China after the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia of the view that US-China relations could decline severely in certain instances, prompting China to take a cautious approach in its US policy. It was argued that recent changes on the Chinese side regarding relations between China and the North Korea are based not so much on concerns about North Korea's nuclear developments as on regional instability. The anti-US sentiment in South Korea and *Goguryeo* problem were touched upon, as was the possibility of nationalism becoming a tinderbox in relations between China and North/South Korea. With regard to relations with Southeast Asia, it was stressed that China has been doing more than other countries to encourage cooperation in the ARF on sensitive issues such as military exchange and joint exercises.

It was asserted that, in contrast to this new approach in Chinese foreign policy, the mainstream view on Japan-China relations in China was a passive stance towards improving relations with Japan. Some Japanese participants suggested that Japan has done almost as much as it possibly can do to resolve the historical issues, but other participants claimed that both sides are not cooperating enough to improve the bilateral relations. It was deemed important by some that Japan-China relations be viewed from a broader perspective in determining how to develop an East Asian community over the long term, and that Japan-China relations be handled within a larger strategic framework for regional cooperation. Participants also remarked that bilateral exchange is steadily increasing at all levels, and that problems in future should be resolved not only between governments but also between societies.

Session 3: "The Defense Aspects of China's Security Strategy"

Professor Shambaugh discussed party-military relations in China from the perspective of the division of roles between civilian and military officials. A thorough reshuffling of the PLA leadership took place at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 as the military promotes specialization and systemization and as it now places even more emphasis than the party on procedures when making personnel changes. Within the Party Central Committee there are almost no leaders at all with military experience left; a split is developing between the CCP and the PLA, whose relationship has thus far been unclear, and *de facto* nationalization of the military is making headway. Hu Jintao will need to build more positive relations with the military as Jiang Zemin did in early 1990s.

Dr. Kondapalli examined the modernization of the PLA since the mid-1980s, discussing from a variety of perspectives such as strategy, force composition, weaponry, and military education/training/exercises. He demonstrated that the PLA has achieved substantial modernization by purchasing weapons and technology from other countries over the past two decades. At present, the PLA's strategic emphasis is on China's territorial waters to the south, stretching from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the Spratly Islands and centered on the Taiwan Strait. Dr. Kondapalli also asserted that China continues to make efforts to ensure victory in local wars, and on the whole China has emerged as a presence posing a threat to the stability of the region.

Professor Asano discussed the China's Perception of threats, pointing out that China under Deng Xiaoping adopted a restrained foreign policy that avoided confrontation with the US in order to achieve a "well-off" (xiaokang) society. Jiang Zemin basically followed this same approach but, as its national strength has increased, China has

increasingly come to the view that it should make a greater contribution to the international community. China's strategic capabilities are not yet on par with its major rivals, however, and the lack of coordination in political, economic, and social strategies indicate that China has far more will than capability in seeking to reform its international relations. China must therefore, asserted Professor Asano, find a suitable balance point with the competition in the strategic game.

Several discussants in the debate said that, when analyzing China's national defense, one must first properly acknowledge the gap between the PLA's desires and actual capabilities. In addition, it was confirmed that China's leaders have been alarmed at the rise of China threat perception in foreign countries in the 1990s, and the PLA has made active efforts over the past three years to promote a "benign image" (Professor Shambaugh). With the exceptions of India, Vietnam, Japan, and Taiwan, the China threat perception has disappeared almost entirely in neighboring countries, coinciding with the "peaceful rise" course of the Hu Jintao administration. Concerns were expressed about some moves by the PLA, including the military buildup in the area near Taiwan and scientific surveys by the Chinese navy in the waters near Japan. In trying to understand these phenomena, particular attention was paid to changes in the relations between civilian and military officials. In other words, even as military specialization moves ahead and a bifurcation arises between party and military functions, a division of roles is being pursued among actors in activities relevant to national defense. The scientific surveys in the waters near Japan, for example, are ordinarily conducted under naval command; the Foreign Ministry has no regulative authority and the political leaders only intervene when these surveys become a political issue. Only the leaders on the Central Military Committee are informed on China's missile forces, and civilian leaders do not have a firm understanding of their own country's military status. It was pointed out that, while *de facto* national militarization of the PLA is growing, the overall control of the party and national leaders does not extend to the matters requiring great expertise.

(Chisako T. Masuo)

China's Perspective On The World

By Gilbert ROZMAN, Princeton University

Of all the great powers facing the surging global leadership of the US superpower, China is the quickest to adjust its calculations, the most deliberate in analyzing changing international conditions, and the clearest about its objectives. Over a quarter century since its main slogan became "peace and development," reassessments have occurred often, but in the past five years they have reflected growing realism about limits to China's options. Hopes for riding a wave of socialist reforms to balance capitalist powers faded in 1989-91.(1) Interest in joining with neighboring states to champion Asian values for an emerging "Asian century" collapsed with the regional financial crisis of 1997-98.(2) Expectations for great power balancing as strategic partnerships took shape came crashing down in 1999 as the US-led war in Yugoslavia ended with China quite isolated.(3) From 1999 over four periods we can trace changing reasoning about five themes central to China's foreign strategy: 1) great power balancing, emphasizing Russia; 2) regionalism, highlighting Japan; 3) rogue states, symbolized by North Korea; 4) globalization, represented by the US; and 5) nationalism, focused on Taiwan reunification. New leadership emerging from the 16th Party Congress has made further alternations in thinking on each of these themes, adopting the slogan "peaceful emergence" as China's direction for the next twenty years.

1. Four Stages of Increasing Realism, 1999-2003

In 1999 Chinese analysts had exaggerated the troubled world they face, charging that: Clinton was trying to build a unipolar world order under US hegemony, Japan was conjuring up a China threat as it aimed to make its alliance with the US the focus of the regional order, and Russia was rightly alienated by the war over Kosovo and US plans for NATO expansion and missile defense.(4) Behind the scenes, they were debating how to fix policies that had led to hyperbolic emotionalism after the Belgrade embassy bombing by the US;(5) a nationalist backlash after Jiang Zemin's misfocused visit to Japan in November 1998;(6) overdependence on mercurial Boris Yeltsin, who cut a deal with Clinton behind China's back;(7) and an overall sense that multipolarity had become an empty slogan. By year end Beijing had changed course. Increased realism was recognized on all sides: US assessments of new seriousness in China in favor of entry into WTO and acceptance of the existing world order; Japanese talk of China's new "smile diplomacy;" the upgrading of ASEAN + 3 as a venue for summits with the leaders of Japan and South Korea that could give impetus to regionalism; more subdued Sino-Russian rhetoric as Putin took charge in Moscow; and Chinese support for Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" toward North Korea.(8) Through the year 2000 China's adjusted foreign policy seemed appropriate for the upbeat mood as the U.S. stayed mostly on the sidelines in East Asia.

Bush's victory and his initial policies to Northeast Asia led to new calculations in Beijing. They left the "sunshine policy" at a standstill, while signaling a sharp tilt toward Japan and away from China. The spring of 2001 also produced new tensions in relations with Japan after Lee Teng-Hui had been admitted into Japan for medical reasons and a new Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro promised to visit Yasukuni shrine on August 15. Despite escalating tensions in April after the crash between a US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter plane that trailed too closely, in mid-summer there were signs of Chinese accommodation as the posture seemed a little less assertive. With no progress in sight for North Korea and a weak friendship treaty signed in July with Russia, China calculated again that its best option was to reach a compromise with the US, focused on the State Department and aimed at a state visit by Bush on the eve of the APEC summit in Shanghai, even if the Defense Department was in no hurry to renew exchanges.

The air of disappointment hung heavy in 2001 that cold war thinking in the US and Japan had undercut the sunshine policy and targeted first China and then North Korea for containment. It suggested that there had been high hopes for the transformation of the Korean peninsula with minimal outside interference, drawing the great powers together in the region. When the US was attacked on September 11, it was interpreted as a failure of US strategic thinking, leaving domestic security unprotected while foolishly fixing on a nonexistent threat from China.(9) Quickly, however, attention shifted to how China might best respond to new security challenges,

inducing increased sobriety. Compared to the nervous reconciliation in the summer, at year-end there was hope that China could gain from an unexpected opportunity even if it would have to set its sights quite modestly.

After September 11 Beijing recognized that failure to support the US war against terror and specifically against the Taliban would leave it isolated and almost encircled as US troops were getting set to land in Central Asia as well as Afghanistan, Putin threw his weight firmly behind the war, and Japan pledged unprecedented postwar military support. While some Chinese worried about a setback on all fronts, leaders seized the opportunity to escape from designation as the foremost threat to US interests and to give their country more breathing room.(10) Before long, they would be repairing relations with India and using new tensions between the US and Southeast Asian Muslim states as one more stimulus to intensify cooperation with ASEAN. Insisting that its own Xinjiang province also faced a threat of terrorism associated with the Taliban, China again turned apparent isolation into cooperation with the US and a generally favorable external environment.

A fourth test for Chinese diplomatic pragmatism came when Bush's branding of North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" led after some uncertainty to a showdown from October 2002. For a few months it appeared that the US was adopting a hard line to the North, not limited to elimination of its newly uncovered nuclear enrichment program, while South Korea, Russia, and even Japan were closer to China's position in favor of a compromise solution. Yet, as Pyongyang's rhetoric and actions inflamed the situation, Beijing gradually repositioned itself to be the central and indispensable player between the two extremes in this confrontation, earning good marks from all except the North, which had no other recourse. In winter Beijing's cut off of oil for a few days was seen as pressuring Pyongyang into three-way talks. In summer its active diplomacy brought all sides together for six-party talks. Finally, from the fall it not only reinforced its pivotal role in diplomacy, but it also established what many considered to be linkage with US cooperation against Taiwan's moves toward independence.(11) Again diplomatic realism had extracted China from an unpromising situation, but the five themes at the apex of foreign policy concerns still posed formidable challenges as new leaders emerged.

2. Great Power Balancing

The centerpiece in Chinese diplomacy from before the time of Henry Kissinger's chats with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong remained strategic reasoning about the world's foremost powers. Leaders became obsessed with balancing against the power seen to be pressing for global hegemony. Enamored of the "strategic triangle" that placed their state in the world's top trio, they struggled in the 1990s to find a strategic replacement—strategic partnerships, new great power triangles or quadrangles, or rising multipolarity—as an antidote to globalization of the world's economy that threatened to diminish the country's voice. Yet, at the peak of its pursuit of great power summitry and symbolism, China in the late 1990s made several miscalculations: 1) exaggerating the Clinton administration's determination for unipolarity without seriously pursuing a deal to ensure a measure of multipolarity; 2) overestimating Russia's commitment to a close partnership and to multipolarity, when its instability and economic rut left it vulnerable to sudden change; and 3) rejecting India and Japan as partners in strategic balancing, even refusing the label "political great power" for them. When the US and NATO could not be stopped from war in 1999, new US-Japan defense guidelines reaffirmed that alliances are not just a cold war atavism, and Putin shied away from multipolar rhetoric after Yeltsin acceded to the US endgame in Yugoslavia, China had no choice but to reconsider its enthusiasm for great power balancing.

Even after downgrading Russia's reliability as a partner and watching as the UN Security Council was bypassed in the Iraq War in ways that diminished great power joint actions, despite momentary bravado from the triad of France, Germany, and Russia, the leaders of China rested much of their claim to a balance of powers on bilateral ties with Russia. In addition to arms sales from Russia and continued insistence that the two states had common positions on many issues such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing placed energy security high on its agenda. After all, Russian leaders had been urging it to cooperate in construction of an oil pipeline from Angarsk since the early 1990s and the two sides had actively discussed the issue from 1996, reaching agreement in 2001. Yet, Russians started seriously considering an alternate route, and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's visit to Beijing in September 2003 brought news that a decision was delayed. One report of the meeting suggested that Chinese hinted of retaliatory

steps, such as blocking Russia's entry into WTO and denying it contracts for construction of a gas pipeline from West to East China and of a nuclear reactor.(12) The Russian connection was looking quite shaky, even if few expected an open breach in the face of US unilateralism.

For new leaders to revive a balancing strategy they would have to take steps that are unlikely to be seriously considered, even if some are being openly debated in a fresh wave of publications focused on pursuing national interests through realism in place of emotionalism. Of late, Ma Licheng and Shi Yinhong have insisted that there is no danger of a revival of Japanese militarism, and China should accept Japan as a political and even a military great power.(13) One can even detect talk of a tradeoff whereby China drops its objections to consider Japan's entry as a permanent member of the Security Council in return for Japan accepting China as a member of an expanded G-9.(14) Yet, even if Jiang Zemin's earlier Japan diplomacy is now indirectly criticized, both negative reaction from mass opinion in China and efforts to find balance by China's Japan experts have shown that "new thinking" is still in flux.(15) Without interest in Tokyo, there is no prospect for a great power connection, and rivalry with India leaves that option no less doubtful.

The key to China's diplomatic posture at a time of US assertiveness is the slogan from the end of the 1990s: avoid confrontation, reduce trouble, increase understanding, and stress cooperation. Beijing and Washington have agreed on the need for stability, raising awareness of common interests. Chinese suggest that their country is gaining recognition as a "responsible great power." In place of the rhetoric that aroused concern a few years ago, Chinese emphasize quiet diplomacy on global matters. New leaders have taken a low profile on great power issues, preferring to focus on regional ones. After all, it is widely assumed that the U.S. will isolate itself, galvanizing others to react.(16)

3. Forging Regionalism

Chinese interest in East Asian regionalism keeps growing. In 1997 along with the startup of ASEAN + 3 came the shakeup of the Asian financial crisis that raised China's profile as part of the solution. In 1999 came the upgrading of ASEAN + 3 as a formal summit of the three as well as an upsurge in regional financial cooperation, leading to the Chiang Mai currency swapping agreement. In 2001 conferences in favor of regionalism revealed new seriousness that gave rise in November 2002 to Zhu Rongji's proposal for a regional FTA.(17) In December 2002 the first plenum of the new Central Committee called for improved relations with surrounding countries, leading to "new thinking" to Japan.(18) Chinese sought to establish a partnership in all respects with Japan, while capitalizing as an economic magnet on the interests of others in the region. With Japanese suspicious, China seeks to use ASEAN and South Korea in triangular contexts to shape Japanese ties as well to boost cooperation with the US for positive spillover to Sino-Japanese ties.(19)

In 2003 China had overtaken the US in exports to Japan, while Japanese exports to China exceeded by one-half US exports to China. Of late one major Japanese company after another has invested in China, planning to produce some of their newest products as they take advantage of China's entrance into WTO.(20) Even if Koizumi on January 1, 2004 again visited Yasukuni shrine to Chinese government protests after appointing a cabinet seen as the most historically revisionist since 1945,(21) Beijing analysts reason that with economic integration proceeding well they can be patient. Already there is talk of changing the name of the ASEAN + 3 gathering to the East Asian summit, although the Southeast Asian countries fear that their role would be diminished. Japan may be hesitant to accept the idea of a Northeast Asian community with its own structure and summitry, but it cannot do without some form of regionalism. Chinese calculate that a Japan nervous about dependency on the US will not be able to resist the lure of a region.(22)

Chinese tactics to Southeast Asia and South Korea suggest renewed interest in the Confucian concept of benevolence (renyi). In the old tribute system, China did not seek to make a profit in regular exchanges of prized products. Today it runs large trade deficits or arranges substantial symbolic purchases from surrounding areas. Again it seems more interested in whether they show respect. Reminiscent of "friendship" ties with socialist countries, open criticisms, even in the media, are avoided. By facilitating economic ties, China seeks an enhanced political role, rejecting the idea that hegemonism must follow.

Discussions of regionalism differentiate three directions in Asia: Northeast, Southeast, and Central, with South Asia still seen mostly in bilateral terms. Before 2002 China was hesitant toward multilateral diplomacy, apart from Central Asia, where the SCO overcame

weakness in bilateral relations and potential tensions with Russia, and ASEAN, where existing regionalism that made other great powers cautious proved convenient for China. Having reduced its expectations as a global power, Beijing has reinforced its objectives as a regional one. Recognizing that economics cannot be divorced from political and strategic questions, it has broadened its approach to regions.

Chinese coverage of the Bali ASEAN +3 meeting on October 6-8 highlighted how new leaders are giving added stressed to cooperation. The term integration (yitihua) appeared widely, as Wen called for studying a region-wide FTA. For the first time China formed a strategic partnership with an entire region, and this was a first for ASEAN too.(23) In policy circles across China there was talk of the new activism of Hu Jintao in forging closer ties with surrounding (zhoubian) areas. The goal was to make China a pillar of regional stability that would boost trust as well as deny other great powers any prospect of interference along China's borders that could contribute to containment.(24)

Although the two most prominent debates in 2003 featured relations with Japan and the Korean peninsula, another debate searched for a new approach to the Russian Far East and Siberia as well as Central Asia.(25) Having decided that Northeast China merits new priority in Chinese development, leaders have before them the problem of bringing to bear economic strengths from elsewhere in China and making linkages with nearby areas in Russia. On the positive side, they can draw lessons from the large boost in trade across this border since 1999 reinforced by plans discussed with Kasyanov in September. On the negative side, the image problem for Chinese business remains serious. The same applies across China's Central Asian borders, despite talk of creating a modern silk road with FTAs to buttress the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO).(26) While the SCO survived the redrawing of the security map of Central Asia after September 11, 2001, it lacks much clout or spillover into confidence building beyond minimum peace along the borders. Even along its southern borders normal market-based ties and migration are absent, despite the much-improved Chinese relations with maritime ASEAN countries.

Regionalism has a high priority, but on all sides it poses time-consuming challenges.

4. Quieting Rogue States

Keeping firm ties with old friends North Korea and Pakistan, China in 1990s was satisfied to make problems for the US and global security. The strategy has now changed to manage problems. This means more cooperation with the US on proliferation issues and more effort to balance relations with improving ties to South Korea and, lately, India. China no longer seeks to use problem states to deny stability to the global and regional order, even if it still may be hesitant to apply the same degree of pressure as the US does.

In 2003 China found more balance against the perception that it was too close to North Korea and Pakistan and too opposed to international efforts to pressure Iraq and Iran. Ties with India notably improved, including joint naval exercises, without seriously damaging traditional relations with Pakistan. After a January visit by Colin Powell, China made a strategic decision to pressure North Korea and grew increasingly critical of its nuclear program. Yet, as the middleman in negotiations, China kept encouraging the US to present a more compromising position that does not humiliate the North. At each stage of preparations for multi-party talks (April 3-party talks, August 6-party talks, and the illusive second six-party talks), Chinese gained credit for pragmatic appeals and insistent diplomacy. In Washington there was talk that relations with China had never been better, but in Beijing criticism continued that the US had needlessly provoked the crisis instead of working with the "agreed framework" of 1994, and its motives remained suspect. One analyst referred to plans for multilateral containment as a means for a regional security system unfavorable to China, and another suggested that the US aims to use the "nuclear threat" of North Korea to control the region.(27) Recognizing its own weakness and lack of influence over North Korea as well as Japan's emotional reaction and inclination of the right wing to make this its defining issue,(28) Chinese saw little option except patiently to try to bridge the huge differences on how to resolve this crisis.

After great powers and surrounding states, China includes third world states in its division of the globe. Apart from those important for energy resources, China has not given them much attention of late. The fact that some are breeding grounds for terrorism is not much noted. When questions arise about Pakistan, Indonesia, and North Korea, open publications offer no hint of the recently intensified debate. One hears that China keeps

its old friends. One reads optimistic statements that more engagement from the US will offer incentives that these states will seize.(29) Treatment of the real barriers to reform, such as the politics or ideology of these states, rarely appears. Although interest in using threats from these areas to shape international relations has been replaced by support for managing the problems that have arisen, Chinese are not candid about how hard this is.

New leaders have decided that China cannot be a bystander in the Korean crisis for fear that the results would harm the stability needed for economic construction and national interests. The security and prosperity of all of Northeast Asia is threatened. After the six-party talks at the end of August 2003, Chinese were proud that they had displayed their responsibility in international society and optimistic that despite the complexity of the problems remaining a path forward was likely to prevail. Yet, they worried that the US would not be reasonable in its approach. The ideal would be for China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan together to persuade it to respect the principle of simultaneity, allowing the North some face as well as some confidence in the future as a compromise is reached.(30) Whether the Korean peninsula can advance toward peaceful unification will determine how the Northeast Asian regional order takes shape.(31)

In place of old, one-sided slogans, today Chinese write about the need to combine anti-hegemonism with anti-terrorism, which is acknowledged to be ever more wild and on a global scale.(32) Recognizing the complex interplay of the two forces, Chinese seem to be still groping for an appropriate way to proceed. Fearing that the US uses terrorism as an accomplice in its aims and provokes more of it, Chinese offer limited support to the US because they see no other way to achieve their peace and development objectives.

5. Championing Globalization

Critical interpretations of foreign policy under George W. Bush do not exclude recognition that China can cooperate as long as core national interests are not threatened. It is assumed that the US with its unilateral, preemptive approach, based on confidence in its moral superiority, is creating a more disorderly world that destabilizes great power relations and damages international society and its organizations. Yet, hegemonism backed by a rush to armed force does not mean that war between great powers is likely. The U.S. is losing some of the soft power it accumulated, and its containment of China has been relaxed. This gives China more room for strategic maneuvering.(33) It must not openly challenge the US hegemonic position, but it has new means to use international divisions and even internal American forces to limit this. Although after September 11, the US became more cohesive as conservative forces raised the nationalist banner, China now seeks through deeper understanding of American society to shape its policies.(34)

In 2003 Chinese diplomacy took advantage of the North Korean nuclear crisis. It did not waste energy on standing in the way of the US in its pursuit of war in Iraq. In fact, through every means possible it encouraged US officials to take satisfaction that bilateral relations had never been so good. In early summer, after Washington had first appeared to intensify its determination to apply economic pressure against Pyongyang following the unsatisfactory outcome of the April three-way talks, the US at last took a more moderate position. The Iraq occupation was not going well and South Korea had resisted appeals to join in pressuring the North. This meant that the US become more reliant on China, which delivered North Korea to six-way talks in August and then intensified its newly active diplomacy to prepare the ground for a second set of talks with an ambitious agenda. Chinese seek concessions from both sides: renunciation of nuclear weapons by the North and simultaneity of security guarantees and other forms of support by the US. They are optimistic that the crisis will not worsen in 2004 and, even more, that American dependence and gratitude will continue. The Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration has made professional diplomacy the centerpiece of its new respect in global circles.

Although it has faced sharp criticism for not revaluing the renminbi and even for opening the door to some imports too slowly, China is still basking in the light of a newcomer to the WTO that expanded trade rapidly just when the industrialized countries needed more markets. Recently, it has also championed the cause of agricultural opening favorable to less developed countries. In economics as in security it is seen as a force for globalization, and the rhetoric in support of that has intensified under the new leadership.

Underlining Chinese policy considerations is long-term optimism that the center of the world economy is moving to China if reforms are deepened in a timely fashion and economic ties with the US keep growing. It

is even argued that once China overtakes the US economically, it can slowly overtake it in other respects.[35] In contrast to pessimism in Russia that globalization only intensifies marginalization, Chinese are largely persuaded of their nation's competitiveness and ebullient over its chances in the emerging system. Yet, distrust of the real motives of the Bush administration and doubts about the uneven development of their country leave leaders rather cautious about the timetable ahead.

6. Controlling Nationalism

Ever since the late 1970s reformers in China had downplayed the state of their country's development. Unlike the mid-1990s when Jiang Zemin had taken advantage of global awakening to China's fast economic growth and revised purchasing power parity prowess, in 1987 it was announced that China was only at the initial stage of socialism and similar modesty kept reappearing. In 2003 the goal of building a "xiaokang" society renewed this outlook. Leaders saw China's modernization in danger without stabilizing social development and the international environment, especially in surrounding areas. One article described China as a developing country with a low GDP per capita and pockets of severe poverty that has very limited international influence with no prospect of uniting other powers around its goals. It must act within its own capacities, waiting for rising national power and concentrating on the many things it must do at home. Besides, other foreign matters must wait in a country that is still not unified.[36] This is the message that has been conveyed by China's new leadership as it consolidates power. In place of "emotionalism," provoking public interference in "strategic thinking," Chinese academic writings insist that China must set an example for sober pursuit of national interests.[37]

Although Beijing nervously awaits the prospect of a referendum on election day that would boost Chen Shui-bian's re-election chances, it also is more optimistic that time is on its side should Taiwan not succeed soon in a declaration of independence and global support. The fact that Taiwanese have been unwilling to spend for the military plan adopted by the Bush administration adds to Beijing's confidence.[38] Yet, aware of intense pursuit of new strategies in Taiwan, China's leaders have internationalized the issue to seek Bush administration pressure on Chen Shui-bian. As Taiwanese identity displaces a shared sense of Chinese roots, Beijing has searched for more ways to pressure Taiwan's politicians, such as through new activism by business interests on the mainland.

Diplomatic coverage of Hu Jintao and the new leadership group intensified from the summer of 2003. There was talk of a new government and a new diplomacy. Hu's first trip to the G-8 summit in June drew close attention. Generally, comments centered on bearing more responsibility as a great power in an age of globalization, taking a long-term outlook, and increasing the confidence of international society in China.[39] This is the agenda of a power with interest in gradual reform, not sudden jolts in the world order. Yet, it is also a calculated set of goals for a more realistic leadership that has made denial of Taiwan's independence an overriding nationalist goal that trumps great power gambits.

Notes

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Chinese Approach to Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific: A Path to China's Peaceful Rise

By XU Xin, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

Introduction

On October 15, 2003, when Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut, was carrying out China's first manned outer space flight, he took an act of symbolic significance—displaying the national flag of the PRC and the flag of the United Nations side by side in outer space. This gesture sends a powerful message to the world: China is rising and a rising China keeps the UN-centered international community in mind.



Yang displays China's national flag and the flag of the United Nations in outer space.
China Daily, October 16, 2003

This gesture goes beyond sheer symbolism, implying much more about how China to date perceives and define itself in world affairs when Chinese power and influence is rising, and what image, role, and behavior of a rising China its political elites intend to project in the international community. In particular, this episode shows that multilateralism has figured increasingly prominent in China's international strategy, which aims to secure and facilitate the external environment for China's long march toward modernization and global great powerhood.

In IR literature, multilateralism, bilateralism, and imperialism are "alternative conceptions of how the world might be organized."[1] Multilateralism, in John Ruggie's words, is "a deep organizing principle of international affairs," [2] which "is distinguished from other forms by three properties: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity." [3] The institution of multilateralism, as opposed to merely multilateral organizations or multilateral activities, "is grounded in and appeals to the less formal, less codified habits, practice, ideas, and norms of international society." [4] As such it is a highly demanding mode of international life whose significance cuts more deeply, because it advocates "universal organizing principles" at least for a relevant group of like-minded countries. [5]

Applying this conceptual criterion to China, one finds an impressive yet unique track record about China's approach to multilateralism over the last two decades. First, there is a clear trend showing that China has been attaching an increasing importance to multilateralism as a general organizing principle of international life, as opposed to unilateralism and to a less extent bilateralism. Second, there is an extension of the scope of

China's multilateral diplomacy from economics to politics and security in that Chinese embracing multilateralism tends to integrate its overall international activities. Third, there is a subtle shift of thematic and rhetorical emphasis in Chinese IR discourse from multipolarization to multilateralism, although the former retains much of its normative predominance. Fourth, there is a specific strategic targeting of China's multilateral diplomacy that is directed at regional security politics in the Asia Pacific, where the robust persistence of the U.S.-led bilateral-based alliance system, the incipient development of ASEAN-centered security multilateralism, the volatile transition of post-Soviet Central Asian states, and the perverse behavior of troubled states such as North Korea and Taiwan have all compelled China to reassess its security environment and redefine its security interests. Fifth, there is a bottom line in China's multilateral diplomacy, as well as in its overall foreign policy, i.e. safeguarding the One China principle and preventing the internationalization of the Taiwan issue. It is here that the degree and nature of China's embracing multilateralism is categorically determined and confined, as China has been always vigilantly guarded against any intrusive encroachment of multilateralism on state territorial sovereignty. And finally, there is an explicit or implicit concern in the Asia Pacific about the "China threat," especially given China's rapidly growing power but not being fully integrated in the international system, that needs to be carefully and effectively addressed, because such a concern may elicit multilateral actions excluding, or even worse targeting, China. Such a scenario seems to have never been close to reality, but still underscores China's deep-down apprehension about the use of multilateralism by others against China.

The complex record of China's multilateral diplomacy suggests that a process-oriented rather than a structural-dictated analysis be a more appropriate and productive approach to the study of multilateralism, as each country's path to multilateralism is historically embedded in its diplomatic traditions, contemporarily bounded by its given circumstances in terms of specific power, interest and identity configurations, and strategically premised on its definition of national interests and its perception of self-image. From this perspective, China's approach to multilateralism since the end of the Cold War can be seen as a continuous evolution from its revolutionary tradition to a reformist course of action, which goes through three stages: the initial stage of suspicion and reluctance (1989-1996), the second stage of crafted engagement with multilateral institutions (1996-2001), and the third stage of assertive participation in the institution of multilateralism (2001-). As an ongoing process, this three-staged development is dynamic, contested, and open-ended.

To be sure, at the turn of the century, evidence abounds to substantiate China's significant moving toward multilateralism at both the global and regional levels, as demonstrated in China's painstaking entry into WTO, new emphasis on the central role of UN in global governance, bold endorsement of many international treaties and conventions regarding human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and environmental protection, historical participation in G-8 summit, and even exploratory approach to NATO, as well as its actively participating in APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3, unprecedentedly taking the lead in creating Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), unexpectedly launching China-ASEAN FTA process, pathbreakingly embracing a multilateral way to the South China Sea dispute, and constructively mediating the Six-Party talks over the North Korea nuclear crisis. It is tempting to say that moving to multilateralism represents a conscious, systematic, and well-schemed effort to reposition China in world affairs. As such, it may be well argued that China's late commitment to multilateralism marks a paradigm shift in its basic approach to international relations which will have a long-term implication for China and the world in the 21st century.

While the evidence of change is too robust to dismiss China's new multilateral diplomacy simply as tactic maneuvering, China's move to multilateralism, including its characteristics and significance, can only be appropriately assessed within the broader context of China's grand strategy and ongoing international structural change since the end of the Cold War. From China's vantage point, four general factors loom large in shaping China's new multilateral diplomacy: its unswerving adherence to Dengist developmental grand strategy, its strategic assessment of globalization and multipolarization, its crafted response to regional security politics in the Asia Pacific, and its redefined approach to pursuing China's great power status. Because of its limited scope, this paper cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of China's approach to multilateralism in all these four aspects. Instead, it will focus on China's regional security policy practice and try to shed light on the trend and character of China's new multilateral diplomacy from the

perspective of China's international strategy of peaceful rise (和平崛起).

The "peaceful rise of China," as one outside commentator observes, is "one of the most significant new ideas put forward by the administration of President Hu Jintao." [6] Advocated first by the "Shanghai school of thought" to offset the "China threat" theory, "peaceful rise" has gained its political weight in China's diplomacy as Hu Jintao takes the command of Chinese foreign policy. Both President Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao have unambiguously endorsed and conspicuously articulated this idea in their recent diplomatic activities. Of various means and ways to promote China's peaceful rise, this paper argues, multilateralism represents the most strategically significant approach to accommodate China's determination to pursue a great power status and outside concerns about the "threat" of a rising China. Therefore, a move to multilateralism is irreversible and will even gain more weight in China's dealings with the outside world in years to come.

Below I will first present the rise of China in the regional context as it relates to the reinforced U.S. led hegemonic stability centered on the redefined U.S-Japan alliance and the emergence of the ASEAN way of security multilateralism based on ARF. I will then try to explain why as China's regional security policy diverges from the U.S. alliance-based hegemonic stability, it converges with the ASEAN Way of security multilateralism by examining China-ASEAN interaction. Finally, I will discuss China's approach to multilateralism in relation to its "new security concept" (新安全观) as an alternative vision of regional security order which serves the long-term goal of China's peaceful rise.

1. An Overview of China's Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Context

The end of the Cold War opened a new course of history which Zbigniew Brzezinski calls the "third grand transformation of the organizing structure and motivating spirit of global politics," and which Kenneth Pyle referred to as a "third transformation of organizing structure of regional politics" in East Asia. [7] In this process of grand transformation, regions appear to be assuming a greater importance than ever before, for both practical and intellectual reasons. That is, the future shape of the international system will depend largely on political and economic dynamics at the regional level. With the receding of global geopolitics and the increasing importance of regional political and economic dynamics, policymakers and scholars in many parts of the world have begun to shift their attention and interest to the state of affairs at the regional level. Against this background, East Asia has entered a new era, building a new regional order by acting more independently than at any other time in its modern history. [8]

From a standpoint of international politics, the post-Cold War era was ushered in with the unexpected advent of international *systemic* change in terms of both material and normative structures—international distribution of power and "distribution of identities and norms"—and concluded with the unprecedented threat of international *systems* change. According to Gilpin, systemic change is "a change within the system" and systems change is "a change of the system itself." Whereas the former "entails changes in the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and rights embodied in the system," the latter involves a major change in the character of the system—"the nature of the principal actors or diverse entities composing the system." [9] It may be well argued that the 9-11 events in many ways have brought nation-states further together to cope with threats posed primarily from non-state actors, thus marking a new era of international relations. In the Gilpinian sense, therefore, while the *systemic* change continues, the emergent systems change tends to alleviate some formidable interstate problems and compel state actors to cooperate against common problems and challenges posed by globalization and non-state forces.

In particular, with a series of landmark events in the mid-1990s—the launching of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration, and the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation—as a watershed, the post-Cold War era of East Asian security politics can be divided into the two phases: the early post-Cold War phase (1989-95) of strategic uncertainty, and the later post-Cold War phase (1996-2001) of strategic realignment. And with the 9-11 events, as well as the creation of SCO and the acceleration of Asian regionalism, as another turning point, East Asian security politics has entered a new phase of strategic maneuvering and collaboration.

In this era of transformative politics, three most significant developments in East Asian regional security landscape have been the consolidation of the U.S.-led alliance system, the emergence of the ASEAN-sponsored

multilateral security forum, and the rise of Chinese power and influence. The interaction among these three processes has constituted the macro-context of the international systemic change at the regional level in the Asia Pacific.

Of the three processes, the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the mid-1990s has been a key component of U.S. efforts to reinforce the hegemonic stability based on its unchallenged military power and robust alliance network. Despite its bilateral origin, arguably, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been "regionalized" to the effect that its scope has been officially extended from defending the Japanese territory to policing the regional order and stability. Since 9-11, this tendency has gained a new momentum as Japan under the Koizumi administration has become more assertive, confident, and determined in moving out of the confines of its peace Constitution, and playing an international security role in supporting U.S. hegemony.

On the other hand, the late development of *regionalized multilateralism* based on the ARF and other mechanisms in the Asia Pacific has been another marked feature of the ongoing "grand transformation" of the organizing structure and motivating spirit of regional politics since the end of the Cold War. Despite distinctive characteristics compared with other major regions, regional multilateral institution-building initiatives—as reflected in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and many other "Track I," "Track II" and even "Track III" occasions [(10)]—have come into being one after another in this very dynamic region since the end of the Cold War, "springing up like bamboo shoots after spring rains." [(11)] This nascent regional multilateralism has significantly thickened the social nexus of international relations in the region and has evidently begun to reshape the region's habit and way of political interaction and even its way of thinking about global and regional politics.

Sharing the same regionalized context of Asia Pacific political economy and security politics, regional multilateralism and hegemonic stability nevertheless represent two contrasting—partly competing and partly complementing—logics of regional political transformation. Yet, to the extent that conscious political actions are taken to accommodate the longtime forces of market-driven regionalization, to withstand the growing challenges of globalization, and to deal with the uncertainties of regionalized security politics due to the end of global bipolarity, the Asia Pacific has begun to emerge steadily as an international subsystem in the post-Cold War era.

Furthermore, China's rapid economic growth and steady political advance in regional and global affairs has become another shaping factor in the ongoing international structural change in the region and beyond. As the China factor in many ways underscores the basic rationale of regional security politics represented by the consolidation of U.S. hegemonic stability and the development of security multilateralism, mutual engagement between a rising China and these two political forces constitutes the core of transformation of Asia Pacific international relations in the long run.

Against the backdrop of these ongoing processes, China's regional security policy has experienced significant adjustments and adaptations reflecting the dialectical character of *dynamic stability*. This has manifested most clearly in China's increasingly differential approaches to the two other major processes of constructing/reconstructing a regional security order, as China becomes increasingly vigilant against the regionalization of the U.S.-led alliance system with the U.S.-Japan alliance as the anchor, and steadily participatory in the institutionalization of the "ASEAN Way" of regional security multilateralism centered on the ASEAN Regional Forum—both have apparently changed from China's previous positions when the Cold War ended. More significantly, a characteristic blend of dynamism and stability has been reflected categorically in China's constant efforts to propose its own vision of a new international order through propagating the "new security concept" on various international occasions and taking initiatives to launch the first-ever China-led multilateral security cooperation – the "Shanghai Five" process since the mid-1990s and the creation of SCO in 2001. This momentum of multilateralism has appeared to be robust and coherent as China has made moves on several fronts: its bold proposal for establishing China-ASEAN FTA in 2001, its strategic concession to ASEAN in accepting a multilateral approach to the South China Sea dispute in 2002 and its accession of Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003, and its leadership in initiating and facilitating the Six-Party talks on North Korean nuclear crisis since 2003.

2. China-ASEAN Mutual Engagement for Security Multilateralism

In view of Amitav Acharya, three factors have fueled the demand for regional multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. The first is "a desire to build upon the payoffs of economic liberalism and interdependence," which has not only been a prime catalyst for APEC but also encouraged security multilateralism, on the premise that interdependent states presumably have a larger stake in avoiding war. Second, "multilateralism is conceived as a problem-solving exercise aimed at preventing and containing the risk of regional disorder posed by an array of historical and emerging disputes and rivalries." Third, multilateralism is also seen as "an insurance policy to cushion the region from the current flux in the regional and global economic and security climate." (12)

(1) *ASEAN Way of Regional Multilateralism*

Since the mid-1970s, ASEAN has transformed itself into a partial pluralistic security community, (13) and Asian regional cooperation has become "ASEANized" in the sense that "ASEAN has formed the core of most successful organizational initiatives." (14) The ASEAN way, or the wider "ASEAN Formula," as Hadi Soesastro and Charles Morrison call it, has been based on a combination of "shallow regional cooperation and deep global engagement." On the one hand, ASEAN states have established norms of behavior toward each other that minimize inter-mural conflict, magnify their bargaining position vis-à-vis outsiders, and facilitate domestic regime survival. On the other, they have embraced "integration with the global economic system as a strategy for growth." (15) The ASEAN way consists of three core guiding principles: restraint, respect, and responsibility. The principle of restraint obliges ASEAN states to avoid interfering in each other's domestic affairs; the principle of respect requires group consultation and consensual decision-making while discussing problems and airing grievances in private; and the principle of responsibility suggests that ASEAN states be considerate of each other's interests and sensitivities. (16)

Acharya argues that "The origins of notions such as the 'ASEAN way,' 'Asian way,' or 'Asia-Pacific way' of multilateralism are to be founded in the conscious rejection by Asian leaders and policy elites … of 'imported models' of multilateralism, and in their call for multilateralism to conform to local realities and practices." (17) In the eyes of many Asians, for instance, the American approach is to "start with legally binding commitments covering a wide range of issues," something that "scares many people in Asia." (18) Yukio Satoh argues that European concepts and processes would not fit the conditions of the Asia Pacific region well—partly because Asia lacked the strict bipolarity of Europe due to the role of China and the nonaligned foreign policy of many Asian states during the Cold War, and partly because Asia's main concern was with economic development so that the primary aim of regional cooperation was economic rather than political or security. (19)

According to Muthiah Alagappa, the claim that Asia has a distinct value system further underscores the need to study Asian security practice. (20) In his edited volume on this topic, he concludes that the security practice in most, if not all, Asian countries is characterized by the five key features:

> (1) the state is the primary security referent but it is also problematic; (2) security concerns of Asian states span domestic, regional, and global levels; (3) the core security concern is political survival, which is articulated by Asian central decision-makers in a broad or "comprehensive" manner; (4) self-help is the dominant strategy but increasingly cooperation and community-building also characterize the Asian approach to security; and (5) Asian practices of security have been dynamic and more change can be expected. (21)

For ASEAN states, security multilateralism, as reflected in the operating principles of the ARF, aims to integrate China into a system of regional order, ensure the continued engagement of the United States in the region's security affairs, and discourage Japan from pursuing an independent security role. (22) A realist interpretation of this rationale is that the ARF was designed to keep the United States in, to keep China and Japan down, and to keep ASEAN relevant. (23) But "the ARF is more than an intraorganizational balancing of threats and capabilities." (24) Acharya argues that "Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific context is defined in direct opposition to the 'exclusive bilateralism' of America's post-World War II security strategy in the region, which focused primarily on a balance-of-power approach maintained by a regional network of bilateral military alliances." (25) In this view, Yuen Foong Khong argues, the ARF is the

"mechanism for defusing the conflictual by-products of power balancing practices" in the Asia Pacific. [26] Instead of balancing against great powers, Katzenstein and Okawara contend, ASEAN states have sought to "export the ASEAN way of intensive consultation to East Asia through the ARF" and other indigenous arrangements. [27]

Within ASEAN, there is a "tacit agreement to suppress sensitive and potentially destabilizing issues, or to avoid discussing them." Contentious bilateral or multilateral issues are carefully and routinely kept outside of formal ASEAN agendas. Many intra-ASEAN conflicts have been "swept under the carpet," rather than confronted directly and resolved. [28] The Asia-Pacific way seems to be invoked precisely when national interests and objectives come into conflict with multilateralist goals. [29]

In ASEAN's view, the so-called Asia-Pacific way is no more than the ASEAN way, in the sense that ASEAN desires to "retain control over the development of Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions." In the case of APEC, ASEAN has not been able to maintain a strong hold on the agenda-setting process, but ASEAN has made it clear its intention to be the "driving force" behind the ARF. [30] "While many smaller East Asian countries have U.S. links and welcome the continued presence of U.S. forward forces in the region to balance larger local powers and compensate for their weaknesses, they prefer the U.S. presence to be a passive one in the absence of a threat of international aggression." [31]

(2) *The "Gulliver Strategy" toward China*

The ARF and CSCAP were set up in 1993 and 1994, respectively, against the background of uncertainty about the East Asian security order in the post-Cold War era, and "particularly the rise of China and the regional debate about the appropriate response." [32] As Alastair Johnston and Paul Evans note, "both institutions were created with China in mind, either as *a* principal or *the* principal reason for their existence." The architects of the CSCAP and the ARF tended to see these two institutions as "low-cost and non-provocative means for engaging China in regional process." [33]

Since its birth in 1967, ASEAN has viewed China with apprehension. [34] ASEAN states are concerned for various reasons. Historically, China was a dominant power in the region, based on a tributary system. As C. P. Fitzgerald writes, "Chinese influence, Chinese culture and Chinese power have always moved southward since the first age of which we have reliable historical evidence." [35] During the Cold War, China had connections with local communist parties against governments by practicing "revolutionary diplomacy." It was widely believed by many in the region that China was involved in the failed Indonesian communist coup in 1965, although many studies suggest that internal conflict in the military played the major part in the incident. In the security field, "territorial disputes in the South China Sea have emerged as the key external security issue facing ASEAN and pose the greatest potential 'flashpoint' for conflict in Southeast Asia." [36] As China gradually enhanced its defense modernization program, the lack of transparence also caused concerns among ASEAN countries. Economically, China's economic takeoff created a new engine of growth for the entire region, but the growth of Greater China also backfired in some parts of Southeast Asia. Psychologically, there was naturally a perceptional gap between China as a great power and ASEAN states as small countries. [37]

Lee Kuan Yew's frequently cited quotation about the rise of China is instructive in terms of ASEAN's vantage point: "It is not possible to pretend that China is another player. This is the biggest player in history of man." [38] In the climate of strategic uncertainty, the rise of China was indeed a key and worrying factor for ASEAN countries. As a Malaysian general put it in 1996: "as the years progress, there exist … uncertainty in the form of China's behavior once she attains her great power status. Will she conform to international or regional rules or will she be a new military power which acts in whatever ways she sees fit?" [39]

The China factor indeed figured prominently in the early 1990s, when ASEAN countries began the process of regional institution building. As far as ASEAN was concerned, almost all security issues were related to China. China also appeared to be an economic competitor. "The preponderance of the 'overseas' Chinese, China's compatriots from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the importance of having Chinese connections (*guanxi*) in doing business in China could also be an area of concern in the ASEAN region." [40]

While many Asian countries harbor deep misgivings about China's role, China has never been described as a "threat." ASEAN states are keen to ensure that the notion of "the China threat" will not become a self-fulfilling prophecy. [41] In ASEAN's view, it would be unwise to

talk about the "China threat"; rather, a dialogue with China would be beneficial to all.[42] In particular, "identifying a country publicly as your adversary goes against the grain of Asian strategic culture."[43] In fact, ASEAN has adopted the so-called "Gulliver Strategy," which aims to enmesh China in regional economic and security institutions so as to persuade China to conform to norms that would support regional stability and order.[44]

Based on the widespread perception that China is destined to become the next East Asian great power, ASEAN states believe that the most effective way of dealing with that power is to foster greater economic interdependence.[45] The rubric of economics can help keep China benign.[46] Yet the understanding of the aims and means of engagement in the region have widely varied. To some, engagement means "enmeshment," or a way of constraining China in specific conflict settings such as the South China Sea. To others, it means "a deeper and longer term process of making China more comfortable in regional institutions, bringing more Chinese into contact with multilateral processes and the habits of consultations, and increasing the chances that China will act as a responsible regional power."[47] The latter view is more compatible with ASEAN practices, which have emphasized the socialization of its members in the direction of cooperation and the avoidance of conflict and confrontation.[48]

To some extent, ASEAN states wanted the United States to be a "balancer" in the region. Suharto, Mahathir, and Lee all shared this idea. They also believed that it would be inevitable and unstoppable for China and Japan to play more prominent roles in the region. Yet by attempting their balancing act, they tended to "play the game of the international community" through multilateralism.[49] "Multilateralism," Acharya argues, "has been viewed as a necessary framework within which to engage China and integrate it into a system of regional order, thereby reducing the need of provocative strategies of 'containment.'"[50]

(3) *Multilateral Approach to the South China Sea Issue*

At the first ARF meeting in July 1994, when Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines took up the South China Sea issue, China proposed a subregional forum with only the ASEAN countries, apart from the ARF, to discuss relevant security issues.[51] Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen argued that respect for the difference in each country's position should be the precondition for deliberating on the future direction of the ARF, and that concrete measures and cooperation mechanisms should be sought orderly and incrementally.[52]

In the second ARF meeting in August 1995, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's conciliatory moves were widely applauded by other ARF governments. But Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang sounded less conciliatory when he reaffirmed China's sovereign claim to the Nansha/Spratlys and contended that the ARF was not an appropriate place to discuss what he characterized as a "bilateral issue." "There were no regional expressions of dismay over Shen's statement, however."[53]

At the peak of the Taiwan Strait crisis in March 1996, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxun visited Brunei. To alleviate Southeast Asian countries' concerns about Beijing's use of coercive power against Taiwan, Tang deliberately made a distinction between the Taiwan issue and the Nansha/Spratlys issue. He stated that "I think the [Nansha/Spratlys] issue and Taiwan are two unrelated issues and are of completely and different category and nature." Whereas Beijing regarded Taiwan as an "internal matter," it considered the Nansha/Spratlys as a "multinational issue"—"we have all along called for the settlement of the dispute with peaceful negotiations."[54] Arguably, as Beijing felt increasingly pressed by the threat of the new Taiwan issue, it seemed adept at turning regional atmospheres to its own advantage. For some Southeast Asian observers, Beijing's approach was one of "three steps forward, two steps backward." That is, China would continue to advance into the South China Sea. When confronted by expressions of regional disquiet, it would give the impression of being conciliatory, but when the dust had settled, it would make further advances into the area.[55]

Nevertheless, the general impression held by Chinese analysts is that China has exercised self-restraint since the mid-1990s, even under some provoked circumstances. In the case of the China-Philippines dispute, for example, as a Beijing analyst asserts, "China has always adhered to the eight principles" that the two governments formulated in their 1995 joint statement regarding the establishment of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.[56] Even when the structure constructed on Mischief Reef in 1995 was out of repair, the repair plan was delayed for two years. "Once we started repairs, however, there was an immediate reaction [from ASEAN countries]. So the repair work had been only done by half."[57]

When a draft *Code of Conduct in the South China Sea*—a non-legally binding, confidence- building measure—was finally presented at the ASEAN SOM held in Manila in November 1999, ASEAN members sought China's support for the draft. In 2000, China joined ASEAN discussions with its own draft toward creating the *Code of Conduct*. There were several differences between the two sides. First, ASEAN emphasized conflict resolution though a multilateral approach, while China still favored a bilateral method. Second, ASEAN proposed that the scope of the area should cover the entire South China Sea, but China wanted it to concentrate on the Nansha/Spratlys. Third, ASEAN emphasized cooperation through bilateral or multilateral agreements, but China argued for joint development. Fourth, ASEAN's version emphasized the suspension of further occupation of islets, a point not mentioned in Beijing's draft. Fifth, ASEAN's version did not mention the avoidance of military exercises, reconnaissance, or patrols, while China's version opposed such actions in the Nansha/Spratlys. (58)

In November 2002, the *Code of Conduct* was issued. Four ASEAN countries at the center of the disputes—Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam—had reached an agreement on the common text in mid-October. The remaining six ASEAN members—Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand—approved the text in late October. China gave its agreement on November 1.(59) On November 4, China and ASEAN member states signed the *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea*, which basically stipulates that the countries of ASEAN and China should refrain from any activities that would escalate or that would complicate the relations among themselves, as well as to help any person in distress. (60) China and ASEAN states "reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective." (61) Upon this time, China's embracement of multilateralism has become more substantial than declaratory.

(4) *China-ASEAN FTA*

ASEAN-China trade has been growing at an annual rate of about 15 percent since 1995. According to a 2002 report, trade between China and ASEAN had quadrupled in the previous ten years. It was worth US$ 41.6 billion in 2001, up 5.3 % from a year before. ASEAN was China's 5th largest trading partner and China the 6th trading partner of ASEAN. (62)

In the course of their interactions, however, it is political economy rather than simply politics or economics that has driven China and ASEAN to mutually engage each other. While the political logic of their economic engagement has been apparently potent and persistent, the economic dimension of their overall relations has also been growing robust and prominent. Just as ASEAN has intended to lock China into a constraining multilateral framework on its terms, China has attempted to influence the process of ASEAN-centered regional multilateralism as an important part of its preferred alternative regional order. Driven by different political considerations, however, China and ASEAN share their concentration on economics as the predominant approach to their mutual engagement. Gradually, then, the vigorous political economy of that engagement has promoted their interdependence and produced the dynamics of wider and deeper integration of the East Asian region. As ASEAN states are determined to reconcile to the rise of China in the ASEAN way, China becomes more sensitive to behave as a responsible great power and to accommodate ASEAN interests.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a political plus for China, in that Beijing enhanced its status in the region by eschewing the devaluation of the *renminbi*, offering aid, and joining the mainstream ASEAN opinion in seeking mechanisms under the framework of "ASEAN Plus Three" and other organizations to regulate the disruptive consequences of economic globalization. (63) Chinese analysts observed, China's conduct during the Asian financial crisis demonstrated its leadership role, because it would lose its credibility if it devalued *renminbi*. (64)

China first proposed the China-ASEAN FTA. The concept can be traced to 1995, when Thailand proposed a special economic zone between itself and China's southern provinces. Chinese experts and scholars since then had become interested in the idea. The 1997 Asian financial crisis further spurred Chinese discussions on a regional FTA. Primer Zhu Rongji instructed the Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade to make a cost-benefit assessment and a feasibility study of a China-ASEAN FTA. (65) Yet political factors were very important determinants of pushing for a China-ASEAN FTA. Having

seen the financial crisis as an opportunity for Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy, Taiwan started to implement the "second southward policy" in late 1997 to reinforce its substantial relations with Southeast countries. The measures of the "second southward policy" included the central bank's financial assistance to its local branches in Southeast countries, the establishment of the government-led "Southeast Asian Investment Company" to consolidate and better protect Taiwanese investment interests, the issuing of $1 billion bonds in Southeast Asia, and so on. (66)

From 1999, the discussions about China-ASEAN FTA moved from academic circles to the policy making level, pushed partly by Beijing's effort to strengthen its economic engagement with Southeast Asian countries vis-à-vis Taiwan's reinforced "southward policy," and partly by China's quest for ASEAN support in the aftermath of America's bombing of its embassy in Belgrade. Chinese leaders decided in 2000 to "strengthen cooperation" with ASEAN. At the fourth ASEAN+3 (ASEAN and China, Japan, and Korea) meeting in November 2000 in Singapore, Chinese Primer Zhu Rongji for the first time put forward the concept of the China-ASEAN FTA. At Zhu's initiative, China and ASEAN began to explore how to strengthen economic links and facilitate trade and investments.

After the fourth ASEAN Plus China (ASEAN+1) meeting in November 2000, the two sides set up a specialists group to study the FTA issue. At the China-ASEAN senior officials meeting in June 2001, the ASEAN general secretary pointed out that the China-ASEAN FTA initiative should preserve the central place of ASEAN, considering fully ASEAN's interests and demands. In response, the Chinese side contended that the China-ASEAN FTA would be based on the existing ASEAN FTA, and that there was no need to "set up another kitchen" (*lingqi luzao*). China also agreed to adopt a special preferential tariff treatment for underdeveloped ASEAN member states—Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. In September, the China-ASEAN economic ministers meeting passed the FTA report drafted by the specialists group and decided to present it to the meeting of political leaders. At the fifth ASEAN+1 meeting in Brunei on November 6, Chinese Primer Zhu put forth the three proposals: (1) to define primary cooperation areas between China and ASEAN; (2) to establish the China-ASEAN FTA within ten years; and (3) to enhance political mutual trust and support. Zhu also offered to slash tariffs for eight agricultural products to kick-start this liberalization process. The leaders from China and ASEAN swiftly reached an agreement based on the recommendation by the joint specialists group, and decided to establish the China-ASEAN FTA by 2012. (67) While many factors contributed to Beijing's decision, "with China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Beijing offered the FTA with early concessions for the ASEAN countries to soothe their worries about Chinese competition." (68)

More fundamentally, as the rise of China has become a defining factor in regional affairs for better or for worse, China has to be very careful and sensible about its role in the region. To construct a safety cushion around itself as a security measure and influence the process of regional order building on its preferred terms, China has to reconcile its interests with those of ASEAN countries. For China, the process of working for an FTA with its Southeast Asian neighbors is just as important as the outcome itself. This is the first in the history of its relations with Southeast Asia that it has found a common interest to engage all the Southeast Asian countries constructively to talk about cooperation, instead of quarrelling on issues such as the rival claims in the Nansha/Spratlys. This can thus be read as another form of "political confidence-building" for both sides. (69) In view of Akihiko Tanaka, the fact that China, not Japan, played the leadership role in promoting East Asian trade liberalization is alarming for Japan. (70) As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir comments, the FTA pact should not benefit China alone; it should oblige China not just to sell but also to buy from ASEAN. He has sensed that Beijing understands this because the proposed FTA pact is also important to China for strategic, not just economic reasons. (71)

(5) ***ASEAN Plus Three***

ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian states – China, Japan and South Korea – launched the ASEAN Plus Three process in 1997. During his visit to Southeast Asia in 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto took the initiative to propose the establishment of the mechanism of regular East Asian summit meetings. Having accepted this proposal, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Plus Three informal summit meetings in December 1997. Since then, East Asian leaders have begun to explore ways for dialogue and cooperation in non-traditional security areas. South Korea attempted to promote Northeast cooperation

by means of ASEAN+3. During the third ASEAN+3 summit meeting in 1999, President Kim Dae-chung proposed to his Chinese and Japanese counterparts Zhu and Obuchi to establish the "Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation Community." At the fifth ASEAN+3 summit meeting in 2001, Kim went further to propose the transformation of ASEAN+3 into the "East Asian Summit." He also declared that the ultimate objective of East Asian cooperation would be the establishment of an East Asian Community that encompasses political, economic and security aspects. While ASEAN was cautious about South Korea's initiatives because of its fear of losing ASEAN's central role in regional cooperation, Japan was inclined not to comment on the idea of the "East Asian Summit," and only emphasized the importance of keeping the "ASEAN+3" open. (72)

China's principled stance on ASEAN+3 is that this mechanism should gradually explore new fields for cooperation while focusing on economic cooperation. Given the new situation after 9-11 events, Premier Zhu Rongji proposed at the fifth ASEAN+3 summit in 2001 that East Asian countries phase in political and security cooperation and begin cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues. In this view, the Chinese government suggested a 10+3 Ministerial Meeting on Combating Transnational Crimes to promote cooperation in that area, including the fights against terrorism, drug abuse, illegal immigration, transnational crimes, financial and economic crimes, cyber crimes and cult crimes. (73)

With East Asia rapidly falling behind the European Union and North America in terms of regional integration, East Asian states have realized that the possibility of remaining fragmented 20 to 30 years from now is very real, if they cannot build an institutional foundation to take care of the long-term prosperity and security of the region. (74) It is against this background that the "ASEAN+3" framework has been pushed to the forefront of East Asian integration. With Japan's vision of "10+5" (adding Australia and New Zealand) receiving only a lukewarm reception, some regional observers see "10+3" as "the last chance for building an integrated East Asia after the debunking of the East Asia Economic Caucus." (75)

In view of Zhang Yunling, a leading Chinese scholar in Asia Pacific studies, the current process of East Asian cooperation proceeds with the "three wheels": 10+3, 10+1, 10 and 3. Whereas 10+3 covers the whole region of East Asia and 10+1 is about ASEAN's cooperation respectively with China, Japan, and South Korea, 10 and 3 are about cooperation within ASEAN and China-Japan-South Korea cooperation. He argues that Northeast Asian cooperation has a special importance at present. But in the long run, the true institutionalization of East Asian cooperation must be constructed under a unified institutional framework. (76)

Barring some limited progress (the Chiang Mai Initiative, China-ASEAN FTA, and the comprehensive economic partnership between Japan and ASEAN), however, "10+3" has yet to make much headway toward a codified institution. What is needed badly, many argue, is the leadership. The problem of leadership has much to do with troubled China-Japan relations, as well as with ASEAN's concern about losing its pivotal place in regional affairs. (77) Some Chinese policy elites have become so frustrated with the state of China-Japan relations that they have begun to look for the role of leadership from smaller powers in the region.

As Tang Shiping forcefully argues, because Japan and China still cannot see eye to eye, the prospect that the two powers can share leadership seems unlikely in the near future. To fulfill the leadership role, Tang suggests, "ASEAN states and South Korea must acquire a new mindset." First, they must try to bring Japan and China together and make them work for the region's common interest. Secondly, they "must sharpen their intellectual leadership. They have to transform not only their own ideas about self-interest in regional integration, but also have to transform those of Japan and China." But "the devolution of leadership to ASEAN and South Korea represents a temporary solution." Eventually, East Asia will still require a much more cooperative relationship between Japan and China. East Asia without Sino-Japanese cooperation has no future, just as a European Union without Franco-German cooperation is unimaginable. (78)

3. China's New Security Concept: An Alternative Regional Security Order

In July 1996, at the Third ARF Foreign Ministers' Meeting, China called for the first time for the abandonment of the "Cold War mentality" and the introduction of a new concept of security. Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposed that "countries in the region jointly cultivate a new concept of security, which focuses on *enhancing trust through dialogue* and

promoting security through cooperation." [79] Since then, Chinese political leaders and policy analysts have categorically expressed the Chinese view of international and regional security by further articulating the *xin anquan guan* (new security concept) on various occasions, including unilateral declarations, bilateral meetings, and multilateral fora. In other words, the NSC has become prominent in China's foreign and security policy, as it has been consistently elaborated and formalized in the Chinese official discourse—China's white papers on national defense in 1998, 2000, and 2002, keynote speeches by Chinese leaders including President Jiang Zemin on various occasions, some important diplomatic agreements, and most specifically, *China's Position Paper on New Security Concept*. As this document concludes: "The New Security Concept has become an important component of China's foreign policies." [80]

(1) *Beijing's Objectives of Security Cooperation*

Historically, China's security policy had zigzagged from an alliance-based security policy in the 1950s and 1970s to a non-aligned security policy in the 1960s and 1980s. Before the end of the Cold War, China was depicted as "a regional power without a regional policy." [81] Since the end of the Cold War, like many other states, China has sought to redefine its national interests and place in international politics. Given the uncertainty of multipolarization as a long process, Yan Xuetong argues, "Chinese leaders have been seeking a new security concept for a new type of security cooperation which is conducive to China's modernization drive in a stable and peaceful external environment." [82] In the early 1990s, Chinese political elites began to articulate an explicit Asia policy, which was called *"lizhu Ya Tai, wending zhoubian"*: literally, "gaining a foothold in the Asia Pacific, stabilizing China's periphery."

At the 1st ARF Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 1994, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen put forward three basic objectives for the Asia Pacific region's security: (1) maintenance of stability and prosperity in China, (2) safeguarding long-term peace and stability in its surrounding environment, and (3) initiating dialogues and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality.[83]

In general, there has been discernable evidence showing that Jiang Zemin has introduced "new themes and emphases to Beijing's foreign policy since Deng's death in February 1997." [84] Among others, Jiang's policy initiatives since then are evident in several broad areas:

- As has been discussed, Beijing has consistently advocated replacing the "Cold War mentality" with the new security concept as a new conceptual and institutional basis for international security order.
- Beijing has sought to establish strategic partnerships that embody a new type of great power relationship based on common interests, consensus seeking, cooperation and dialogues, and shared responsibilities for world stability, peace and prosperity. Jiang himself has been very enthusiastically promoting the establishment of nested partnership networks through summit diplomacy.
- Beginning with the eighth conference of diplomatic envoys and the foreign publicity conference respectively held in August and December 1998, Beijing has begun to more explicitly define and articulate China's international identity as a great power. China is defined externally as a "developing great power with its own characteristics" and internally as a "developing socialist great power". Rejecting the conventional practice of a great power, China aims to play a distinctive role among great powers. The degree and scope of China's distinctive great power influence, however, will depend on its own national interests. [85]
- Beijing has decided to pay due attention to its relations with both great powers and developing countries so as to avoid the mistaken preference of one to the other in the past. In the developing world, the emphasis has been placed on the relationship with "developing great powers" such as India, Brazil, Egypt, etc. [86]
- Beginning with Jiang's keynote speech to the eighth conference of diplomatic envoys in the summer 1998, Beijing has stressed the importance of economic globalization as a central and enduring feature of the emerging world order in the 21st century. In this regard, "Beijing has called for multilateral steps by the economic powers in particular, premised on free market principles, to provide for 'economic security'" in the increasingly interdependent world.
- Jiang has taken considerably farther the defense modernization effort initiated under Deng. Jiang has led the way toward the establishment of a

"new defense mechanism" that enhance collaboration between the PLA and China's scientific and technological community, and has brought the "greater compatibility between military and civilian products and greater convertibility between peacetime and wartime production." [87]

Apparently, all of these themes and decisions fall into the category of grand strategy and overall foreign policy.

In 2000, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a major foreign and security policy think tank, also proposed three objectives for China's short—and medium-term regional security strategy: (1) to maintain strategic balance and avoid a China-U.S. confrontation; (2) to contain potential threats and prevent surrounding areas from getting involved in conflicts; and (3) to establish a new mechanism for security and strengthen a leading role for China in Asia Pacific security affairs. [88]

Comparing with the three objectives put forth by Qian Qichen in 1994, two points merit attention here. First, the shift of emphasis from "stability and prosperity in China" to "strategic stability and avoidance of China-U.S. confrontation" suggests a more outward-looking viewpoint in China's security outlook. Second, the shift of key wordings from "initiating dialogues and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality" to "establishing a new mechanism for security and strengthening a leading role of China in Asia Pacific security affairs" indicates a more active and constructive approach to regional security cooperation. In general, the CICIR version sounds more specific, practical, proactive, and assertive.

At the eighth ARF meeting in 2001, Qian's successor Tang Jiaxuan reiterated the three objectives for China's regional security strategy as set out by his predecessor in at the outset of the ARF. Tang regarded the ARF as "the most important venue in the Asia Pacific region for the discussion of regional security issue." Stopping short of criticizing the "Cold War mentality" and military alliances, Tang only made critical remarks on TMD: "Insistence on developing missile defense program will upset global strategic equilibrium, undermine regional peace and stability and adversely affect international arms control and non-proliferation process and will do no good to trust and cooperation between countries." Interestingly, he presented a positive view of U.S. presence in the region, stating that China "welcomes a positive, constructive role of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and is ready to work with the U.S. side to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region." Yet he stressed, "At the same time, the U.S. should also recognize and respect China's security interests." [89]

China's Position Paper on New Security Concept, presented to the 2002 ARF annual meeting, states: "The New Security Concept is, in essence, to rise above one-sided security and seek *common security* through mutually beneficial cooperation. It is a concept established on the basis of common interests and is conducive to social progress." [90] The core of NSC, according to this keynote diplomatic document, includes "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination." Under the NSC framework, *China's Position Paper* emphasizes, security cooperation should be "flexible and diversified in form and model": It could be a multilateral security mechanism of relatively strong binding force or a forum-like multilateral security dialogue. It could also be a confidence-building bilateral security dialogue or a non-governmental dialogue of an academic nature. The promotion of greater interaction of economic interests is another effective means of safeguarding security. [91]

(2) *NSC an Alternative View of Regional Security Order*

Conceptually, the NSC is an alternative, which blends liberal languages with realist concerns, to a classic realist concept of security based on military power and alliances. It is liberal because it explicitly advocates for common security; it remains realist because it is essentially state-centric in the sense of emphasizing the basic Westphalian principles such as state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Arguably, the NSC represents China's conscious effort to offer its own vision of a new security order and international security cooperation in post-Cold War world politics. It aims to compete with a predominant realist security fashion reflected in what the Chinese criticize as the "Cold War mentality" by presenting an alternative approach to international and regional security cooperation.

As opposed to the "Cold War mentality," in response to the three processes, the NSC presents a different view of security threats by emphasizing political relationship rather than power distribution as a decisive factor. [92] "Whether a country poses a threat to the world," a *People's Daily* editorial holds, "depends not on whether its national strength is powerful or not, but on what kind of

domestic and foreign policies it adopts." [93] In particular, as an alternative to the "Cold War mentality" which prefers power and strength, military alliances and unanimous political ideology and institutions, NSC differs in its emphasis on common security interest, mutual trust, and economic development as the foundations and prerequisites for international security. [94] Given the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region, China believes that "only mutual-accommodation, mutual-learning and greater cooperation can serve to achieve common progress and development of all nations." [95] "Therefore, security cooperation is not just something for countries with similar or identical views and mode of development, it also includes cooperation between countries whose views and mode of development differ." [96]

Against two broad trends in regional security politics—the consolidation of U.S. unipolar/hegemonic security order and the emergence of ARF-led multilateral security institution building—the timing of Beijing's presentation of its official view of the New Security Concept and order can be explained by several specific events: the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the possible development of TMD in East Asia, the emergence of ARF as a major multilateral security organization, the improvement of China's relations with Russia and Central Asian states, the growing convergence of worldviews between China and Russia based on their national interests, and the growing concern about the "China threat" in the region, particularly after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Beijing's primary security concern and interest has been drastically refocused on the Taiwan question since the 1990s. But to the extent that China has intended to debunk the image and theory of the "China threat," it has had to present an image of China as a responsible great power by embracing positive trends in the region which reflect the interests of majority countries. Between the U.S.-led hegemonic order and the emerging multilateral order, Beijing has found that the latter is less threatening and more accommodating to China's vital national and security interests. Moreover, its new experience in nurturing a new type of state-to-state relations with Russia has repeatedly produced positive feedbacks into Beijing's foreign and security policymaking process. All in all, at the time it adopts a more accommodationist and participatory approach to regional multilateralism, China has also become more confident in its leading role in influencing the process of regional security order building.

Indeed, in view of Ambassador Sha, "the New Security Concept should serve as the guiding principles for establishing a new security order in the Asia-Pacific region." [97] Yan Xuetong also argues that this New Security Concept should be acknowledged and endorsed by the majority of countries in the world and thus gradually develop into a mainstream concept of security cooperation as the long process of multipolarization unfolds in the post-Cold War world. [98]

(3) *Causes of Change*

Arguably, China's shifting attitude and approach to regional multilateralism was originally based on instrumental rationality. The question is: has its utilitarian embracing of regional multilateralism gradually risen to the level of teleological rationality? That is, a multilateral regional order in which China defines and restrains its international identity and role represents a structural preference rather than a strategic choice.

Since the mid-1990s, as China has more actively involved in regional multilateral security processes, the Chinese official discourse on regional security has increasingly adopted "liberal" terminologies like common security, mutual and equal security, multilateral security, and so on. China has found that regional multilateralism, rather than regional multipolarity, is more compatible with its preferred security order in the Asia Pacific region. China's preoccupation with sustained domestic stability and development has made a stable and peaceful external environment desirable and irreversible. While Beijing has been annoyed by the continued "Cold War mentality" embodied in the reinforced U.S. hegemonic security order based on its military alliance system, it has generally acted cautiously not to jeopardize regional stability by confronting the U.S. hegemonic security order outright, instead articulating its own reformist version of security order. As one analyst states: "East Asian security cooperation should not be aimed at forming an anti-America front so that there is no need to ask for the dissolving of the U.S.-Japan alliance. On the other hand, there is no need to get the U.S.-Japan alliance involved either. East Asia must have its own ways and channels for cooperation."[99]

In fact, whereas Beijing's rhetoric is indiscriminately critical of power politics and military alliances as outdated Cold War relics, its real concern and policy focus are the implications and impacts of reinforced U.S. security posture—alliance system, TMD, etc.—for and on

China's vital national interests, particularly the Taiwan issue. Instead of attempting to replace the U.S. hegemonic order, China has to put up with it and create an alternative space to withhold the pressure and live with it peacefully. In essence, China's NSC represents this reformist approach to regional security order. It surely aims to "compete with" the predominant conception of security order in international fora of free expression; it does not, however, desire a malignant confrontation between great powers.

Another context in which China has to calculate its regional security interests is the growth of China's power and influence itself. China, through its proactive foreign policy behavior, has been trying to ensure that it is "one of the rule-makers" for the global and regional environment of the 21st century. (100) Yet the concern about the "China threat" is only natural from the standpoint of international relations and world history. China must address the anxieties of countries in the region about the implications of a new rising power for their interests. To defuse the "China threat," Beijing must nurture its image as a responsible great power and behave in a considerate manner to accommodate other countries' concerns and interests. At the very least, China would want to avoid isolation and regionwide containment against it, making its surrounding areas as friendly as possible. At most, it would like to be received as a good neighbor and a benign great power, making its external environment as friendly as possible. Beijing's self-restraint in its disputes with ASEAN countries over the South China Sea is a case in point.

Among all the issues affecting China's security interests, the emerging new Taiwan issue in the form of Taiwan's search for a new international identity based on its democratization and indigenization in the 1990s has posed the biggest challenge to the PRC's security interests. Beijing's overwhelmed and desperate preoccupation with preventing the Taiwan secession movement has penetrated almost every aspect of its regional security policy. Its uncompromising insistence on the continued centrality and validity of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs reflects this profound security concern. On this issue of vital interest and importance, China has found that the emerging regional multilateralism under the ARF framework is less threatening. More importantly, Beijing has realized that only through active involvement and constructive participation can its voice be heard and its legitimate interests be supported. From its initial precautionary approach to the ARF to its taking initiatives in creating a multilateral institution (SCO), China has accomplished a historical "great leap forward" in its worldview and diplomatic statecraft.

The case of Germany is instructive in this regard. German unification occurred "not against but within Europe, indeed *for* Europe: The [European] Community channeled the unification process as unification in turn imparted new impulses to integration." (101) Since multilateral regionalism in the Asia Pacific is rather nascent and China's integration in the region is still shallow, we do not witness explicit efforts to create a linkage between Chinese reunification and regional integration. In particular, Beijing has actually always made sure that the Taiwan issue will not be "internationalized" under any circumstances. The robust persistence of the One China principle in China's foreign policy and ASEAN's embracement of this principle are self-evident of no involvement of the emerging regional community in the Chinese reunification process, at least in terms of Track I activities. However, China's changed behavior in the ARF process and its reformed attitude toward regional multilateralism suggest an implicit and subtle connection between Chinese reunification and regional integration.

Key to this implicit linkage are three factors: (1) China must accept regional/multilateral involvement in the South China Sea issue, which, though concerning territorial sovereignty, is secondary only to the Taiwan issue; it serves as a litmus test, in the eyes of ASEAN states, for China's intention and responsibility in regional affairs. (2) Despite its reluctance, Beijing has to allow for the minimum involvement of the incipient regional community in the Taiwan issue, notably, through CSCAP and other Track-II arrangements.(102) The flourishing Track-II activities involving Taiwan allow participants across the Taiwan Strait and across the region to come to the same table without confronting the sensitive cross-strait sovereignty problem. (3) As long as China is brought into the regional multilateral process and is responsive to ASEAN's concerns and position about China's behavior in the South China Sea, ASEAN states tend to consider the Taiwan issue categorically as a Chinese problem, not automatically inferring a wider regional implication from Beijing's behavior toward Taiwan. For ASEAN states, there is only the China question, of which the Taiwan question is always a part.

Conclusion

Alastair Johnston suggests that China's security behavior, as deeply rooted in its strategic culture, "has been generally consistent with hard realpolitik strategic axioms." [103] Even in the 1980s and 1990s, when China faced the most benign threat environment since 1949, "hard realpolitik decision rules continue to dominate the Chinese leadership's approach to foreign policy and security affairs."[104]

A realpolitik view tends to look at the importance of China's periphery from a power politics perspective. As some analysts argue, history has shown that all world powers have paid heed to the strategic supporting role of their surrounding areas. The United States has enhanced its position in the global geostrategic structure through successfully relying on Canada and Mexico as strategic supports and keeping Latin America as its backyard; whereas Russia's strategic position has been greatly weakened as the CIS states became centrifugal, resulting in the loss of its security buffer zone against the U.S. and NATO. [105]

In the long run, this line of reasoning suggests, multipolarization with great powers as poles will be replaced by multipolarization with regions as major components. Along with the Americas, Europe, and Russia, the Asia Pacific is the fourth part of this multipolar world. But the Asia Pacific is divided into small pieces of Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia, dispersing around China. Without the "glue" role of China, the region cannot be formed as an integrated whole. China's good-neighborly diplomacy will work toward connecting the Asia Pacific, playing a proactive role in the process of multipolarization of the new sort. [106]

A more liberal view of regional multilateralism has also emerged throughout the interactive process of China's participation in the ARF and the Shanghai Five. One interesting finding is that some key policy practitioners are more inclined than many academics to embrace liberal concepts. More recently, some policy analysts advocate that China adopts a regional strategy of "new regionalism." That is, China should pursue a stable and long-term Asia policy aiming at building an East Asian community. This can be done by seeking to integrate various forces of regionalization and regionalism, and by exploring a new model of coexistence and co-prosperity in economic, political, security, social and ecological realms. In so doing, China will profoundly restructure its relations with Asia, promote peaceful change of international relations in the region, and achieve the rise of both China and Asia in global affairs. [107]

The findings of this study indicate that as China has substantially modified its worldview and foreign policy behavior, particularly since the mid-1990s, its behavior in the post-Cold War era can no longer be readily labeled as "hard realpolitik." Arguably, the new security concept bears the imprint of liberalism as much as realism, to the extent that it values state sovereignty but also stresses common security. Although Beijing's unambiguous embracing of security multilateralism has been epistemologically linked with its normative commitment to multipolarization as opposed to unipolarism and unilateralism, it cannot simply be dismissed as tactical maneuvering or external power balancing. The solid progress that China has jointly made with ASEAN countries across a number of issue areas, particularly over the South China Sea dispute and the China-ASEAN FTA, have indisputably substantiated Beijing's normative shift to regional multilateralism.

On the other hand, Beijing's criticism of the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance more specifically reflected its real concerns about the alliance's implications for Taiwan, formally or informally incorporating Taiwan into a regionalized alliance system centered on the U.S. hegemony. No evidence suffices to support overarching power balancing behavior in Beijing's approach to the alliance. On the contrary, ample evidence shows that Beijing's course of action was driven more by the Taiwan factor than by anything else. Its interest in the health of the U.S. economy and its attempt to forge a China-U.S. strategic partnership, among others, also made the power balancing thesis hollower and less relevant.

On balance, it may be well argued that China's attention to the state of the global and regional power balance remains intensive and that its perception of the threat of the robust U.S.-led alliance system remains potent; it may also be said that the emergence of regional multilateralism has indeed facilitated a comfortable social atmosphere to engage China, even in a transformative fashion. But China's embracing of regional multilateralism and its promotion of the new security concept can neither be simply dismissed as the insignificant byproducts of the realpolitik calculations, nor exclusively attributed to the forces of outside socialization. To say the very least, these trends have emerged in the regional institutionalist context as a way of mutual engagement and even mutual constitution between China and its periph-

ery. They constitute a new motivating spirit and force to influence Chinese foreign policy behavior, sometimes in parallel and sometimes in competition with the real-politik logic.

Notes

1. Caporaso 1993, p.54.
2. Ruggie 1993.
3. According to James Caporaso's succinct summary, "Indivisibility can be thought of as the scope (both geographic and functional) over which costs and benefits are spread, given an action initiated in or among component units. …Generalized principles of conduct usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not universal modes of relating to other states, rather than differentiating relations case-by-case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a priori particularistic grounds. Diffuse reciprocity adjusts the utilitarian lenses for the long view, emphasizing that actors expect to benefit in the long run and over many issues, rather than every time on every issue." See Caporaso 1993, pp.53-54.
4. Ibid., p.54.
5. Ibid., p.55.
6. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China Aiming for 'Peaceful Rise'," CNN, February 3, 2004. *Taiwan Security Research*, http://taiwansecurity.org/CNN/2004/CNN-030204.htm, accessed on February 7, 2004.
7. Brzezinski 1991, p.1; Pyle 1992, p.139.
8. Evans 1993; Mahbubani 1993; Alagappa 1998; Oksenberg and Morrison 2001.
9. Gilpin 1981, pp.41-42. How to assess the impacts of the 9-11 event on world politics is debatable throughout the world. For one school of thought, see, for example, Ikenbury 2001, Nye 2002. I personally believe that the 9-11 event in many ways has brought nation-states together to cope with threats posed primarily from non-state actors. In the Gilpinian sense, therefore, while the *systemic* change continues, the emergent *systems* change tends to unite state actors or at least alleviate some formidable interstate problems.
10. Track I refers to government-to-government multilateral activities, while Track II involves semigovernmental think tanks and Track III private institutions. See Katzenstein and Okawara 2001, p.161. In the case of China, however, there have been no private institutions involved (although some private institutions in security affairs did come to exist in recent years).
11. By the early 1990s there were about 40 ongoing channels for regional discussions on political and security matters, but by the late 1990s there were about two meetings per week, an increasingly large percentage occurring at a formal governmental level. See Johnston and Evans 1999, p.256.
12. Acharya 1997a, p.7
13. Alagappa 1998, p.635.
14. Haas 1997, p.329.
15. Soesastro and Morrison 2001, p.58.
16. Ibid., p.61.
17. Acharya 1997a, pp.10-11.
18. Quoted in Acharya 1997a, p.12.
19. Acharya 1997a, p.11.
20. Alagappa 1998, pp.8-9.
21. Ibid., p.611.
22. Acharya 1997a, p.8.
23. Leifer 1996.
24. Katzenstein and Okawara 2001, pp.172-173.
25. Acharya 1997a, pp.9-10.
26. Khong 1997, p.296.
27. Katzenstein and Okawara 2001, p.173.
28. Various remarks quoted in Acharya 1997a, p.13.
29. Acharya 1997a, p.16.
30. Ibid., p.15.
31. Morrison 2001, p.6
32. Johnston and Evans 1999, p.257.
33. Ibid.
34. Sokolsky, Rabasa, and Neu 2000, p.30.
35. Fitzgerald 1972.
36. Sokolsky, Rabasa, and Neu 2000, p.19.
37. Interview 3-98, Beijing, March 25, 1998.
38. Singapore's Proposal. *International Herald Tribute*, April 11, 1993, p.1, p. 7.
39. Quoted in Acharya 1999, p.131.
40. Lee 1993, p.1097.
41. da Cunha 1998, p.121.
42. Interview 3-98, Beijing, March 25, 1998.
43. Acharya 1997a, p.13.
44. Sutter 2002, p.23.
45. Almonte 1997.
46. da Cunha 1998, 121.

47. Wanandi 1996; Johnston and Evans 1999, p.257.
48. Acharya 1997b.
49. Interview 3-98, Beijing, March 25, 1998.
50. Acharya 1997a, p.8.
51. Takagi 1998, p.28.
52. *Renmin Robao*, July 24, 1994.
53. da Cunha 1998, p.123.
54. "Spratly, Taiwan Not the Same, Says Chinese Minister," *Reuter*, March 18, 1996.
55. da Cunha 1998, p.123.
56. Yue 2002, p.59.
57. Interview 22-99, Beijing, April 2, 1999.
58. Yu 1999.
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External Decision-making in Hu Jintao's Administration—Emerging Leadership amidst Incomplete Succession

By LAI Hongyi, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

The Sixteenth Congress of the CCP in late 2002 elected a new Central Committee, a new Politburo and its Standing Committee. In the following months, new leaders assumed top positions in internal organs that control external policies. This paper examines the new leadership lineup, membership of these organs, and relevant institutional players in the making of the external policy making since the 16th Party Congress.(1) It also examines the role of public opinions and overseas Chinese commentators, as well as new leaders' thinking over the Japan policy.(2)

China's external policy making after the Party Congress is characterized by two aspects, that is, a gradually diffused process amidst leadership transition. Even though the Chinese Communist Party constitutes the core of the state power, policy making has become more diffused. A variety of actors also play a role. They include the Politburo and its Standing Committee, leading small groups, the Central Military Commission, think tanks, and to some extent, ministries, overseas commentators, and public opinion ("public" opinion to be accurate, as discussed later). Meanwhile, after the Party Congress, Hu Jintao assumes leadership within vital internal policy-making bodies. Yet Jiang Zemin retains his post as the highest military leader, and he has placed a large number of associates at the Politburo and the Party's leading positions. It will thus take years for Hu to finally establish himself as the core of the new leadership.(3)

1. Institutions

(1) *Decision-making Body*

A. Politburo Standing Committee

Thus the Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of power, meets weekly to take care of policy matters.(4) The membership of the new Standing Committee has expanded from seven to nine (Table 1). The Politburo Standing Committee acts as a regular body to decide on foreign policies.(5) The Politburo and its Standing Committee make decision based on the proposals from the leading small groups and the CMC.

B. Leading Small Groups

As members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee are very busy with their own duties, the national center (Central Committee) of CCP has set up four leading small groups (LSGs) to handle external affairs. They are the CCP Central Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economy, Taiwan Work, and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs LSGs (Table 2). As specified by the Party Central Committee in late 1987, the LSGs belonged to decision-making consulting bodies (*juece zixun jigou*).(6)

Only a complete and official report on the Taiwan Work LSG has been publicized. Hu has chaired the Taiwan Work LSG, a policy issue that Jiang has paid considerable attention in his tenure as the Party Secretary. This confirms other unofficial reports that Jiang has turned over leadership of the other LSGs to Hu. Thus my analysis will be based on unofficial reports on the lineup of these LSGs.

The Foreign Affairs LSG (FALSG)The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group is long standing. This LSG makes recommendations regarding foreign policy to the Politburo for rectification. In addition, the LSG provides a forum for central leaders in charge of foreign affairs to meet with top bureaucrats of party, government, military, and foreign affairs, and even department-level officials, academic experts, and journalists. Hu Jintao apparently heads the LSG, and Vice State President Zeng Qinghong reportedly serves as a deputy head. Its members reportedly include State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan who overseas foreign affairs, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and Director of Central Party International Liaison Department (ILD) Wang Jiarui.(7) Its membership should also include Minister of State Security Xu Yongyue and Deputy Chairman of Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong.(8) The LSG reflects institutional interests represented by these members.

Table 1: Members of the Politburo Standing Committee after the 16th Party Congress

Name	**Posts**	**Duties/power**
Hu Jintao	State President, Party General Secretary, Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission	Party, diplomacy, military, and major economic policies
Wu Bangguo	Chairman of National People's Congress	Legislature
Wen Jiabao	Premier of the State Council	Administration; economic policy
Jia Qinglin	Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	Satellite parties; religious communities, ethnic minorities, intellectuals, artists, and overseas Chinese
Zeng Qinghong	Vice State President, Chairman of CMC, President of the Party School	Party building and organization, Party School, and Hong Kong and Macao affairs.
Huang Ju	Executive Vice Premier	Finance, manufacturing, transport, and SOEs
Wu Guanzheng	Director of Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection	Party discipline and anti-corruption
Li Changchun	Head of propaganda and ideology	Propaganda and ideology
Luo Gan	Vice Premier	Law enforcement and security

Sources: *China Directory 2003;* Qiu Ping, *Disidai Quanzheng Neimu (Inside Story of the Power Struggle of the Fourth Generation).* Hong Kong: Xiafeier Chuban Youxian Gongsi, 2003.

Table 2. Members of CCP Central LSGs and CMC

	Foreign Affairs	Finance and Economy	Taiwan Work	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs	Central Military Commission (CMC)
Head	Hu Jintao	Hu Jintao	Hu Jintao	Zeng Qinghong	Jiang Zemin
Deputy head	Zeng Qinghong	Wen Jiabao	Jia Qinglin	Tang Jiaxuan	Hu Jintao Guo Boxiong Cao Gangchuan
Members	Tang Jiaxuan Li Zhaoxing Wang Jiarui Guo Boxiong Xu Yongyao Xiong Guangkai	Huang Ju Wu Yi Zeng Peiyuan Hua Jianmin	Tang Jiaxuan Wang Gang Liu Yandong Wang Daohan Chen Yunlin Xu Yongyue Xiong Guangkai	Liu Yandong	Xu Caihou Liang Guanglie Liao Xilong Li Jinai

Notes: Bolds suggest official lineups. Regular fonts suggest lineups reported by media outside mainland China.

Sources: *China Directory* 2003; information posted at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/subsite/yj16d/16-mindian.htm; Xia Nanfang, "Five New Changes in the High-level Power Structure in China," *Fenghuang Zhoukan (Phoenixweekly),* No. 112, p. 20; "Mainland's New Team for Taiwan Policy Is Revealed," *Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning Post),* December 26, 2003; information supplied by David Shambaugh.

Tang Jiaxuan now takes over Qian Qichen's role as a supervisor of China's external policy. He served as a Foreign Minister between 1997 and early 2003. He was born and educated in Shanghai. He was a second and then first secretary in Japan between 1978 and 1983, and an envoy and eventually an ambassador to Japan between 1988 and 1991. Being able to speak good English as well as fluent Japanese, he is the most knowledgeable member in the new team on Japan. Similar to Jiang, however, Tang had bitter experience during the Japanese occupation of China.

The Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council (SCFAO)(*guowuyuan waishi bangongshi*) is responsible for research, policy suggestions, and executive meetings of the LSG. It also supervises the execution of decisions, drafts and examines certain national regulations, handles reports to the LSG, and coordinates foreign affairs work. Headed by Liu Huaqiu, it has two Deputy Directors and six departmental-level (*si ju ji*) chiefs. The SCFAO has about twenty staff members, mostly former officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

The Finance and Economy LSG (FELSG) One increasingly important dimension of China's external relations is trade and economy. These issues fall under

the jurisdiction of the Central FELSG. Hu Jintao has reportedly taken over the leadership of the LSG from Jiang. Wen Jiabao serves as the deputy director, and Zeng Peiyuan has served as Deputy Secretaries General since 1992. Reportedly, the members of the FELSG include Vice Premiers Huang Ju, Wu Yi, and Zeng Peiyuan, as well as Hua Jianmin, the Secretary General of the State Council.[9] Hua probably continues to head a general office that provides staff support for this LSG. Below the LSG are two bureaus, namely, Financial and Economic Bureau and Rural Bureau.[10]

The Taiwan Work LSG (TWLSG) Since Taiwan factors heavily in China's external relations, especially given Taiwan's recent pushes toward referendum, this LSG is worth closer examination. According to the published official lineup, Hu Jintao is the new director, and Jia Qinglin, the Chairman of China's Political Consultative Conference, serves as the deputy director. The other members of the TWLSG are State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, Director of the Office for the Central Party Committee Wang Gang, Director of the United Front Work Department of the Central Party Madam Liu Yandong, PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai, the President of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait Wang Daohan, CCP Taiwan Work Office Director Chen Yunlin, and Minister of State Security Xu Yongyue.[11] Again, these members will represent the views and interests of their own institutions.

The CCP Central Taiwan Work Office, also known as the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (SCTAO), serves as a general office of the TWLSG, just as the SCFAO does to the FALSG. It gathers opinions from various agencies and institutions and supervises the implementation of Taiwan policy at lower levels.[12]

In addition, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Leading Small Group (HKMALSG) is worth mentioning due to dramatic development in the former British colony after the protest by half a million people on July 1, 2003. The leadership over Hong Kong and Macao affairs originally fell under the FALSG. After the July-1st demonstration in Hong Kong, the Party worried that the one-country-two-system program would fail and that unification of Taiwan with mainland would thus be obstructed. It thus reportedly established a LSG to oversee Hong Kong and Macao affairs. Vice President Zeng Qinghong reportedly heads the HKMALSG, assisted by Tang Jiaxuan.[13]

All the above LSGs are supposed to make policies based on the proposals from the office, submit major decisions to the Politburo for approval, and ask their own office and affiliated agencies to implement regular policies.

Central Military Commission (CMC)When an external event involves the military, the CMC will also meet to make its decision. The CMC follows personal responsibility and entrusts its chairman tremendous power.[14] Jiang Zemin chairs the current CMC. Deputy Chairmen are Hu Jintao, Guo Boxiong, and Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan. Committee members include Director of General Political Department (GPD) Xu Caihou, Director of General Staff Department Liang Guanglie, Director of General Logistical Department Liao Xilong, and Director of General Armament Department Li Jinai.[15] CMC has a General Office that assists with information collection, processing, and coordinates its work.[16] Around the beginning of 2004, Jia Ting'an, Jiang's former chief secretary, became the director of the office.[17]

C. Jiang's and Hu's Influences

At present, Hu appears to command three out of the above five important groups related to external policies— Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Work, and Finance and Economy. Jiang now only takes charge of the CMC, the most powerful group of all.

Hu, however, confronts Jiang's sizable followings or association at the national level— reportedly that over half of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Jia Qinglin, Huang Ju, Zeng Qinghong, and to a lesser extent, Li Changchun and Wu Bangguo, who owe their jobs more to Jiang than to Hu.[18] It was reported that Hu had pledged to consult Jiang on behalf of the new leadership over critical issues after the Sixteenth Party Congress. Hu did so in order to retain his control over which issues he should consult Jiang and in becoming the primary go-between person.[19]

Over external policies, Hu has long working ties with the following people dating back to the Central Youth League in the 1980s—the Director of the United Front Department Liu Yandong, Hu's associate at the League; Deputy Director of the ILD Cai Wu, Hu's former associates at the League. Hu's circle may also include Ling Jihua, the Deputy Director of the General Office for the Central Party Committee and Hu's long-time secretary; Liao Xilong, Hu's associate during his tenure in Tibet. Hu's daughter, who has studied in the U.S., may also

become a source of information about the U.S.[20]

(2) *Ministries as Policy Implementers*

Central bureaucracy, which is discussed briefly here, and local departments are policy implementers of China's external policy. They have certain inputs in the policymaking.

The *CCP Central Secretariat and the General Office* (GOCCCCP) The Secretariat serves as the Central Party's executive body. It has seven members, namely, Zeng Qinghong, Liu Yunshan (propoganda), Zhou Yongkang (public security), He Guoqiang (Party Personnel), Wang Gang (GOCCCCP), Xu Caihou (GPD), and He Yong (Party discipline). All except Zeng are new members.[21] The CCP General Office may be directly involved in the details of daily matters.

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs*The MFA remains the most important implementer of foreign policy, and makes policies mainly toward minor states and within the central guidelines of regional policy. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs is Li Zhaoxing, a member of the FALSG. A staunch speaker for China when serving as an ambassador to the U.S., he has apparently become more skillful in managing public relations.

*Ministry of Commerce*This ministry, now headed by Bo Xilai, has over a dozen of departments in charge of formulating, studying and implementing China's policies, strategies, reports, planning, and negotiations regarding foreign trade, external cooperation and foreign aid.[22]

International Liaison Department (ILD)The ILD manages the CCP's relations with political parties around the world. Its Director is Wang Jiarui, a former mayor of Qingdao. He is a member of the FALSG.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA)The military has two out of the 21 Politburo members (or the 18 resident members). The PLA has two seats at the Foreign Affairs LSG and one seat at the Taiwan Work LSG. In addition, Jiang's CMC chairmanship helps the PLA to convey their preferences. The PLA's moderate role in foreign policy is based on its institutional interests, such as budget, intelligence, arms purchase and exports, Taiwan, and threats from China's periphery.[23]

Ministry of State Security (MSS) Minister of State Security (Xue Yongyue) is a member of the Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Work LSGs. The ministry's main tasks are to counter espionage, gather intelligence, and conduct analysis in order to safeguard the state from enemy spies and dissidents.[24]

*Xinhua News Agency*It plays two roles: publicizing and clarifying China's foreign policy inside and outside China, and providing valuable information for leaders. In this sense, it informs central leaders about implementation of China's foreign policy.

(3) *Think Tanks*

Now think tanks have significant inputs on policy making. This is particularly true for those that have close institutional links with the state, personal connections with leaders, and have academically, if not publicly reputed scholars. Key research institutes include the two sets. The first set is policy-oriented think tanks and agencies. The SCFAO, likely other LSGs, and the MFA have their own policy research units.[25] In addition, the following other centers are noticeable. 1) The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) under the MFA;[26] 2) the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) under the MSS; and 3) to some extent the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). All of them have dozens to a hundred of researchers to investigate international topics in all fields.[27]

On the military side, think tanks include the following: 1) The China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS) under the Second (Intelligence) Directorate of the GSD. 2) Center for Peace and Development Studies under the Liaison Directorate of the General Politics Department. 3) Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS), loosely associated with the GSD Second Directorate and serving as an exchange platform between the PLA and foreigners. 4) The Strategic Research Institute and the International Relations Teaching and Research Office at National Defense University. 5) Strategic Research Department at Academy of Military Sciences.[28]

The second set is academic. These institutes include Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (The two institutes related to Japan are the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies and the Institute of Japanese Studies), as well as the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. While the former conduct prominent research on policy and academic issues, the latter is noted mainly for academic issues.[29] Wang Jisi, the Director of the Institute of the American Studies at the CASS and the Director of the Institute for International Studies of the Central Party School, is one of the best and most influential scholars in China-U.S. ties and China's external policies.

2. Overseas Chinese Commentators

A long ignored player is that overseas commentators. My own recent experience enriches my understanding on overseas Chinese commentators. These commentators' unique backgrounds give them an edge over analysts in China and those in the West. First, raised in the Chinese society and educated and living in the West, they are familiar with the Chinese and Western cultures and politics. Second, living and staying outside China allows them to take a neutral and free position in criticizing China's policies. Third, when a commentator (not necessarily a prolific one) from overseas credible outlets especially in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan is well informed and can suggest well-grounded and effective ideas, Chinese leaders may take them up.

Two cases illustrate. After the fruitless end of the three-party talk in Beijing over the Korean crisis, a commentary was published on a Chinese newspaper in Singapore on May 6, 2003. It suggested that China's low-key diplomacy and a failed resolution of the crisis would result in military encirclement of China. China's open intervention, should it succeed or fail, would earn itself a favorable impression in the West. It suggests that China should openly intervene, send senior envoys and apply pressure on North Korea.(30) On the next day, the commentary was posted on the official internet forums for China's MFA and for *the People's Daily*. On July 12, Hu Jintao sent Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo to Pyongyang, persuading Kim Jung Il into joining a six-party talk in Beijing. Hu did so reportedly for the reasons suggested in the commentary.(31)

In the last quarter of 2003, the Taiwan top leader Chen Shui-bien was pushing for the referendum law, prompting Beijing's angry and open reaction. On November 20, a commentary on Singapore's Chinese newspaper suggested that Chen wanted to use referendum to draw Beijing's angry reaction, thereby attracting votes from assertive Taiwanese. It suggested that Beijing should express its opposition skillfully, and should ask Washington to restrain Chen.(32) The commentary was soon posted at websites associated with the Chinese military and sponsored by the State Council's Taiwan Office.(33) On his visit to the U.S., Premier Wen expressed his strong wish for peace and successfully persuaded Bush into criticizing Chen.

3. Public Opinion

The demise of dominant leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping also lends public opinion a rising role in external policy making. Highly-educated Chinese are more interested in politics and tend to think more independently. In addition, they are more likely to have access to internet and other non-official sources of information. With certain restrictions the above influential groups can voice their opinions through various channels, such as on TV interviews, newspapers and magazines, through phone calls to governmental offices, internet postings, and even posters in the public, jokes, ditties, catchy phrases, or rumors satirizing policy makers.

These Chinese include academics and students at universities, staff at research institutes, engineers, managers of state-owned enterprises, cadres, officials, journalists, clerks at presses, etc. These groups can be regarded as key public opinion groups. Workers and blue-collar employees in cities may be moderately interested in external policy, and peasants are less likely to be interested in external issues.

In recent years internet has mushroomed in China, becoming a main avenue for public discussion. Some of the postings have caused the state to take into account public sentiments in handling events of external implications. Two recent cases illustrate this point. In 2003, upset by a controversial performance by Japanese students at a university in Xi'an, thousands of college students took to the street to protest. Chatrooms in China were immediately filled with coverage of the protest and emotional commentaries. Under the pressure from internet messages, the Chinese authority dismissed the Japanese students involved in the act from their Chinese host university.

In the second case, nearly 300 Japanese ordered illegal commercial sex services from Chinese women at an upscale hotel in Zhuhai, Guangdong of China. Japanese tourists displaced a sign to celebrate the founding of their corporation at the hall of the hotel. Some of them Japanese even declared that they came just to sleep with the Chinese women. They and some 200 Chinese prostitutes flooded the hallways and disturbed the residents the whole night. This event coincided with the anniversary of September 18, when Japan invaded China's Manchuria in 1931. Many local Chinese resented this festive atmosphere of illegal sex service.(34) Internet chatrooms were filled with angry messages. Under public pressure, the Chinese government prosecuted the Chinese organizers of the event, and demanded the Japanese government

hand over the Japanese organizers. At both events official media only referred to them briefly and belatedly. The Party's Propaganda Department reportedly clamped down on rampant reports on the second event.

Only a few surveys are available on the Chinese views on Japan. In 2002, on the 30th anniversary of normalization of Sino-Japan ties, a Chinese newspaper survey found that only 5.9% of the respondents had a warm feeling about Japan, 47.6% a neutral feeling, and 43.3% negative impression.(35) Over the event of the dozens of Chinese injured by leaked poison gas left by Japan during WWII in August 2003, 97% of Chinese youth surveyed expressed their concerns, 83% said that their impression of Japan had deteriorated, and 82% found Japan's 100 million Japanese yuan in the name of a sympathy fund (instead of compensation) unacceptable.(36)

The poll results reveal astonishing enmity against Japan. In recent one or two years, knowledgeable Chinese are aware that Japan remains a developed and democratic nation despite its recession. They are also aware of the tensions in Sino-Japan relations over the history, Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, and re-arming of Japan.(37)

4. Missed Opportunities for Reconciliation?

The new leadership, especially Hu, leans toward a new thinking over China-Japan relations. It realized that China should try to prevent the controversy of Japan's war crimes in the WWII from obstructing bilateral relations. Chinese leaders appreciate Japan's aid for China's SARS campaigns and Japan's support for the one-China policy.(38)

The new leadership, however, finds itself in a quagmire. Japanese leaders continue to visit the Shrine. The Liberal Democratic Party even includes the Shrine visit into its campaign policies. Under these circumstances concessions to Japan over the matter of history would be unacceptable for officials in China as well as the public. They would view such concessions as showing the other cheek while one has been slapped. Chinese leaders are also concerned that hawks have gained increasing influence in the LDP in 2003. Seeing that his new thinking had been elapsed by controversial moves by Japanese counterparts, President Hu, in meeting former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, urged Japanese leaders not to do anything that could harm Sino-Japan relations.(39) Yet it is not clear whether the message has been heard. Perhaps when future historians reflect on this part of history, they may find that a great opportunity for China and Japan to reach a settlement on history has been missed and that since then leaders of both countries would take increasingly tough stances over the issue.

Conclusion

Briefly stated, China's foreign policy making process operates in the following way. First, four LSGs (Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economy, Taiwan Work, and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs) and the CMC will deliberate on external policy under their jurisdiction. The LSGs and the CMC may submit policy proposals and issues on critical policies to the Politburo or its Standing Committee for discussion and approval.

Second, a few top leaders will play a prominent role in external policies. Hu Jintao takes charge of major decisions and representing China on the world stage; Premier Wen Jiabao, entrusted by Hu and leading the administrative apparatus, is actively involved in external affairs. Vice State President Zeng Qinghong takes charge of the Hong Kong policy, and Tang Jiaxuan supervises daily external affairs. Within two to four years, Jiang may exercise his influence over major issues in China's external policy.

Third, the MFA, MOFTEC, ILD, MSS, PLA, Xinhua News Agency, and local external affairs agencies and responsible officials implement the policy. The Secretariat, the SCFAO and MFA oversee the implementation. The MFA controls the policy toward non-vital and non-sensitive countries. Leaders obtain information from various sources, ponder over overseas commentaries, and weigh public opinion.

Fourth, China's policy making towards Japan is likely to become even more complex and more difficult to manage with an increasing role of internet and hand phone messages. The vocal Chinese public demands the government to stand firm toward Japan in the history, territorial, and social disputes. Several confrontations between the Chinese public and individual Japanese last year served to damage Chinese good impression of the Japanese people. Given periodic controversial moves by Japan's leaders, government, and individuals, Chinese new leaders' hope to avoid confrontation over history may vanish over time, and progress in China-Japan relations would be compromised by periodic setbacks or public outbursts.

Notes

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5. Lu, "The Central Leadership," p. 42.
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7. "Several Items of Jiang Zemin's Power Are Handed Over and Hu Jintao Takes Command of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economy and Taiwan Small Groups," *Sing Pao Daily,* May 30, 2003.
8. I thank David Shambaugh for the information.
9. "Several Items of Jiang Zemin's Power Are Handed Over and Hu Jintao Takes Command of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economy and Taiwan Small Groups," *Sing Pao Daily,* May 30, 2003.
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11. See *Jingbao*, December 2000, p. 81; Lu, ibid, p. 48; *China Directory* 2002, pp. 26-27; p. 230; Swaine 2001, p. 299. This list comes from *Jingbao* and differs from those on *China Directory 2002* and suggested by Lu. *China Directory* did not include Wang Zhaoguo as a member of the Taiwan Work LSG, but Lu did. See Lu, ibid.
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15. Information posted at http://www.chinanews.com.cn, http://www.huaxia.com, and http://www.pladaily.com.cn, accessed on January 19, 2003.
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Policy toward the United States

By Seiichiro TAKAGI, Aoyama Gakuin University

1. The basic dynamics of the China-U.S. relations after the cold war

The post Cold War relationship between the U.S. and China has been characterized by constant fluctuation. However, serious confrontation and close cooperation are both short lived and the relationship tends to fluctuate within a rather narrow range. This is because none of the factors of both cooperation and conflict can be consistently dominant and their relative balance can be affected by domestic politics of both countries as well as unexpected events.

For the United States, cooperation with China is necessary for its pursuit of both security and economic interests. For global security issues, the U.S. can not neglect the facts that China is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a nuclear weapon state. For its pursuit of stability in Asia, China's cooperation is indispensable. China is a critical third party to the Korean peninsula problem and the party to the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea problems. China's significance as an enormous market for the U.S. export finally became real in 1992 when Deng Xiaoping's southern tour touched off a double-digit economic growth. China was designated as one of the "Big Emerging Markets"(BEM) by the Clinton administration, which was inaugurated in 1993 with the mandate of reviving the U.S. economy. China's rapid economic growth also made it an increasingly preferred destination of the U.S. investment and a major supplier of low price consumer products to the U.S. market.

For China, cooperation, or at least avoidance of serious confrontation, with the United States is critically important for several reasons. First of all, as the United States became the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War, serous confrontation with it can not be in China's national interest. For its economic growth, which came to assume dominant significance for the legitimacy of the current regime, the United States is indispensable as the market for its products and the supplier of capital, technology and opportunity for training its personnel in management and research. With its penchant for triangular approach in diplomatic strategy, amicable relationship with the U.S. tends to be considered as an asset with which to apply pressure in case of frictions with Japan. China also accepts, with increasing openness, the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific as a critical factor for regional stability, which it requires for its pursuit of economic development.

The factors affecting the bilateral relationship are not limited to the above. There are factors of conflict and concern on both sides. For the United States, China's behavior is inimical, or at least problematic, from the point of view of all three pillars of its national strategy. For the security goals, China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rapid increase of military expenditure with continued lack of transparency, and growing anti-American tendency are all matter of serious concern. For economic prosperity, enormous trade deficit has become a constant source of concern. Social and administrative practices hampering access to Chinese market, which has been significantly reduced since its accession to WTO late last year, rampant violation of intellectual property and brand rights, and overall weakness in rule of law often leads to angry protests and sanctions by the U.S. For human rights and democracy, China's problematic behavior ranges form persecution of the political dissidents and followers of religious movements, which the Chinese government brand detrimental to national interest and public welfare, to too eager pursuit of one-child policy, which involves forced abortion. Although it rarely leads to actual conflict, China's slow progress in political reform, or perpetuated Communist Party rule, with continued suppression of freedom of opinion and association, is antithetical to the values Americans hold dear.

As we examine the impact of these factors on the U.S. China policy, however, we should not ignore the fact that China's problematic behavior do not always lead to frictions. They can sometimes lead to cooperation, though on limited scale, to the extent Americans take corrective, rather than punitive, approach to them. The concern with proliferation of WMD led to U.S. cooperation for improvement of China's export control system. Concern with the weakness of rule of law, which pertains not only business relations but also human rights protection, led to the U.S. assistance to the Chinese legal education.

For China, the U.S. unipolar tendency, which, they consider, reinforces its "hegemonism" and "power politics," is fundamentally antithetical to their preferred world order based on multipolarity. One aspect of this objectionable tendency is the U.S. attempt of "peaceful evolution," which aims at transforming Chinese Communist Party rule into democracy. The U.S. missile defense program is considered as a pursuit of "absolute security" with the effect of solidifying unipolarity. The U.S. is also perceived as pursuing the policy of "containment" of China with the aim of blocking China's emergence as a great power. The protectionist tendency, which sometime surfaces in the U.S., often targets China. For China's effort for re-unification of Taiwan the U.S. is seen as the single most serious stumbling bloc with its arms sale to and toleration of independence orientations in Taiwan.

These problems also do not always lead to China's conflictual behavior. As an obviously weaker power, the extent to which their reactions to the U.S. "hegemonism" go beyond verbal accusations depends on their success in forming a dependable countervailing coalition, which rarely happens. The resistance to the "peaceful evolution" is increasingly powerless in light of ever-expanding pursuit of the open-door policy. Some advocates of political reform even secretly welcome it. Even the Taiwan question has an aspect which counsels prudence to the Chinese. If the bilateral conflict becomes serious enough, reinforcing the "China threat" arguments in the U.S., it is possible for the U.S. side to re-recognize strategic significance of Taiwan, which would make reunification all but impossible.

Actual manifestation of these factors is often affected by domestic political dynamics of each country. In the United States, conciliatory policies of the administration are often susceptible to the accusation of "kowtowing" to China, especially when the Congress is dominated by the opposition. Powerful interest groups are involved in human rights and economic issues in the bilateral relations and their activity level and mutual balance often moves the China policy either toward more cooperative or conflictual position. The government agencies often get involved in serious bureaucratic politics over a particular China policy with implications for two or three pillars of the national strategy simultaneously. The media and public opinion often pushes the policy in the direction critical to China. Although the foreign policy usually does not feature as the critical issue in the presidential election of peacetime, the incumbent's China policy is one of the preferred objects of attack by the opposition candidate.

Although not much can be known to the outsiders, the policy toward the U.S. also seems to be significantly affected by domestic politics in China. At the fundamental level, the post-Tiananmen re-establishment of the pursuit of high economic growth in 1992, which meant Deng Xiaoping's political victory over the conservatives, was a critical factor for Jiang Zemin's non-confrontational 16-character policy toward the U.S. On more specific policy issues, it is also politically dangerous for Chinese negotiators to be considered too conciliatory to the U.S. With gradually expanding political freedom, the public opinion is increasingly an influential factor in the foreign policy-making. Although Chinese leaders are careful in handling nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese public because the full play of its anti-foreign nature could disrupt the critical foreign relations, they cannot afford to ignore it completely because it can be directed against them. This was clearly the case when the U.S. mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. In addition to the policy-making phase, Chinese domestic situation sometimes complicate their implementation of commitments to the Unites States, as in the case of their failure to control the violations of intellectual property rights, which is due, to some extent, to declining power of the center over the localities.

Overarching these factors and dynamics is the mutual groping for a workable relationship between the sole super-power and the biggest nation that has been growing at an enormous speed. At even more fundamental level the working out of the bilateral relationship constitutes a critical aspect of formation of the emerging new world order.

2. The Evolution of China's policy toward the United States under the G.W. Bush administration

(1) *Initial Phase*

When the Bush administration was inaugurated in January 2001, the U.S.-China relations were commonly predicted to deteriorate because of the new administrations tougher approach to China. Candidate Bush and his advisors had criticized Clinton's pursuit of "strategic partnership" with China and the "strategic ambiguity" regarding the Taiwan question. They characterized China as a "strategic competitor" and advocated a clearer

commitment to Taiwan's security. This prediction was expected to become real first in the decision on the arms sale to Taiwan in April.

China tried to deal with the situation with flexibility and restraint. In January Vice-Premier Qian Qichen criticized the notion of inevitable U.S.-China confrontation and hinted at flexibility in their approach to the Taiwan question by suggesting that the loose confederation could be considered and that Taiwan might not be considered a part of the People's Republic of China. Qian visited Washington in March to convey these thoughts and ask for restraint on the Taiwan arms sale. When the bilateral relations faced another difficult problem of the EP-3 incident before the arms sale decision was reached China's accommodating approach was even clearer. Although China's positive response was not quick enough to prevent the U.S. hostility, it accepted the U.S. ambassador's ambiguous expression of regret as the apology, which they had demanded, to release the crew.

The Bush administration decision on the Taiwan arms sale announced in late April reflected only a minimum response to the Chinese effort. It provided for the largest amount of sale since 1992 when father Bush approved the sale of 150 F16 fighters. The package included destroyers, submarines and antisubmarine planes, all of which would significantly improve Taiwanese maritime defense capability. The avoidance of the sale of the Aegis destroyer could be seen as a reflection of response to the Chinese flexibility but it also meant retention of the card to induce further compromise from China. The next day, President Bush further raised Chinese concern with the comment that he would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself." Although it was quickly followed by his expression of support for the "one China" principle, Chinese apprehension could not cease. Later that month the U.S. government issued a multiple-entry visa to Lee Tung-hui and allowed President Chen Shui-bian to spend a few days in the U.S. on his way to Central America.

Although these U.S. actions were clearly unacceptable to the Chinese, what they represented was not Bush administration's hostility toward China but their unwillingness to give sufficient consideration to the Chinese concerns. This point was demonstrated most clearly by its missile defense policy. In his first major speech on the missile defense program on May 1, he acknowledged the need to consult with allies and countries concerned with the program. And he repeatedly referred to the consultation with Russia but mentioned China only once. Since Russia is the party to the ABM Treaty frequent mention of it is quite natural but, considering that the missile defense system pursued by the U.S. could neutralize Chinese, not Russian, deterrent capability against the U.S., the low level of attention to China means nothing but lack of interest in taking Chinese concerns seriously. When the Under Secretary of State was sent to Asia to explain the program in May, he first came to Japan and then went to India, not China. To China the U.S. government sent a high official two ranks below, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The calm in the bilateral relations in the first three quarters of 2001 was achieved mainly by the Chinese flexibility and restraint. But this does not mean that there was nothing positive on the American side. True to the Republican tradition the Bush administration did not ignore its economic interest in China. It followed the practice of the previous administrations by renewing the "normal trade relations" with (or most-favored nation treatment of) China on June 1 and supported China's accession to World Trade Organization. It also avoided unnecessarily antagonizing China in other ways. It did not oppose Beijing's bid to host the 2008 Olympics and after the inauguration the use of the expression, "strategic competitor" was consciously avoided. However, the level of enthusiasm for a positive relationship with China was markedly lower than the Clinton administration after 1994.

(2) *The impact of the 9.11*

The question is how much of this has changed after the 9.11. As the U.S. sought to form a global coalition against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, China clearly saw the opportunity to remind the U.S. of its importance thus to improve the bilateral ties in terms more favorable to it. Right after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Jiang Zemin sent a telegram to President Bush expressing China's support for the U.S. fight against terrorism. At the UN Security Council on September 12 China voted for the Resolution 1368 which recognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" in response to the terrorist attacks.

One thing China counted on to enhance its significance in the U.S. calculus was its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In mid-

September, when it clarified its position on the U.S. military action in Afghanistan it specifically stated that the UN Security Council should play a proper role. But the calculation did not work as the U.S. led coalition started the military action in early October drawing on the UNSC Resolution 1368, without another UNSC resolution specifically authorizing it. Some Chinese actions gave Americans the impression that the Chinese were seeking quid pr quo for its support for the U.S. actions in the form of commitment to reducing arms sale to Taiwan and/or understanding on their own fight against Islamic separatists in Xinjiang, some of whom had engaged in terrorism. But there were no positive response from the U.S. side.

Of course, there were some positive developments. The Chinese offer of intelligence assistance led to a counter-terrorism dialogue in late September, which was followed up by the visit by State Department Coordinator for Counter-terrorism to Beijing and China's approval to station FBI personnel in U.S. embassy in Beijing. Although President Bush's East Asia tour in October on the occasion of the APEC summit, which included the visit to Beijing, was cancelled, the U.S. government announced that Bush would attend the summit, which was the event of the year for the Chinese, as scheduled. However, their effect on the U.S. approach to China was rather limited. The Defense Department Fact Sheet on international contribution to the war against terrorism issued in February 2002 made no mention of China. When President Bush visited Shanghai in mid-October for the APEC summit, he publicly acknowledged that "China is a great power" and expressed desire for "a constructive relationship" with it, but he also stated that the war on terrorism must never be an excuse to persecute minorities, showing little sympathy for the Chinese problems with Islamic separatism in Xinjiang.

Limitation of the effect of China's cooperative behavior was revealed at the most fundamental level by the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued on September 30. Its discussion of Asia as a region where there is a possibility that "a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge" clearly expresses concern with future China. The Report argues that the U.S. should identify capabilities to deal with "adversaries who will rely on "surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare" as the requirement of the capability-based defense planning it advocates. Although the capability-based approach denied the ability to identify a potential enemy, that the "adversaries" include China was made clear by another recent Defense Department Report on China's military power, which argued that surprise, concealment of intentions, and the use of asymmetric methods constitute the current operational doctrine of the People's Liberation Army. China's concern with Taiwan is ignored by its reference to "the East Asian littoral," which clearly includes Taiwan, as one of critical areas where "hostile domination" should be precluded.

Later in 2001, the Bush administration began to demonstrate higher level of diplomatic accommodation toward China. When the U.S. announced unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty in mid-December, Secretary of State Powell clearly stated that the missile defense system, development of which was to be facilitated by the withdrawal, would not threaten China's strategic deterrents. Bush himself made a phone call to Jiang Zemin a few hours before the announcement and proposed to start high-level strategic dialogues. In February 2002 he visited Beijing after Tokyo and Seoul. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a "constructive, cooperative" relationship with China, though he also used the term "candid" to characterize the relationship and continued to disappoint the host on the Taiwan issue. The Chinese side was quite positive, especially on the agreement to intensify high-level strategic dialogue

The development on the U.S. side since then, however, suggests that these changes mean bifurcation rather than a fundamental shift. On the one hand, this basically cordial approach was carried on to Vice President Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. in April. Assistant Secretary of Defense Rodman visited Beijing in June to resume the high-level strategic dialogue. The State Department report on pattern of global terrorism issued in May 2002 spent one full page, out of eight and half pages allocated for entire Asia, for detailed description of China's contribution to the fight against terrorism as well as sympathetic description of Chin's own problem with terrorism. In August Deputy Secretary of State Armitage visited Beijing to prepare for the upcoming Jiang Zemin's visit to the Bush's ranch at Crawford, Texas and told Chinese officials that the U.S. government had added East Turkistan Islamic Movement, a Uighur separatist group, on its list of international terrorist groups.

On the other hand, Taiwan's defense minister was admitted to attend a "private" conference in Florida in

mid-March and was met by the U.S. deputy secretary of defense and the assistant secretary of state. About the same time, the part of Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review, which identified China as one of seven potential targets of the U.S. nuclear weapons, was leaked to the press. In mid-July Defense Department issued a report on Chinese military power, which, among other things, cast a serious doubt on China's professed intention to solve the Taiwan question peacefully by referring to Chinese missile deployment across the straits. The report was coincided by the report of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission of the Congress, established in 2000, on national security implications of the economic relations with China, which argued, in part, that China provides technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system to terrorist-sponsoring states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan.

The long-awaited White House report on *The National Security Strategy* issued in September 2002 brought a kind of synthesis to this apparently bifurcating China policy. It puts the war on terrorism at the center of the national security strategy and clearly stated the need of cooperation among the "great powers" as well as the alliances. China is mentioned as one of those potential great powers along with Russia and India. The report characterizes the relationship with China as the "important part" of the U.S. regional strategy and welcomes "the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China." Although it is critical of the lack of democratic development and it expressed an open-ended approach to China's future. China's military capability is now considered to poses threat only to its "neighbors". Thus it expresses the intention to "seek a constructive relationship with a changing China" and mentions the war on terrorism and the Korean peninsula problem as the case of on-going cooperation. It also notes positive impact of China's accession to the WTO on both countries. It does mention the "profound disagreements" on Taiwan and human rights but it immediately says that "we do not allow" these differences to "preclude cooperation where we agree," clearly denying the linkage approach.

Although the above-mentioned aspect of the report represented the best approach to China that the Chinese could have realistically expected from the Bush administration, another salient point in the report, the so-called "Bush doctrine" of preemptive actions, was quite objectionable to them. According to a representative Chinese commentary, the doctrine was aggressive and dangerous to the international society in that any nations other than the U.S. allies could be the target, that it reinforces the U.S. unilateralism and unipolarity, and that it destroys the mechanism established in the international law to prevent the outbreak of the war. However, there was also a commentary which pointed to the constraints the U.S. had to confront in its pursuit of the preemptive action and argued that the "doctrine" represented only one alternative in the U.S. national security strategy rather than its entirety. Overall, Chinese reaction to the "Bush doctrine" was certainly critical but calm.

For both the U.S. and China, Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in October clearly meant the confirmation of the new great power cooperation approach of the Bush administration. Coinciding with the visit China took another set of actions to accommodate the U.S. concerns. In the weeks leading to the visit Chinese government made a series of announcements to issue regulations on export control of dual use biological agents, relevant chemicals, military equipments and military production facilities. Right before the summit, the two governments announced the opening of the FBI liaison office in Beijing. At Crawford, Jiang Zemin informed Bush of China's decision to join the Container Security Initiative. According to the Chinese media, Bush responded by going one significant step closer toward the Chinese position on the Taiwan question, saying in private conversation that he "opposed," rather than "did not support," Taiwanese independence, although there was no confirmation of this from the U.S. side.

(3) *The Hu Jintao regime*

China's new leadership, which was established through the Communist Party Congress in November 2002 and the National People's Congress in March 2003, showed the utmost cooperation with the United States on the North Korean nuclear development problem, which had re-emerged just before the transition. At the Board of Governors meeting of IAEA in February 2003 China voted to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. And in order to pre-empt UN sanctions, China took an active leadership in promoting multilateral solution to the problem, hosting the three-party talk in March and the six-party talk in August. Although China's position diverged from the U.S. in that they demanded the U.S. to take North Korean security needs more seriously and that

they blocked the U.S. proposed statement condemning North Korean for reviving the nuclear weapons program, its unambiguous position against North Korean nuclear weapons program, effective pressuring on North Korea and frequent communication with the U.S. side were highly appreciated by the U.S. government.

The cooperation in the war against terrorism was even smoother. At the meetings in February in Beijing on anti-terrorism cooperation and cutting off financial links to terrorists, the head of the U.S. delegates characterized the cooperation as "highly successful," pointing to China's assistance to the U.N. counterterrorism organizations and to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

China's attitude on the U.S.-led war in Iraq was not so cooperative. When the issue was still at the U.N. Security Council, China was with the United States demanding Iraq to disarm and to comply with the past U.N. resolutions. But as the U.S. intention on the military attack on Iraq became increasingly apparent in early February, it clearly sided with France, Germany and Russia in opposing the U.S. unilateralism. However, thanks to the more vocal and persistent defiance by France and Germany, China's relatively low-keyed opposition largely managed to escape the U.S. counter-accusation.

There are other issues in which China was more clearly defiant or deviant from the U.S. norms. In spite of promulgation of a series of export control regulations in August 2002, China's poor record on non-proliferation continued to frustrate the United States. In May 2003 the U.S. government imposed a tough sanction against China's state-owned arms trading corporation called North China Industries Corporation (Norinco) for the sale of missile technology to an Iranian government agency in charge of missiles production. The State Department's annual human rights report for 2002 issued in Mach 2003 continued to judge Chinese record to be "poor," pointing to such cases as arrests of democracy activists, trial of labor leaders and the death sentence against two Tibetan dissidents. However, the U.S. government decided not to sponsor a resolution against China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in April. When Treasury Secretary Snow visited Beijing in Early September 2003, he blamed the America's highest trade deficit of $103 billion with China on deliberately under-valued Chinese currency, Yuan, and demanded its appreciation. The Chinese side refused to take any near-term measures to raise the value of Yuan and only stated their long-term intention of allowing the exchange rate to be completely determined by market forces. China's such unfair trade practices as rampant piracy of intellectual property and forced technology transfer from joint ventures continued to frustrate the U.S. There are voices now in the U.S. questioning China's compliance with the WTO rules.

These cases of defiance and deviation, however, did not lead to serious deterioration of the bilateral relations, at least so far. In fact, clearly referring to China's cooperative behavior on the North Korean nuclear weapons program and in the war on terrorism, State Secretary Powell even declared in early September that "U.S. relations with China are the best they have been since President Nixon's first visit," which must have been music to Chinese ears. When China's new premier Wen Jiabao visited Washington in December 2003, the U.S. side reinforced China's optimistic perception by taking the position closer to China on the issue it considered the most serious, Taiwanese president Chen Shuibian's attempt to conduct referendum at the time of the upcoming presidential election in March. President Bush said, "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally, to change the status quo, which we oppose."

If the above description is appropriate, it may indicate that China's new leadership is quite adept in the art of selective cooperation and non-confrontational defiance in dealing with the United States. But, of course, it is still too early to tell.

China's New Leadership and Its Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: Slow Changes in the Making?

By Jae Ho CHUNG(*), Seoul National University

The Sixteenth Party Congress convened in the fall of 2002 selected a new group of leaders for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Of the nine members of the new Standing Committee of the Politburo, eight were newly elected. As widely expected, Hu Jintao has emerged as the new helmsman of the CCP. At the National People's Congress held in March 2003, Hu succeeded Jiang Zemin as the President of the People's Republic. In the realm of foreign-policy making, Hu has also taken over the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Leadership Small Groups. With his successful debut at the Evian summit and high-profile appearance at the APEC in 2003, Hu has been put in the diplomatic limelight.(1)

The rise of the new leadership under Hu Jintao poses a crucial question regarding the future direction of Chinese foreign policy. The question becomes more relevant if the major junctures of China's foreign policy changes in the past are taken into consideration. If the past experiences can serve as any guide, leadership changes alone may not be as crucial as the evolving strategic assessments and domestic political atmosphere in redirecting the course of Chinese foreign policy. The shift from the strategy of "relying solely on the Soviet Union" during the 1950s to that of "opposing imperialist, revisionist and counter-revolutionary forces" in the 1960s and later to that of "forming a united front against the Soviet" of the 1970s had little to do with leadership changes.

In the post-Mao era, major foreign policy shifts and leadership changes appear to have been corresponding in their timing. Deng Xiaoping's return to the center stage in the late 1970s was almost simultaneous with China's "comprehensive opening" (*quanmian kaifang*) to the outside world.(2) On the other hand, while China's policy of stressing good relations with its neighbors (*mulin youhao*) appears to have been synchronized with the rise of Jiang Zemin in the early 1990s, it was in fact more a function of the external manifestation of the Tiananmen trauma.(3) These notable variations along the time dimension make the question at hand—whether the rise of Hu Jintao is bound to produce crucial changes in China's foreign policy—all the more interesting and worthwhile to explore.

While one year is certainly not long enough a time-frame on the basis of which to produce a definitive assessment, Chinese foreign policy since late 2002 appears to manifest more continuity than abrupt change. The "responsible great-power diplomacy" (*fu zeren de daguo waijiao*) remains the overall framework of Chinese foreign relations.(4) While the tragedy of September 11th and the War on Terrorism have led China to focus more on sustaining a "healthy" relationship with the United States, the change is not necessarily occurring at the expense of its policy toward the neighbors in the region.(5) In a nutshell, despite the rise of Hu, China's adept and nuanced diplomacy toward Asia remains largely unchanged.

Three attributes continue to characterize China's policy toward the Asian region: stability, cooperation, and responsibility. China highly values the stability in the region as it wishes to preclude the possibility of being entrapped into an unwanted conflict. China has consistently focused on promoting cooperation with the countries in the region as it is viewed as the royal path to co-prosperity. More importantly, China has also emphasized the importance of assuming due responsibilities as a great power. The first two attributes are best demonstrated by China's extensive engagement with the ASEAN, most notably the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TOAC).(6)

There is potentially some room for a serious contradiction between stability on one hand and responsibility on the other. One crucial manifestation of China's foreign policy has been to keep "a low profile with high expectations for a larger role in the future" (*taoguang yanghui*), reflected most notably in China's management of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the midst of the War on Terrorism in Central Asia.(7) If China assumes more responsibility for a certain issue or a region, it may not always work in the direction of promoting regional stability. Of course, it is not to say that the status quo is necessarily China's preferred outcome.

If there was an area where Chinese foreign policy has implied—if not demonstrated—some changes since 2002,

it would be the Korean Peninsula. By hosting the three—and six-party talks in Beijing during 2003, China has displayed a more engaging and norm—abiding position on the management of a near-crisis situation induced by North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship. While Beijing had been largely lukewarm in getting directly involved in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear problem during 1993-94, China has this time made it clear that it is a stakeholder and not just a spectator.

The synopsis of this paper is that the new leadership under Hu Jintao has not yet introduced fundamental changes to the overall framework of Chinese foreign policy. Nor is there any persuasive evidence that Beijing's Asia policy is shifting. It can be suggested, however, that as China assumes more responsibilities, some readjustments may be in the making with regard to the Korean Peninsula, North Korea, and its nuclear problem in particular. Whether such readjustments are going to be merely short-term tactical remedies or will even move into the realm of strategic reassessment is uncertain.

1. China in the Second Nuclear Crisis

With Seoul's diplomatic normalization with Moscow and Beijing in 1990 and 1992, respectively, Pyongyang was put on the defensive in both security and diplomatic terms. Since the trilateral dynamics between China, North Korea, and South Korea was transformed from a "stable marriage" into a sort of "romantic triangle," Pyongyang had to seek for a mechanism—if not pretext—for guaranteeing its survival and security. Subsequently, North Korea induced what is now popularly referred to as the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94.

During the first crisis, China had remained largely lukewarm in dissuading North Korea from going nuclear. In a sense, Beijing was not convinced that Pyongyang was capable of possessing pertinent technologies and, therefore, even vetoed a United Nations condemnation of North Korea's deadly program. At the time, it was evident that China had assigned higher priority to the maintenance of "stability" (*wending*) on the Peninsula than to the immediate termination of the nuclear weapons program that it had not necessarily believed to exist.(8) Yet, that was precisely when China's relations with North Korea began to cool down significantly, China's continued economic assistance to North Korea notwithstanding. China's "socialization" with the international community during the 1990s has also made South Korea increasingly more attractive in comparison with North Korea.(9)

In the second nuclear crisis since October 2002, however, some discernible changes appear to have been taking place with regard to Beijing's approach to this intricate problem. Initially, the Chinese government repeated its official position on the three principles: (1) permitting "no nuclear weapons" (*wuhehua*) for North Korea; (2) maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; and (3) resolving the problem through dialogue and negotiation – i.e., peaceful means.(10)

Initially, China did not quite accept the American assessment of North Korea's progress in its clandestine nuclear weapons program and instead chose to stress that "[South] Korea cannot blindly follow the United States" in dealing with North Korea.(11) Chinese officials also repeated its position that China possessed only limited influence over North Korea and that it was the United States that should do more for the resolution of the problem.(12) At the same time, however, it should be noted that they appeared to enjoy the enormous attention the world was paying to its potential role in the looming crisis.(13)

China's stance appears to have made a turnaround in the spring of 2003—roughly towards late February. According to knowledgeable Chinese analysts interviewed by the author, it was around this time that Beijing became more receptive to the American intelligence assessments.(14) The change was also facilitated by China's perception that North Korea's relationship with the United States was then heading toward a certain clash that would be disastrous. Not only Beijing expressed grave concerns about the increasingly hostile exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang but they were also extremely alarmed by the close encounter between North Korea's MIG fighters and America's RC-135S reconnaissance plane on March 2.(15)

In February, China's Deputy Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, went to Pyongyang to meet with Paik Nam-soon, North Korea's Foreign Minister. At the meeting, Wang reportedly made a straightforward plea that Pyongyang should terminate its nuclear provocation immediately. Allegedly, China even hinted on the possibility that Beijing might drop its longstanding opposition to international sanctions if Pyongyang should fail to comply. Again, in March, Qian Qichen—China's foreign policy guru—flew to Pyongyang to demand that North Korea stop its nuclear brinkmanship.(16)

In early March, the Central Committee of CCP re-

portedly established the "Leadership Small Group on the North Korean Problem" (*chaoxian wenti lingdao xiaozu*) headed by Hu Jintao. Upon its formation, the first thing Hu allegedly did was to summon China's top Korean specialists to solicit their opinions on the issue.(17) According to knowledgeable Chinese analysts, the creation of this new unit also coincided with the sudden flourishing of debates and discussions in China and Beijing in particular with regard to the need for certain readjustments of China's policy toward North Korea.(18)

In stark contrast with its lukewarm and protective response during the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94, this time around, Beijing chose to support a resolution put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that demanded the immediate termination of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs in January 2003. Furthermore, China even voted in favor of referring the North Korean case to the United Nations Security Council for discussion in February 2003.(19)

More critical signs were detected in the subsequent months. Above all, in late February, the oil pipelines from China to North Korea were reportedly shut down for almost three days. While this unprecedented incident was officially attributed to certain "technical difficulties," one could not help wondering if that was indeed a veiled warning from Beijing.(20) As if to ascertain the effectiveness of Beijing's threat, when China offered to host a three-party talk in Beijing to provide an invaluable opportunity for Washington and Pyongyang to communicate face-to-face, North Korea did not hesitate to accept the invitation. While the unprecedented three-way meeting in April did not produce any visible outcome, China nevertheless emerged from it as a major peace broker for the region.(21)

In August, China again showed off its diplomatic caliber by hosting the six-party talk where, for the first time, the US, China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas gathered to exchange views. Although Beijing pressed the participants to produce a communiqué that would serve as a long-term foundation for the peaceful resolution of the North Korean conundrum, the communiqué did not come about due to the lack of agreement mainly between the US and North Korea. Nevertheless, once again, China emerged as a crucial mediator for the region, significantly boosting its image as a "responsible great power."(22)

China's official publications lost no time in publicizing the "constructive role" Beijing had performed in drawing Pyongyang to the international negotiating table.(23) Interestingly enough, in retrospect, whenever Pyongyang took part in multilateral negotiations over its nuclear programs, certain high-level visits by the Chinese delegations appear to have just preceded North Korea's such decisions. Qian Qichen's March visit took place just before the materialization of the three-party talk in April, and Dai Bingguo's July visit appears to have laid the foundation for the first six-party talk in August.(24)

2. Hu Jintao's Korea Policy: Slow Changes in the Making?

The nuclear weapons programs were the extreme effort to express North Korea's ultimate security concerns. Although Pyongyang's nuclear ambition is widely interpreted as a minimum security measure vis-à-vis Washington, it was at the same time the loudest voice it has been making against its traditional allies, most notably China.(25) In retrospect, however, Pyongyang's voicing has not been very effective, at least vis-à-vis Beijing. To a considerable extent, it has instead made Beijing more drawn to Seoul and rethink about its long-term position on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the late 1990s, China quietly purged the stylized language of the "ally sealed in blood" (*xiemeng*) previously reserved only for describing its relationship with North Korea. The phrase has been quietly replaced by the significantly downgraded concept of "traditional friendly ties" (*chuantong youhao guanxi*). While, officially, China continues to display concern for North Korea, the intensity of Beijing's support for Pyongyang has gradually declined over the years, as discussed in detail in the earlier section. Although it may be a truism that China may not sacrifice Pyongyang just for the sake of Seoul, China's *modus operandi* in dealing with the two Koreas has been increasingly shifting in favor of the South at the expense of the North.(26)

Nowhere has the response to the "rise of China" been more receptive than in South Korea where China has managed to win the hearts of many, the elite and the public alike. (27) Although some attribute this "China fever" mostly to economic incentives, it has been quietly closely monitored by the Korea watchers in the United States. In particular, Washington has paid attention to a possible connection between the "China fever" and the rise of anti-American sentiments in South Korea in recent years.(28) By 2002, the trade with China accounted

for over 13 percent of South Korea's total trade, signifying a trend of Beijing's non-allied "capture" of Seoul.(29)

Is there a proven connection between the "China fever" and the rise of anti-American sentiments in South Korea? Is such a connection—if there is any—one of Beijing's long-term preferences? While both Washington and Beijing have reiterated the same tenet of "stability" in their respective managing of Korean affairs, one cannot help but wonder if they really meant the same thing by it. In fact, stability may mean many different things: (1) the continued division of the Peninsula; (2) the maintenance of peace and no war; (3) the sustained dominance by the US and US-based alliance; or (4) the continuation of Beijing's "creeping" influence over the Peninsula. If China is indeed keeping a low profile but seeking a right time to emerge in order to pursue its own preferences—*taoguang yanghui*—the Korean Peninsula may well be the perfect setting to do so given its historical and geopolitical backgrounds.

With the foregoing discussion as the backdrop, we now return to the question posed in the beginning of this article: does Hu Jintao's rise matter to Chinese foreign policy? No concrete evidence is available to support that Hu Jintao's emergence as China's new leader has introduced a crucial new variable in its policy toward the two Koreas.(30) In fact, the situation—specific variables—i.e., the non-proliferation and the "axis of evil" contingencies—have further pushed Beijing to opt for the aforementioned position that has surprised many of the seasoned observers of Sino-North Korean relations. It should be noted, however, that such a situation—specific position may not necessarily represent a fundamental change in Beijing's relationship with Pyongyang.(31)

On the other hand, it is equally plausible that we may be witnessing only the first string of Beijing's determined moves to deal with Pyongyang on a more normal and rational basis. If this were really the case, then, the rise of Hu Jintao—and younger and more technocratic leaders—is likely to make China readjust its relationship with North Korea more in line with international norms and values of reciprocity. Just that these changes are bound to be slow and difficult to discern considering China's "special" consideration for North Korea. In conclusion, some stealth changes may be in the making but whether they will become much more visible and even endure remains to be further explored in the years to come.

Notes

* Jae Ho Chung is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies at Seoul National University, Korea. Professor Chung is also a policy advisory member of the National Security Council, non-resident fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), and China consultant for the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the POSCO Group. Dr. Chung is the author and editor of six books, including *Central Control and Local Discretion in China* (Oxford University Press, 2000), and currently working on two books entitled *Between Dragon and Eagle: South Korea-China Bilateralism and the United States* and *China's Internal Governability: Challenges from Local, Rural and Cyber Spaces*.

1. While one other powerful position—the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission—is still retained by Jiang Zemin, the extent of Jiang's direct involvement in the making of China's foreign and security policy remains uncertain at this juncture.
2. Whether the watershed year for China's opening was either 1979 or 1982 is subject to different interpretations. Compare, for instance, Xie Yixian, *Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi 1949-1995* (Contemporary China's Diplomatic History 1949-1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1997) and Wang Taiping, *Xinzhongguo waijiao wushinian* (The Fifty Years of New China's Diplomacy) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 1, pp. 33-37.
3. The argument is well made in Robert Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananment: The Politics of US-China Relations 1989-2000* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2003). Also see Zhu Tingchang, "Lun zhongguo mulin zhengce de lilun yu shijian" (Theory and Practice of China's "Good Neighbor" Poilicy), *Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*, No. 2 (2001), pp. 43-47.
4. For China's assumption of more responsibilities on a par with its power, see Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001); and Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shi zai bixing" (China's "Great-Power Diplomacy" Is Inevitable), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, No. 1, (2000), pp. 9-12.
5. See Li Yu and Lu Tingen (eds.), *Zhongguo yu*

zhoubian ji 9-11 hou de guoji jushi (China, Its Neighbors and the International Situation after the September 11th) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2002).

6. China's success in the ASEAN is attributed in part to the less conflict-ridden nature of the issues in Southeast Asia compared to those in Northeast Asia. At the individual-state level, of course, significant variations are found as the island and continental parts of Southeast Asia have all different perceptions of and relations with China.
7. See Mohan Malik, *Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses* (Carlile, P.A.; US Army War College, 2002).
8. For a good summary of this earlier episode, see Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 320-321.
9. See *North Korea's Decline and China's Strategic Dilemmas*, United States Institute for Peace Special Report (Washington, D.C.: USIP, October 1997), p. 6.
10. See *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), October 25, 2002, and January 10 and 22, and February 19, 2003.
11. See "Hanguo wending zhong qiu gaige" (Korea Seeks Change in the Midst of Stability), *Renmin ribao*, January 8, 2003.
12. For Beijing's snubbing of Seoul's request that China send delegations to Pyongyang to express concerns, see John Pompret and Glenn Kessler, "China's Reluctance Irks US: Beijing Show No Inclination to Intervene in North Korea Crisis," *Washington Post*, February 4, 2003.
13. A *People's Daily* piece reported the following in January 2003: "[W]ithin a dozen days, five delegations came to seek China's cooperation…The world is watching us." See *Renmin ribao*, January 20, 2003 at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/junshi/20030120/910932.html (last accessed on February 13, 2004).
14. For the push by George Bush and Colin Powell that China should do more to defuse the crisis, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China Asserts It Has Worked to End Nuclear Crisis," *New York Times*, February 13, 2003. Interviews in Washington in 2003. Also see *Renmin ribao*, February 8, 2003; and Joseph Kahn, "Turnaround by China: Center Stage as a Diplomatic Power," *New York Times*, August 28, 2003.
15. See *Renmin ribao*, February 20, and March 11 and 13, 2003.
16. For these reports, see Gady A. Epstein, "China Seen Toughening Stance against North Korea Nuclear Developments," *Baltimore Sun*, March 28, 2003; and David M. Lampton, "China: Fed up with North Korea," *Washington Post*, June 4, 2003.
17. On this leadership small group, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China Looks ahead to Korea Crisis," *CNN* (http://cnn.com/world - March 18, 2003); Morton Abramowitz and James T. Laney, *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003), p. 28; and *Dong-A Ilbo* (Dong-A Daily), September 8, 2003. Despite these reports, the actual existence and political importance of this group remains unspecified.
18. See, for instance, Shen Jiru, "Weihu dongbeiya anquan de dangwu zhi ji" (The Urgent Mission in Protecting the Security of Northeast Asia), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economy and Politics), No. 9 (2003), p. 57.
19. See Charles Hutzler and Gordon Fairclough, "The Koreas: China Breaks with Its Wartime Past," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 7, 2003.
20. See "China Seen Toughening Stance against North Korea Nuclear Developments," *Baltimore Sun*, March 28, 2003.
21. When Hu Jintao met with General Cho Myung-rok in April—the highest-ranking military man second to Kim Jong Il—their "stylized language" was starkly different. Whereas Cho emphasized the "blood and bullets" North Korea and China had gone through together in the past, Hu remained much sober by stressing the "traditional friendship" (*chuantong youyi*) between the two. See *Renmin ribao*, April 23, 2003.
22. For Beijing's self-praise about its "shuttle diplomacy" (*chuanjun waijiao*), see *Renmin ribao*, August 7, 2003.
23. See *Renmin ribao*, April 23 and 28 and July 8, 2003.
24. The second six-party talk, initially scheduled for December, was also preceded by Wu Bangguo's October visit although it was later put off to 2004.
25. The conspicuous decline in the high-level official exchanges between North Korea and China since 1994 might have also provided an impetus for such extreme efforts on the part of Pyongyang. For the

"voice" analogy, see Jae Ho Chung, "China and the Korean Peninsula: From Interest Re-evaluation to Strategic Realignment?" in David Shambaugh (ed.), *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

26. For the case of Hwang Chang-Yop's defection, Chae-Jin Lee and Stephanie Hsieh, "China's Two-Korea Policy at Trial: The Hwang Chang Yop Crisis," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Fall 2001). For China's favorable handling of North Korean "escapees," see *Dong-A Ilbo* (Dong-A Daily), December 25, 2003.
27. See Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September-October 2001), pp. 777-796; and William Watts, *Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea: Opinion Survey Report and Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 2002), p. 12.
28. For Washington's concern with the Seoul-Beijing bilateralism, see Jae Ho Chung, "How America Views South Korea-China Bilateralism," *Brookings CNAPS Working Paper* (September 2003) available at http://www.brookings.edu .
29. In 2003, South Korea's trade with China amounted to US$ 55 billion. China (excluding Hong Kong) replaced the US as South Korea's number one export market.
30. While some attach importance to Hu's meeting with Kim Jong Il in 2000, that does not necessarily mean Hu possesses personal amity toward Kim. See Richard Daniel Ewing, "Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary," *The China Quarterly*, No. 173 (March 2003), p. 32.
31. For this position, see Andrew Scobell, "China and North Korea: The Limits of Influence," *Current History*, September 2003, pp. 274-278.

New Chinese Leadership Policy Toward South East Asia

By Chulacheeb CHINWANNO, Thammasat University

South East Asia had always been considered strategically and economically important for China. Since the end of the Cold War, China had cultivated a close relationship with countries in South East Asia, completing the formal diplomatic recognition to all South East Asian countries by the early 1990s and moving forward toward closer economic partnership. As the Chinese economy expanded in this period, the "rise of China" had been a cause for concern for many South East Asian countries. China, realizing this uneasiness, tried very hard to alleviate the fear and suspicion. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provided the opportunity for China to demonstrate her sincerity that the rise of China would be a stabilizing force in Asia. Her announcement of not devaluing the Chinese currency—yuan was praised by all corners.

As China changed the leadership in the Fall of 2002 at the sixteenth Party Congress to the fourth generation, Hu Jintao emerged as the new Party Secretary and led eight new members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Later at the March 2003 National People's Congress, Hu succeeded Jiang Zemin as the President and Wen Jiabao became the Prime Minister. The new Chinese leadership would face several challenges, domestic as well as international. Opportunities were also available , especially for China's policy toward South East Asia.

This paper aims at analyzing new Chinese Leadership policy toward South East Asia. The paper is divided into two parts, the first one presents a brief overview of Chinese foreign policy toward South East Asia prior to the present leadership, the second part focuses on the New approaches and characteristics of Chinese policy toward South East Asia.

1. China and South East Asia Relations: Continuities and Changes

China's relation with her neighbours in South East Asia had evolved through different stages. Historically, China perceived these countries as constituting a natural area of assertion of her power and influence. Until the advent of European imperialism in Asia, China was the dominant center of power in South East and North East Asia, and had a relationship that imposed tributary status on many of these neighbours. Such dominant status enabled China to spread her cultural influence and secure her economic interests in the region.

The Chinese influence was challenged and pushed back to the mainland by the establishment of European Imperialist order in Asia, especially the British and the French. European Imperialism dominated Asia for more than one hundred year until the end of the Second World War in 1945. Interestingly, the end of the British and the French colonial empire in Asia also coincided with the rise of the assertive Communist China.

From the People's Republic of China's perspective, her regional interests had been invariably linked to a wider global dimension. The prevailing Cold War atmosphere very much influenced the Chinese policy toward South East Asia.(1) As China decided to lean on the Communist world led by the Soviet Union (yi bian dao), many South East Asia countries, perceiving Communist China as a security threat , chose to rely upon an extra regional power, the United States, and formed a collective defense arrangement in 1954, the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) to contain communism.

The relationship between China and South East Asia was very tensed and conflictual throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, as China secretly supported the communist revolutionary movements in many South East Asian countries. However, the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969 changed the triangular relations among the three major powers, China, USA and the Soviet Union as well as the strategic landscape in Asia. The Sino-US normalization in the early 1970s and the gradual disengagement of the US in Vietnam had affected Chinese policy and relation with South East Asia. The Communist victory in Indochina in 1975 and the withdrawal of the US from mainland South East Asia created a power vacuum in the region. The competition between China and the Soviet Union for regional influence made China accommodate countries in South East Asia. Meanwhile various countries in the region could no longer rely on the United States for security, decided to accommodate China as well. Moreover, Chinese conciliatory foreign policy based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence was

welcomed by the South East Asian countries, bringing about the establishment of formal diplomatic recognition with Malaysia in 1974, the Philippines and Thailand in 1975.

The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979 brought South East Asia, especially some members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) closer to China. Both viewed the Vietnamese action as destabilizing and a regional security threat. China decided to teach Vietnam a lesson by inflicting a punitive war. Weeks before that, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited South East Asian countries where he underlined Vietnamese assertive plan and its regional security consequences. Michael Leifer a noted scholar on South East Asian observed:

"During the Cambodian conflict, China's priority was to deny Vietnam the prospect of achieving an undue dominance in Indochina… To that end, its government engaged in a united front policy with the states of ASEAN among others, in a successful attempt to reverse the outcome of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia…"(2)

The importance of the strategic interest against Vietnam in China's approach towards ASEAN during the 1980s can not be ignored. However, the congruence of economic interests in this period was also significant as China was embarking upon modernization and reform. The economic relationship between China and ASEAN expanded leap and bound as China searched for a new markets for goods and services. Moreover, the overseas Chinese connection in South East Asia provided China with capital and entrepreneurial experience. China seek foreign direct investment from South East Asia as well as from the world. Many businesemen from South East Asia with oversea Chinese background poured investment into China., one of the major investment in China was from Chareon pokpan (CP) agri-business group owned a Thai Chinese businessman Dhanin Chearavanon.(3) CP invested in the animal feed factories as well as poultry farms in more than 20 provinces in China.

The demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union changed the security environment as the Cold War ended and Communist ideology was no longer a menace. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia improved the security in South East Asia. The strategic cooperation between China and ASEAN contributed to mutual trust and understanding. China's agenda in South East Asia had changed, making possible a restoration of diplomatic relation with Indonesia in August 1990, Singapore and Brunei in October 1990 and 1992 respectively and the subsequent normalization with Vietnam. China had been able to enjoy formal diplomatic relations with all ten South East Asian countries.

The general improvement of China's image in South East Asia, as result of strategic congruence in Cambodia and economic cooperation through trade and investment, had been qualified by the emergence of territorial disputes between China and four South East Asian countries. The dispute was mainly centered in the South China Sea, where China had competing claims with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly issue.(4) The Spratlys are a group of a few tiny islands, shoals, and sandbanks in the South China Sea believed to sit atop large reserve of oil and gas. They are also strategically located near the sea lanes of communication between Indian and Pacific oceans.

A series of Chinese initiatives regarding her maritime claims provoked much apprehension among South East Asian countries. In 1992 China passed the law on territorial Waters which staked claim over the Paracel and Spratly islands. Chinese action was quite disturbing to prompt an unprecedented statement on regional security by ASEAN in the form of 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea. The Philippines in 1995 revealed that China had taken possession of Mischief reef, an action that seemed especially provocative, unexpected and significantly in that this was the first time China had directly challenged the claim of an ASEAN member. It was also a clear challenge to ASEAN 1992 Declaration which repudiated the use of force and urged restrain in the South China Sea. This development had elevated the issue of Spratly in Sino-ASEAN relations. It also reflected the changing character of ASEAN's concern over China. The previous concern tended to be primarily domestic and political, they became militarily and territorial.

In addition to the Spratly issue, the "rise of China" had became another concern among ASEAN. Since Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour to Guangzhou in 1992 and especially after the yuan devaluation in 1994, the Chinese economy had undergone rapid expansion as a result of foreign direct investment and trade surplus. The Chinese economy in the 1990s grew on the average of 7-8%. During this period, China also increased the defense budget and modernized her armed force as she witnessed the United States military superiority in the Gulf War of

1991. The Chinese economic expansion and the defense modernization created the image of the "rise of China" as well as the potential "Chinese threat" in South East Asia.

Although there was no consensus about the impact of the rise of China on Asia, most of ASEAN leaders preferred to "ride the Chinese wave" and tried to manage it as best as possible. On the other hand ASEAN states seemed to have differing views on the extent to which China could become a potential "threat." Vietnam, the Philippines and probably Indonesia tended to support stronger measures to discourage or condemn Chinese misbehavior, while Thailand and Singapore preferred to engage the Chinese so as to sensitize ASEAN concerns.

In order to engage and sensitize the Chinese, ASEAN then set up a multilateral mechanism, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for regional security discussion and consultation. The first ASEAN Regional Forum met in Bangkok on July 1994 with 18 founding members includingBrunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada, European Union, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. The subsequent meetings of the ARF admitted Myanmar, Cambodia, India and North Korea to the group. The ARF became the only regional security framework in which all major players of the world including the USA, Russia, China, Japan and the European Union were involved. More Over it also became the first multilateral forum covering the Asia-Pacific.

The annual ARF meetings involved dialogues and exchanged aimed at promoting confidence building measures in the first stage, and moved toward preventive diplomacy and conflict resolutions at the later stage. The third stage was later change to the elaboration of approaches to conflict, as China was not comfortable with the original term. (5)

At first China was suspicious of the motive of any multilateral security attempt and preferred the South China Sea disputes to be dealt with mostly through bilateral diplomacy. Yet China had moderated her adamant rejection to engage in multilateral dialogue on the Spratlys and other security issues. In order to alleviate China's suspicion toward ARF, ASEAN first took measures to build China's confidence toward the multilateral security dialogue itself, by pursuing its non confrontational ASEAN style approach and refraining from pushing for a solution on the South China Sea. China's confidence toward ARF paved the way for ARF to bring up the sensitive South China Sea sovereignty issue for discussion. The ARF had become a regional security framework crafted and designed by ASEAN to contain threats without specifically containing any particular power.

2. New Chinese Approach to South East Asia

In the past China did not trust the multilateral dialogue on security and prefer to deal with this issue bilaterally. However, China seemed to have more confidence and saw benefits from multilateralism, probably from the good experience with ASEAN. China's new approach to South East Asia included the following.

(1) *New Concept on Security* After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, China saw the change in strategic landscape as a result of the demise of Communism and the rise of the US as hegemonic power. Globalization and the rapid change in technology affected international environment and security. China began to develop and articulate a new concept of security which expanded the old narrow definition of security to include defense, diplomatic, political as well as economic consideration. Hu Jintao, then Vice President visiting Indonesia in July 2000, advocated a new concept of security a Indonesia Council on World Affairs:

"…A new security concept that embraces the principles of equality, dialogue, trust and cooperation, and a new security order should be established to ensure genuine mutual respect, mutual cooperation, consensus through consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than bullying, confrontation and imposition of one's own will upon others. Only in that way cab countries coexist in amity and secure their development..." (6)

This was echoed again by Chi Haotian, then China's Defense Minister in September 2000 at the 4th ARF meeting of the Heads of Defense College in Beijing:

" …we advocate that all countries adopt the new security concept built upon equality, dialogue, mutual confidence and cooperation" (7)

From the new Chinese perspective, Security was not just a matter of military capability. In fact national security was inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Yang Yanyi, Deputy Director General of Policy Planning Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China elaborated further that the new security concept "is characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination." (8)

China believed that the frequent dialogue and mutual briefings on each other's security and defense policies could contribute to bring up the comfort level and degree of confidence and fostering goodwill and trust. Besides trust, mutual benefits should also be advocated through multilateral mechanism. "China sees to it while ensuring its own security interests, other countries security interests are also respected." Equality was also important in the sense that countries, big or small, strong or weak must subscribe the same "universally recognized norms and principles especially the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference in each other internal affairs and peaceful settlement of international disputes." China also placed a premium on dialogue and consultation in place of coercion and confrontation in addressing security issues.

The objective of China' security policy on the Asia Pacific is composed of three parts: China's own stability and prosperity, peace and stability in the surrounding region; and dialogue and cooperation with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

(2) *Strengthen bilateral relations with ASEAN neighbours* China pursued a good neighbourly partnership with her southern neighbours in South East Asia. To enhance further cooperation with ASEAN, China during 1999-2001 negotiated and signed bilateral documents and statements with ASEAN countries on the long-term cooperative frameworks. Thailand was the first ASEAN member to sign a Joint Statement on a Plan of Action for the 21st century in February 1999, laying out the plan for cooperation in various fields including political, economic cultural and security.

Later on China signed with nine other members of ASEAN on similar statements, indicating her commitment in promoting regional stability, peace and prosperity. It was significant that all the statements affirmed that the bilateral relations would be based on the basic norms found in the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and recognized principles found in the international law. Bilateral political dialogues including policy dialogue on strategic and security issues between China and each members of ASEAN would contribute to mutual understanding and trust.

(3) *Promoting multilateral cooperation* The multilateral relations between China and ASEAN have contributed significantly to a closer relation and cooperation. Since July 1994 China and ASEAN agreed to open consultation on political and security issues at the senior official level. By February 1997, ASEAN and China formalized their cooperation by establishing the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC) to act as the coordinator for all ASEAN-China mechanism at the working level.

China became ASEAN dialogue partner and participated in the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) consultation process, with other dialogue partners (ASEAN 10+10) as well as the meeting between ten ASEAN members and each dialogue partner (ASEAN 10+1). China also participated in another ASEAN multilateral mechanism, the ASEAN Regional Forum, reluctantly at first. Later China had taken an active role in the ARF process especially the intersessional work program related to confidence building measures.

Besides the above, the ASEAN-China multilateral relations was expanded and transformed into ASEAN plus Three (APT) which include China, Japan and South Korea and evolved into annual summit meetings at head of state level. At the APT summit in Cambodia in November 2002, ASEAN and China signed a "Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between ASEAN Nations and the People's Republic of China. This agreement aims to establish a Free Trade Area between China and ASEAN, which will be discussed later.

Also in Cambodia, at the 6th ASEAN-China summit, the leaders of ASEAN and China signed a Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, agreeing to cooperate in combating trafficking in illegal drugs, people-smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international rime and cyber crime. Moreover, China also signed here with ASEAN a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. At the November ASEAN2003 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, China also acceded the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, becoming the first non ASEAN member to do so.

(4) *Deepening economic relationships with ASEAN through Free Trade Agreement* The economic relations between China and ASEAN had becoming increasingly close The trade volume had increased from less than 9 billion US$ in 1993 to about 55 billion US$ in

2001, making ASEAN China's fifth largest trading partner and China ASEAN's sixth. China exported in 2001 to ASEAN around 23.8 billion US$ and imported from ASEAN at 31.5 billion US$. Among ASEAN, Singapore was China's largest trading partner, followed by Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Trade with ASEAN increased by 30% over last year and could soar to more than 65 billion US$ in 2003.

Direct Investment between China and ASEAN also increased. Before the financial crisis in Asia in 1997, most of capital would flow to invest in China. However, since 1997, one saw a reverse trend as Chinese enterprise, state owned as well as private, started to invest in cheaper ASEAN more and more.

Chinese Direct Investment in ASEAN

Number of approved outward direct investment projects in ASEAN

	1999	2000	2001	2002	Cumulative value million$
Thailand	3	13	6	15	431.0
Cambodia	1	3	7	3	214.7
Vietnam	2	17	12	20	85.0
Singapore	6	6	3	6	71.1
Burma	1	7	3	5	66.1
Indonesia	0	1	2	6	65.0

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Beijing Dec. 2003

China found out that the financial crisis had weakened ASEAN considerably and also heightened their fear about ASEAN's ability to compete with China economically. This concern plus the worry about China's entrance into the WTO brought an image that China could become an economic threat to ASEAN. Realizing the importance of expanding economic relations with ASEAN and alleviating their fear, China proposed to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) would offer ASEAN members an advance opportunity to enter Chinese market under reduced tariffs before lower rates are extended to all WTO members.

At an ASEAN Summit in November 2001, China and ASEAN agreed to conclude an FTA in the next ten years. At a China-ASEAN Summit in Pnom Penh in November 2002, China and ASEAN signed an Agreement outlining the general FTA framework, under which trade in meat, fishery products and vegetables would be liberalized in 2004. Tariffs on other products would be cut and abolished in stages and the FTA could be realized as early as 2015.

China viewed a FTA with ASEAN as an important driver for its economic development in the coming decades, arguing that the western region of China, less developed than the coastal area, could benefit by tapping the market and capital of ASEAN. Moreover, China was also involved in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) economic cooperation with Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

ASEAN Trade with China by Country (1993 – 2001)

Table A.11. ASEAN Export to China
(Value in Thousand US $)

COUNTRY	Export								
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Brunei Darussalam	-	37.1	152.2	115.4	0.0	0.0	244.2	22,270.0	127,741.3
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	285,985.0	224,984.2
Indonesia	1,249,494.1	1,280,043.2	1,741,717.8	1,867,758.2	2,123,041.2	1,832,034.4	3,338,942.2	4,321,848.9	3,490,998.1
Malaysia	1,202,628.5	1,859,707.4	1,806,866.6	1,519,935.5	1,313,812.7	1,545,082.2	4,595,865.8	6,433,437.9	6,229,130.5
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-	-	65,076.9	86,525.3	103,700.5
Philippines	173,874.0	163,967.0	212,938.6	327,921.7	244,411.6	343,682.6	2,521,925.8	2,570,611.5	2,372,582.0
Singapore	1,902,697.9	2,000,065.8	2,439,216.6	3,214,704.8	4,195,491.8	4,059,714.3	12,718,557.3	16,236,398.3	16,140,398.9
Thailand	-	-	-	543,696.6	1,291,132.0	1,422,072.6	3,231,764.2	5,077,586.6	2,862,555.1
TOTAL	**4,528,694.5**	**5,303,820.5**	**6,200,891.8**	**7,474,132.2**	**9,167,889.3**	**9,202,586.1**	**26,472,376.4**	**35,034,663.5**	**31,552,090.6**

Note: China including Hong Kong in 1999 - 2001

Table A.12. ASEAN Import from China
(Value in Thousand US $)

COUNTRY	Import								
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Brunei Darussalam	-	34,931.4	63,336.5	72,500.2	55,090.6	20,620.9	72,415.9	84,958.9	97,356.1
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	364,110.9	203,774.4
Indonesia	935,983.3	1,477,386.7	1,495,223.3	1,235,458.7	1,518,013.9	904,459.4	1,469,664.0	2,364,323.0	2,099,989.6
Malaysia	816,772.8	1,200,709.0	1,516,774.7	1,719,986.8	1,916,805.4	1,685,513.6	3,358,966.0	6,572,884.9	5,129,407.3
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-	-	223,665.3	261,734.9	394,914.4
Philippines	180,662.9	294,046.6	475,876.6	676,506.8	871,565.5	1,198,911.2	2,265,960.7	1,984,916.9	2,212,320.0
Singapore	2,402,944.9	2,751,912.8	3,578,512.1	4,205,358.5	5,808,553.0	4,853,367.7	8,878,527.6	10,637,225.3	9,982,659.7
Thailand	-	-	-	1,307,809.3	3,312,855.6	2,548,662.2	3,138,797.8	4,210,755.3	3,712,652.5
TOTAL	**4,336,363.9**	**5,758,986.5**	**7,129,723.2**	**9,217,620.3**	**13,482,884.0**	**11,211,535.0**	**19,407,997.3**	**26,480,910.1**	**23,833,074.0**

Note: China including Hong Kong in 1999 - 2001

Conclusion

It can be argued that Chinese influence in South East Asia has been increasing as a result of many factors, especially the shift in her policy and approach toward South East Asia. Although some issues still lingered on such as Chinese territorial disputes with several ASEAN members over territories in the South China Sea or that China was a major competitor with South East Asia for global investment and export markets, they seemed to be well contained. Sino-ASEAN relations are destined toward closer cooperation for mutual benefits.

China in fact sought closer economic and political ties with South East Asia after the demise of Communism in East Europe, the Tian An Men incident and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, but the relationships got complicated by the South Chin Sea conflict, especially the Mischief Reef incident in 1995. By the end of the decade the new Chinese leaders both the third and fourth generation, including Hu Jintao advocated a new security concept emphasizing multilateral cooperation among states, resolving differences through dialogue and peaceful settlement of conflict.

Moreover, the Chinese leasers were quite attentive to the interests and concern of ASEAN countries in seeking to develop common ground with them. Bilaterally, China pursued a good neighbour policy and signed numerous framework agreements governing relations with individual South East Asian States. China was first reluctant to join the multilateral forum to discuss security issues but later actively participated and came to some understanding with ASEAN on several issues.

China also tried to calm regional fears over an expanding China-the rise of China and potential Chinese threat, through multilateral dialogue and Joint statements. The free trade agreement was also a way to alleviate fear and to promote mutual benefits. To sum up, the main objective China in South East Asia is to preserve and enhance a regional security and economic environment conducive to domestic development and regime stability. This aim is also shared by South East Asian nations.

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China's Policy toward Japan: Stagnation for the Next Level

By Chisako T. MASUO, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

1. No Events, No Policy

At the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in November 2002, General Secretary Jiang Zemin emphasized three important categories in Chinese diplomacy. Firstly he stated, "We will continue to improve and develop relations with the developed countries." Secondly he added, "We will continue to cement our friendly ties with our neighbors and persist in building a good-neighborly relationship and partnership with them." Lastly he said, "We will continue to enhance our solidarity and cooperation with other third world countries."(1)

Based on these directions, Japan must be one of China's top priorities in strengthening relations because it fits both the first and second classifications. However, after more than one year since this report, we have not seen clear efforts by the new Chinese government to improve its relations with Japan beyond the level of the Jiang Zemin era. Since Hu Jintao established his new administration in March 2003, he and Premier Wen Jiabao have visited many countries and regions to kick off China's active diplomacy, but not Japan. Nor has the Japanese Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi made an official visit to China. Last year also marked the 25th anniversary of the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China," but there were no eye-catching events held between the two countries.

In terms of security cooperation, China decided to change its long-term passive policy towards the Korean peninsula in spring and started to act as an active mediator on the North Korean nuclear problem.(2) Although feeling quite grateful, Japan is somewhat distant from China in the six-party talks, especially on the abductee issue. There is a strong suspicion in Japan that China is trying to confirm its leading status in East Asia by fully utilizing the North Korean crisis. On regional cooperation, the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea met and signed the "Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation" during the ASEAN+3 Summit held in Bali, Indonesia on October 7th. (3) Despite the friendly posture displayed by the three countries at that time, the Chinese spokesman only expressed conventional greetings in December when asked about Japan's willingness to join TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia) to consolidate its relationship with ASEAN countries, although China was also stressing the importance of stronger regionalism in East Asia.(4) On January 1st, 2004, when Koizumi made his fourth visit to the Yasukuni Shrine since taking office, China as usual expressed strong indignation by saying that the action "rubbed salt on the victims' wounds."(5)

At the governmental level, it may be possible to conclude that neither unusually wonderful nor catastrophic events have happened between Japan and China since the Hu Jintao administration was established. The new Chinese policy toward Japan has not manifested itself clearly to observers.

In this paper, I would like to introduce a controversy and some phenomena related to Japan which took place in Chinese society mainly in 2003, and try to argue that the Japan-China relationship has been experiencing a qualitative transformation recently. Hindered by the political fiction adopted by the old Communist leaders in China, however, historical issues relating to Japan have not been resolved in Chinese society yet but instead serve as an even bigger disturbing factor in bilateral relations these days. Recognizing the need to reshape its Japan policy, China has not found the best solution to improve relations with Japan.

2. New Thinking on Japan Policy

In contrast to the stagnating Japan policy in the government, the so-called "New Thinking on Japan" stirred up a major controversy in Chinese academic and intellectual societies. In November 2002, Ma Licheng, a columnist for the *People's Daily*, published an article titled "Some New Thinking on Sino-Japanese Relations" in *Strategy and Management*. He criticized the emotional and exclusionist nationalism prevailing in China, and argued that China should discard the old way of thinking on Japan that emphasized the importance of historical issues, because Japan had made enough apologies for its invasion of China.(6)

In March and May 2003, Shi Yinhong, a well-known professor of American studies at the People's University of China, wrote two articles in different issues of the

same magazine. Recognizing the strategic instabilities and difficulties surrounding China, especially regarding its relations with the United States and Taiwan, he proposed to the new leaders of China that improving relations with Japan by no longer raising historical issues in bilateral relations would be the most rational and least costly way of finding a path to establish a better international environment for China.(7) These two non-experts on Japanese issues were followed by an old Japan scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences named Feng Zhaokui. He stressed that China should upgrade its relations with Japan because it would serve the long-term national interest of China and also match the diplomatic direction presented by the 16th Party Congress.(8) From various perspectives, all these writers insisted that improving relations with Japan is rational and significant for Chinese diplomacy, and that China should therefore not emphasize its nationalistic desire to solve the historical issues when it deals with Japan.

As expected, they were severely criticized for being "traitors" by the public on the Web. As was shown by the Zhao Wei incident in 2001, the Internet society in China had created an unhealthy and emotional atmosphere abusive of anything related to Japan.(9) However, at the same time, these papers advocating "new thinking on Japan" produced serious and rational debates on how China could develop its relations with Japan, not only among Japan specialists but also among many Chinese intellectuals who were interested in Chinese diplomacy. By fall almost all magazines on international relations in China featured Sino-Japan relations(10).

In this controversy, no matter if the debates were made in public or not, many scholars and intellectuals in China were opposed to dropping historical questions from its relations with Japan unilaterally, although they basically agreed on the importance of treating the issue rationally based on national interests. However, there is no doubt that the "new thinking" sparked a nationwide debate about the future direction of the Sino-Japan relationship for the first time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

In Japan this phenomena in China was reported widely,(11) but it also created some misunderstandings. Because Ma and Shi's articles were published just before the Hu Jintao administration was established, some Japanese took them as signals of a policy change towards Japan by the new Chinese leaders. After much news coverage on these papers, some Japanese seemed to have believed that China had shifted their policy and decided to refrain from raising historical issues with Japan. In reality, the Chinese leaders' attitude on the "new thinking" remained ambiguous. Rumors say it was discussed at the CPC Politburo. At the end of the meeting, the participants decided not to take any special measures on the nationwide debate. The only consensus made by the leaders then was that the "new thinking" was "understandable (*neng lijie*)."

3. Growing Social Factors in Sino-Japanese Relations

Simultaneous with this controversy, several social incidents caused strong public responses in China in 2003. In Qiqihar, five abandoned chemical weapons left by the Japanese military after the Sino-Japanese War were exhumed on August 4th and broken open by Chinese civilians who did not know what they were. This incident killed one person and wounded 42.(12) Although Japan had started to dispose of those weapons in collaboration with China since the CTBT became effective in 1997, these efforts were ignored in Chinese reports and anti-Japanese nationalism was inflamed again.

In the middle of September, just a few days before the 72nd anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, a Japanese company took almost 400 employees on a prostitute-buying tour in Zhuhai, Guangdong province. This was reported by *Beijing Qingnian-bao* first and evoked strong criticism about Japan on the Internet. Prostitution itself is in fact a common phenomenon in China today, but the fact that the customers were Japanese awoke among Chinese memories of comfort women during the invasion.

Finally on October 29, a silly show made by three Japanese students and a teacher at a cultural festival at Xibei University provoked a huge disturbance in Xi'an. According to some Japanese reports they intended to express friendly relations between Japan and China on the stage, but chose an obscene way in jest. However, it was misunderstood by the Chinese side, which made it out to be an insult against China.(13) The next day more than a thousand Chinese students demonstrated in front of the foreign students' dormitory on the campus. They were angry at the Japanese who had "insulted" China by producing such a filthy play, and hundreds of them continued the parade to the center of Xi'an city, demanding public apologies by the students.(14) Several Japanese students who were found at the university's dormitory

were attacked and hurt by Chinese strangers. Rumors on the Internet exaggerated the show over and over and created new "facts" regarding its content.

In addition, a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Tiaoyudao) lurks behind Japan-China relations. China had long been reluctant to raise this question since it established diplomatic relations with Japan.(15) However, the new Chinese government finally gave up prohibiting people on mainland China from joining protest movements against Japan on this issue before last summer.(16) When public concerns regarding Japan arose in the autumn, protesters from the mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan jointly approached the islands to show their objections to Japan in early October.(17) Soon afterwards, a Chinese spokesman supported this action by commenting, "The Chinese government and people are fully determined to protect national territory and sovereignty."(18)

As we can see from these incidents, anti-Japanese nationalism is very easy to stir up in China today through the Internet.(19) Fully utilizing cyberspace, people exchange information and bounce their ideas off each other quite freely. Just like in other countries, the news spread on websites in China is not always true. However, because the Chinese mass media is known for being controlled strictly by the government, Internet users tend to believe the information on the Internet more than public broadcasting.(20) As a consequence, exaggerated information on Japan often calls up extreme images of the Japanese.(21) In the worst cases, such as the Zhao Wei incident in late 2001 and the Luo Gang incident in February 2003, anti-Japanese criticism can be generated by affairs that do not involve any Japanese.(22) Historical skepticism toward Japan also reinforces such a vicious circle.(23)

In the economic dimension, bilateral relations between both countries have been deepening rapidly and consistently since the early 1990s. For example, bilateral trade surpassed 15.3 trillion yen (more than 130 billion USD) in 2003. Japan is China's largest trading partner, and China is Japan's second largest today.(24) The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in Japan provided a special section discussing Chinese economic development in its White Paper in 2003.(25) In this sense China and Japan are not separable anymore.

Contrary to the optimism derived from the interdependence theory, the future direction of Sino-Japanese relations is ambiguous. Chinese policy toward Japan still remains unclear. When Hu Jintao met Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda in Beijing on August 9th, 2003, he did not raise the question of the Yasukuni visit by Prime Minister Koizumi. The Japanese side welcomed this attitude, hoping his regime would deal with Japan issues in a more practical manner than did Jiang Zemin's.(26) Nevertheless, faced with the passionate nationalism of Chinese citizens in the fall of 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the importance of dealing with historical issues correctly and indicated his hope that Koizumi would stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine when he met the Prime Minister in Bali on October 7th.(27) Chinese spokesmen criticized Japan harshly every time a small incident happened in the latter half of 2003.

With the liberalization of Chinese society since the late 1990s, a new relationship between the government and ordinary citizens has been emerging in China. Based on this phenomenon, the Hu Jintao administration has put forward a "people-focused" political line—"*Lidang weigong, Zhizheng weimin* (Party for the public, administration for the people)"—since its establishment. To maintain social stability, the Chinese government needs to absorb public opinion into its policies to some degree so that the society will not lash out against the government.(28) However, it will deteriorate the consistency of their policy. This paradox is especially so in the case of Japan, because today Chinese people have begun to realize that their government has long been suppressing public opinion for the sake of national leaders' interests.

4. Created Fiction on Japan: Historical Perspective

Chinese leaders reportedly formulated their first policy toward Japan in early 1955. Setting Japan-US division and Sino-Japanese normalization as ultimate aims, Communist leaders in China emphasized the importance of dragging the Japanese people onto their side and steering them as a force to make the Japanese government revise its foreign policy.(29) Zhou Enlai recalled these days and spoke about his experience to one of his Japanese friends.

According to his memoir, Zhou told him that there were two obstacles to normalizing relations with Japan. One was Japan's unwillingness to break with the containment policy toward China put forth by the United States. The other was the strong animosity against Japan prevailing among the common people. Millions of

Chinese had been killed by Japan during its invasion. Their families and friends had not forgotten their anger and enmity. To persuade and make them accept the new Japan policy, Chinese leaders discussed and reached consensus on an idea: to distinguish between ordinary Japanese people and the handful of militarists who had waged the invasion on China. In this way, they could differentiate those responsible for the war from everyone else, and tell the Chinese that the ordinary Japanese were also victims of that tragedy. Before visits by Japanese to local areas in China in those days, Premier Zhou dispatched party and government officers there to "educate" the Chinese people to acknowledge such distinctions and be friendly towards the guests.(30) By creating a fiction that imposed all responsibilities for the war on a few militarists, Chinese leaders controlled domestic public opinion against Japan effectively and normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972.

Japan was kept ignorant of such efforts made by Chinese side. Twenty-seven years of segregation between Japan and China after the war widened the societal gaps between, and created misperceptions and misunderstandings about, the two countries.(31) Although the government of Japan stated that "(t)he Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through the war, and deeply reproaches itself" in the "Joint Communiqué" between Japan and China in 1972, Japanese society as a whole has never gone through a serious self-examination about the war. Chinese leaders were rushing to upgrade relations with Japan in the early 1970s to improve their devastated economy and severe international environment surrounding them. They agreed not to accept war compensation from Japan, leaving open the question of whether China had "the right" to receive it or not.(32) Sino-Japanese normalization was finally realized, but the chance to question Japan on its responsibility for the war was lost.(33) As a result, Japanese society never reached a consensus on who had started the war.

When China started opposing visits by Japanese statesmen to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, claiming that the shrine was also dedicated to Class-A war criminals, the Japanese side was puzzled by such a clear distinction between ordinary Japanese and a handful of militarists. For most Japanese who lived through the war period, anybody who did not try to stop Japan from carrying out its militaristic invasion was responsible for the war to some degree or other. They felt uncomfortable imposing guilt on only a handful of people. To renew their pledge not to pursue militarist policies again, the incumbent Prime Minister and many other Japanese statesmen continued to visit the shrine. However, based on the Chinese paradigm on war responsibility, this behavior was judged as evidence of a militarist revival in Japan.

When gradual political liberalization began to take place after the mid-1990s, it opened a Pandora's Box of historical issues involving Japan. Enjoying a greater degree of freedom of speech, many Chinese people started to think and speak about various social problems from their own perspectives, and Japan was no doubt one of their top concerns.

Based on the fiction introduced by the Party a long time ago, the Chinese people began to think that Japanese society was moving toward the right as Japan sought to strengthen its national defense in order to respond the growing ambiguity in the region after the Cold War. Their nationalistic feelings against Japan, which had been suppressed over the years, began to upsurge when they observed the "dangerous" changes in Japan. They started to realize that their government had been making many concessions to Japan without their consent, especially in terms of the war history. Although their economy is growing rapidly, they perceive that they were not receiving enough respect from the Japanese. Patriotic education in the early 1990s and free exchanges of ideas enabled by information technology in the latter half of the decade also reinforced their beliefs. In this sense, the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations largely derives from changes within Chinese society.

In China, public opinion has started to affect the country's foreign policy. This opinion is also exaggerated irrationally by the old fiction of Japanese war responsibility. The Chinese government seems to be aware of the difficulties being caused by uncontrollable public opinion, but it is hard for them to strike at the root of the issue because the problem is one created by the Party.The war history of Japan could be a flashpoint against the authoritarian government.(34) Because of that, many diplomatic issues are becoming more complicated and more difficult to solve rationally through decisions by national leaders.

5. Difficulties on the Japanese Side

It is also difficult for Japan to take firm steps for better relations with China. The stubborn image of China

raising the same history issues repeatedly was inscribed in Japanese people's memory after General Secretary Jiang Zemin emphasized the importance for Japan of self-criticism about the war at the reception party hosted by Japanese Emperor in Tokyo in 1998. Increasing crimes committed by Chinese in Japan are threatening ordinary people's lives.(35) Last year Japanese society was shocked by the money-motivated murder of an entire family, including little children, by Chinese students studying in Fukuoka. No matter how much the Chinese government has attempted to send warmer messages to Japan for better bilateral relations since 1998, Japanese society desperately lacks the political atmosphere to believe and receive them.(36)

Economic ties between Japan and China are expanding. More and more Japanese are visiting China for travel, study and business these days. However, generally speaking, Japanese society is not optimistic about improving relations with China. Mostly through many reports made by the Japanese mass media, Japanese are also aware of strong Chinese dissatisfaction with Japan. Given all of this, the number of Japanese who feel friendly toward China has hardly changed at all in the fifteen years since 1989.(37)

Before China started its Open-door Policy, it was simple to negotiate bilateral issues between China and Japan. It was always the Chinese government or its leaders who decided Chinese policy. With the liberalization of the society and diversification of public opinion in China, this situation is now changing rapidly. Social actions and reactions determine the atmosphere of bilateral relations sometimes, and the situation is often out of the hands of the governments. The context of Sino-Japanese relations is transforming. In Japan, people know that China will be even more important for Japan in many aspects in the future. However, faced with such a new China, they are at a loss to see how to establish firm and stable relations with the growing power just across the sea.

Notes

1. Jiang Zemin, "Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (November 8, 2002), cited from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/37815.html accessed on July 7, 2003.
2. It is clear China shifted its attitude on the assumption that a North Korean nuclear crisis could upset the power equilibrium in East Asia. Facing the threat of domino nuclearization in the region, China started to mobilize many Japan specialists to discuss prescriptions for this issue after the trilateral meeting held in Beijing in late April 2003. See Chinese journals such as *Contemporary International Relations* (Xiandai Guoji Guanxi) and *International Affair Studies* (Guoji Wenti Yanjiu).
3. For the entire statement, please refer to Japanese Foreign Ministry's homepage: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/joint0310.html (accessed on February 28, 2004)
4. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/xwfw/fyrth/t56042.htm (December 12, 2003), accessed on January 31, 2004.
5. *Asahi Shimbun*, January 3, 2004.
6. Ma Licheng, "Some New Thinking on Sino-Japanese Relations: Civil Anxiety Arises from Both Sides (Duiri guanxi xin siwei: Zhongri mingjian zhi you)," *Strategy and Management* (Zhanlue yu guanli), 2002 vol. 6, pp. 41-47.
7. Shi Yinghong, "Sino-Japanese Mutual Access and 'Diplomatic Revolution' (Zhongri jiejin yu 'waijiao geming')," *Strategy and Management*, 2003 vol. 2, pp. 71-75, and "China's External Difficulties and the Challenges that the New Regime Faces (Zhongguo de waibu kunnan he xin lingdao jiti miandui de tiaozhan)," *Strategy and Management,* 2003 vol. 3, pp. 34-39.
8. Feng Zhaokui, "On New Thinking on the Sino-Japanese Relationship (Lun duiri guanxi xin siwei)," *Strategy and Management,* 2003 vol. 4, pp. 1-17.
9. Wearing a mini-skirt that unintentionally looked like a flag of the Rising Sun, Zhao Wei, a popular Chinese singer, appeared on the cover of a magazine published in the United States for Chinese Americans. Zhao was criticized severely on the Internet and attacked by a Chinese man at her concert in Changsha, Hunan, at the end of the year. Although her clothes were chosen by Americans and not by Japanese, this incident provoked a huge anti-Japanese reaction in China.
10. For example, see *Shijie Zhishi*, August 16, 2003 (vol. 1371), X*iandai Guoji Guanxi*, September 2003, and *Shijie Zhengzhi yu Jingji*, September 2003.
11. Ma published a book in Japan that included his

paper on "the New Thinking on Japan." See, Ma Licheng, *Departure from "Anti-Japanese"* ("Hannichi karano dakkyaku), Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2003.

12. The Japanese and Chinese governments agreed that Japan would pay 300 million yen to China for a weapons disposal project in October. (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, October 20, 2003)
13. Generally speaking, this kind of show is very popular at Japanese colleges, even when there are girls and/or teachers attending the activities. Compared to Japan, cultural festivals at universities in China have a much official and serious atmosphere that does not allow sexual jokes in public.
14. Cited from http://japan.people.com.cn/Zhuanti/10/10.html, accessed on January 30, 2004.
15. When Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asked Premier Zhou Enlai his opinion on the Senkaku Islands, Zhou declined to make a comment saying, "It is not the right time to talk about them." (Negotiation between Tanaka and Zhou on September 27, 1972.) See Akira Ishii eds., *Records and studies: Japan-China normalization and negotiations on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship* (Kiroku to Kosho: Nitchu kokko seijoka & Nitchu heiwa yuko joyaku teiketsu kosho), Iwanami shoten, 2003, p. 68, or the equivalent record on http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/ .)
16. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (June 23, 2003, evening edition).
17. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (October 9 and 10, 2003).
18. A comment by Chinese spokesman Zhang Qiyue on October 9, 2003. See http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1027/2126046.html (accessed on February 6, 2004).
19. For a more detailed analysis of this, please refer to Rumi Aoyama, "Public opinion toward Japan formed by two spaces" (Futatsu no kukan de keisei sareru tainichi yoron), *International Affairs* (Kokusai Mondai), February 2004 (No. 527), pp. 56-60.
20. At an academic conference I attended in November 2003, a young Chinese researcher on international relations heatedly spoke out about the "facts" on the Xi'an incident she had gathered on the Internet. When asked why she believed them rather than the public reports, she said in excitement, "Because those news sources are not controlled by the government. They must be telling the truth."
21. Refer to Chinese BBS sites such as "Qiangguo Luntan" or "Zhongri Luntan."
22. In February 2003, a Chinese who proclaimed himself "a Japanese student in China" made a phone call to a radio station in Hunan and read a statement that insulted China very badly. Luo Gang, the navigator of the radio program, was soon dismissed along with his director. Because the program was accessible on the website even after the broadcast, this incident attracted public attention soon and almost sparked another demonstration against Japan among college students. The criminal was arrested the next day.
23. Symbolically, a computer virus called "Aiguo" (patriot) that only attacks Windows OS in Japanese was released from China in early 2004. This kind of cyber-war against Japan by Chinese citizens has been very common since the late 1990s.
24. According to statistics from the Ministry of Finance in Japan, Japan's imports from China amounted to 8731 billion yen (provisional data) and exports to 6638 billion yen (fixed data) in 2003. China has been Japan's largest exporter, exceeding the United States, since 2002. (http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/download/2003/12/d12/d12h03i001.pdf and http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/download/2003/12/d12/d12h03e001.pdf, accessed on February 4th, 2004)
25. Tsusho Sangyo Sho (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), *White Paper on International Trade, Japan, 2003* (2003-nen-ban Tsusho hakusho), Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2003, pp. 13-27.
26. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 10, 2003.
27. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 8, 2003. See also http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1027/2128910.html (accessed on February 6, 2004).
28. A rumor says that both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao are frequent internet users and often check news and public opinion that appears on the Web.
29. Zhang Xiangshan (Japanese translation by Hideji Suzuki), *Analysis and Witness on Japan-China Relations* (Nitchu kankei no kanken to kensho), Sanwa Shoseki, 2002, pp. 7-9. In relations with Japan, the Communist Party of China had placed importance on attracting ordinary Japanese people to its policies since the days it fought against Japan. This posture related very much to their Communist belief that the people drive history and would defeat the imperialist governments in the end. As an example of China's people's diplomacy at that time, see Takashi

Kagawa and Mitsushige Maeda, *Japanese Soldiers in the Eighth Route Army* (Hachiro-gun no Nihon-hei tachi), Saimaru Shuppan, 1984.

30. Kazuteru Saionji, "Impressive talks by Zhou Enlai (Insho-bukai Shu sori no hanashi)," Ishii eds., op. cit. pp. 251-253.
31. Tatsumi Okabe, "Historical Remembering and Forgetting in Sino-Japanese Relations," in Gerrit W. Gong ed., *Memory and History*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, p. 55
32. The Republic of China declared its intention to abandon its demands for war reparations from Japan in the "Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China" in 1952. So as not to diminish the legitimacy of the treaty, which remained valid for twenty years until Japan normalized relations with the mainland, Japan insisted on not writing into the joint communiqué released during the negotiations that the People's Republic of China still maintained the "right" to demand compensation from Japan.
33. On the other hand, it is also important to note that the Chinese government's strategy to target Japanese people as a driving force for Sino-Japanese normalization did serve their political purpose successfully at that time. See, Yoshihide Soeya, *Japanese Diplomacy and China: 1945-1972* (Nihon gaiko to Chugoku: 1945-1972), Keio University Press, 1995.
34. How to view the history of the war has also been a huge domestic issue in Japanese politics. See Sumio Hatano "A milestone for 'historical reconciliation' ('Rekishi wakai' eno dohyo" in Yoshihide Soeya and Masayuki Tadokoro eds., *Japanese Vision for the East Asia* (Nihon no Higashi Ajia koso), Keio University Press, 2004, pp. 329-355.
35. 4109 Chinese nationals were arrested in the first half of 2003 (45.2% of all foreign criminals; this number does not include Taiwanese and Hong Kong citizens). This is almost about three times more than in 1993. (See http://www.npa.go.jp/kokusaihanzai/index.htm pp. 12-13, accessed on January 26, 2004.)
36. In terms of the history issue, it is also necessary for the Japanese government and high officials to pay more respect for the victims and make efforts to relieve their psychological pains. In the end, not only China but also all the governments of South and North Korea and Taiwan are showing objection against the Japanese Prime Minister's Yasukuni visit.
37. According to a poll conducted by the Cabinet Office in Japan, those who feel affinity toward China ranges from 45.0% (1996) to 55.5% (1992), and those who do not from 42.2%(1992) to 50.2% (1996) of the total; the figures were 47.9% and 48.0% respectively in 2003. These numbers are quite stable compared to those connected with attitudes toward South Korea, which fluctuate severely depending on Japan-South Korean relations. (See http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h15/h15-gaikou/, accessed on January 31, 2004)

China's New Military Leadership & Implications for Civil-Military Relations

By David SHAMBAUGH, George Washington University

The Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of 2002 ushered in a new "high command" in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who will guide the PLA and its on-going modernization for much of the next decade. This paper identifies this new military leadership, discusses their backgrounds and priorities, and offers some concluding observations about the implications for future civil-military relations in China.

The sweeping turnover of personnel occurred before, at, and after the Sixteenth Congress. This included retiring six and adding three new members of the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC); replacing the directors of the four general departments (General Staff, Logistics, Political, and Armaments) as well as many of deputy directors in these departments; and appointing new commandants of the Academy of Military Sciences and National Defense University. Over the year prior to the Congress, a wholesale rotation of commanders, deputy commanders, and political commissars of China's seven military regions also took place. While Jiang Zemin remained as chairman of the CMC at the Congress and Hu Jintao stayed on as vice-chair, there was much more change than continuity in the military leadership as a result of the Congress. All other CMC members over 70 retired.

Taken together, these personnel changes constitute the most thorough shakeup and turnover of leading PLA officers ever. Even in the aftermath of the purges of the Yang brothers (1992) or the Lin Biao clique (1971), such an extensive turnover did not occur. The fact that such a thorough vetting could occur absent a purge or crisis is testimony to how regularized and professional personnel procedures have become in the PLA. Unlike in the Party, where the top posts were filled as a result of considerable nepotism and after lengthy political jockeying, high-level changes in the military were the result of standardized procedures, meritocratic criteria, a well-defined candidate pool, and relative transparency. To be sure, those who would occupy the top jobs were not publicly known until they were appointed—but the candidate pool from which they were drawn was well-defined and well-known. That is, the new CMC vice-chairmen were chosen from the previous members under the age of 70, the new CMC members were drawn from the ranks of military region (MR) commanders (in two cases) and existing deputy directors of the general departments, and some interesting patterns of promotion occurred at the MR level. There were no dark horses or "helicopters" who were propelled from obscurity to the top ranks. More importantly, as is described below, the prior career paths of the new military leadership reveal a number of commonalities that illustrate how regularized and institutionalized the tracks of upward mobility in the armed forces have become. Unlike the in the Party, where one can reach the top through a variety of paths (although provincial service seems to be increasingly *de rigueur*), upward mobility in the military is increasingly defined, predictable, and professional. This is not to say that personal ties and loyalties no longer operate at the top of the PLA—they do, as is evidenced by those promoted officers (Guo Boxiong, Liang Guanglie, and Liao Xilong) with ties to retiring Generals Zhang Wannian and Fu Quanyou. But we should not assume that these officers were promoted *because* of their career ties to the retiring elders; rather, their career paths intersected with Generals Zhang and Fu, although they had established their own credentials for promotion.

When one considers the collective backgrounds of the members of the CMC, some interesting patterns emerge which confirm the increasingly professional nature of the military leadership. Unfortunately, there is not yet enough biographical data available on the new crop of MR commanders or general department deputy directors to provide a sufficient profile of the new PLA leadership at these levels—although it is possible to track the channels of promotion.

1. Characteristics of the New Military Leadership

The military leadership in China is essentially comprised of three levels: the CMC and associated organs; the four general departments; and the MR commands. Let us examine each in turn.

(1) *The New Central Military Commission*

The new CMC is somewhat smaller than the outgoing CMC, with only eight total members.

Table 1

The Central Military Commission

Member	Age	Previous Position	New Positions
Jiang Zemin	76	CCP General Secretary; PRC President; CMC Chairman	CMC Chairman
Hu Jintao	59	PBSC Member; PRC Vice-President; CMC Vice-Chairman	CCP General Secretary; (Presumed) President Elect; CMC Vice-Chairman
General Guo Boxiong	60	CMC Member	CMC Vice-Chairman; Member of Politburo
General Cao Gangchuan	67	CMC Member; Director, General Armaments Department	CMC Vice-Chairman; member of Politburo
General Xu Caihou	59	CMC Member; Executive Deputy Director, General Political Department; Secretary, PLA Discipline Inspection Comm.	CMC Member; Member of CCP Secretariat
General Liang Guanglie	62	Commander, Nanjing Military Region	CMC Member; Chief of General Staff
General Liao Xilong	62	Commander, Chengdu Military Region	CMC Member; Director of General Logistics Department
General Li Jinai	60	Political Commissar, General Armaments Department	CMC Member; Director, General Armaments Department

None of the CMC members (other than Hu Jintao) attained a position on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), although Guo Boxiong and Cao Gangchuan became members of the Politburo—replacing Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian respectively. Interestingly, General Xu Caihou was appointed to the Central Committee Secretariat, although he is not a CMC vice-chair (this puts Xu in a key position of interface between the civilian and military leadership). The failure to appoint a military man to the PBSC is not, in fact, unusual—nor does it really reveal any lack of PLA "influence" in high party councils. Historically, it has much more often been the case that the leading PLA officers did *not* make the PBSC; in fact, over the past twenty years only one uniformed officer (Liu Huaqing) was elected to the PBSC.

More broadly, it is interesting to note that PLA representation on the CCP Central Committee has fallen to nearly an all-time low. At the 8th Congress in 1956 it was 35 percent, rose to 45 percent at the 9th Congress in 1969, fell to 26 percent at the 10th Congress in 1973, rose again to 30 percent at the 11th Congress in 1977, declined to 22 percent at the 12th Congress in 1982, fell further to an all-time low of 19 percent at the 13th Congress in 1987, rose again (in the aftermath of Tiananmen) to 26 percent at the 14th Congress in 1992, declined to 23 percent at the 15th Congress in 1997, and fell further to 21 percent of total Central Committee members (full and alternate combined) at the 16th Congress.

Unless they were a new CMC member (whereby they can remain until 70), most officers near the age of 65 were not reelected to the Central Committee. Examples include Deputy Chief of General Staff Kui Fulin, Beijing MR Political Commissar Du Tiehuan, Second Artillery Commander Yang Guoliang, and NDU Commandant Xing Shizhong. Fully 60 percent of the PLA representatives on the Central Committee are new members, and there are a increasing number from the Lanzhou and Nanjing MRs. Of those elected to the Central Committee, it appears to have been entirely a function of protocol rank. That is, the commanders and political commissars of all military regions, directors and "executive" (first-ranking) deputy directors of all general departments, commanders and political commissars of all services and the People's Armed Police, and the political commissars of the PLA's three educational institutions (NDU, AMS, NDSTU), were all elected to the Central Committee. Alternate members included other deputy directors of the GSD and GAD, commandant of the National Defense Science & Technology University, commander of the Xinjiang Military District, commander of the North Sea Fleet, commander of the Macao Garrison, Chief of Staff of the Shenyang and Nanjing MRs, and the commander of the 63rd Group Army. One well-known officer who was not elected to full membership on the Central

Committee is the flamboyant and egotistical Deputy Chief of Staff General Xiong Guangkai. Xiong did eek out a position as an alternate, but placed 148th out of 158 elected alternate members. This is interesting not only because Xiong is the best-known PLA officer overseas (insofar as he is in charge of all PLA foreign exchanges and intelligence, and is the principal interlocutor for foreign visitors), but because prior to the Congress he had audaciously bragged to a number of visiting foreign delegations that he would be promoted high up the hierarchy—possibly to become the Minister of Defense. Xiong's braggadocio resulted in a distinct rebuff at the "polls"—what one Hong Kong newspaper pointedly referred to as a case of "burning down the stove due to overheating."(1)

It was also interesting that the CMC was trimmed from eleven to eight members. The net decline can be attributed to a couple of factors. First is the fact that, in recent years, the CMC has become increasingly an *ex officio* body, i.e. with the directors of the four general departments represented along with two uniformed vice-chairs (with a functional division of labor among them and one simultaneously serving as Minister of Defense). This is what can be considered to be a streamlined model for the CMC. The previous CMC included three individuals who did not have these portfolios (Wang Ruilin, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou). It is also interesting that the position of CMC secretary-general was not resurrected or filled. This slot has remained dormant and unfilled (although never formally abolished) since the purge of Yang Baibing in 1992. What this means in practice is that the Director of the General Office of the CMC (currently Lieutenant General Tan Yuexin) administratively directs the CMC on a day-to-day basis, without a CMC member having this authority. Yang Baibing had used (and abused) this position to manipulate meetings, paper flow, and personnel assignments during his tenure.

The continuation of Jiang Zemin as CMC chairman is, of course, significant. There had been widespread speculation prior to the Congress that he would step down from this post (including this observer), but it was not to be. At the March 2003 national People's Congress Jiang was elected to a new five-year term as Chairman of the state CMC.(2) While Jiang's continuation in these twin posts brings continuity to command of the military and civil-military relations, at the same time it creates two procedural anomalies—with someone other than the CCP General Secretary heading the Party CMC and someone other than the state president heading the state CMC. Traditionally the head of the party (either Chairman or General Secretary) has served as chairman of the party CMC, so as to illustrate the principle that the "party commands the gun." Also, according to National Defense Law of 1997, only the President of the PRC (along with the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress) can mobilize the nation for war or order the military forces into combat. Jiang's continuation as CMC chair, while Hu Jintao has become state president, violates these principles and law, and clouds the chain of command. Indeed, Jiang's clinging to power has clouded and otherwise smooth succession. Many in China, including in the CCP, recognize this fact and grouse about it. Perhaps as a sign of this discontent, the National People's Congress vote to renew Jiang's position as chair of the state was not unanimous. Almost 10 percent of NPC deputies did not vote in favor of Jiang's reappointment (of 2,951 delegates there were 98 votes against him with 122 abstentions). Just as pointedly, the official Xinhua News Agency report that announced his reelection pointedly reported that the 16th CCP Central Committee "let Jiang stay on as Chairman of the CMC," while also noting that he had been "relieved of his official duty" as CCP General Secretary but "relinquished willingly his state presidency."(3)

The reasons for Jiang's continuation as chairman of the CMC, and the maneuvering he undertook to accomplish it, have been the source of much speculation in and outside of China.(4) To be sure, the military have been comfortable with Jiang as their leader and he has been good to the PLA.(5) In the run-up to the Congress, the PLA media engaged in a sycophantic propaganda campaign—presumably to bolster his position and to signal an institutional desire that he remain as chairman.(6) This media blitz followed the apparent decision taken at the summer 2002 leadership retreat at Beidaihe to allow Jiang to stay on in the CMC posts.(7) So Jiang stepped down from all other official positions (including his positions on the Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, and National Security Leading Small Groups), but hung on to his military portfolio. How long he will do so remains in doubt. There is no statutory term for the party post, but there is a five-year mandate for state position. Whether Jiang remains for the entirely of this tenure, when he would be 81 years old, or hands the positions over to Hu Jintao before then remains to be seen. Jiang seems to fancy himself as a paramount leader *qua* Deng Xiaoping,

and would have liked to establish himself in such a role as a semi-retired elder (however this has *not* been the case). Eventually, he will have to hand the CMC over to Hu Jintao (presuming Hu does not encounter difficulties as party and state leader), although Zeng Qinghong may well emerge as the vice-chairman..

Would the military be comfortable with Hu Jintao as their commander-in-chief? Yes and no. Although Hu has been a vice-chair of the CMC since 1999, and the military has had five years to get used to him (and, more importantly, vice versa), he has no previous military credentials of his own and has not been engaged in military affairs. The only active role Hu has shown concerning the military in recent years was his high-profile involvement in the December 1998 divestiture order, which required PLA units to divest themselves of their financial assets and transfer them to the State Council. Hu's other involvement came when he was (briefly) Party Secretary in Tibet in the late-1980s, and particularly during the crackdown in March 1989. According to a recent Hong Kong press report, Hu was intimately involved in the military planning at the time—particularly with General Liao Xilong, then deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region.(8) Liao was promoted to the CMC and position of Director of the General Logistics Department at the Congress, and is the *only* senior officer who evinces ties to Hu Jintao.

To some (and growing) extent, Hu's stature as party and state leader is developing respect and loyalty as China's commander-in-chief, but he still needs to work to build an independent power base inside the PLA (independent of Jiang's). What he needs to do is exactly what Jiang did in the 1990-91 period, after he was catapulted to the CMC chair in November 1989. Jiang very assiduously and carefully went about visiting every military region, all of the general departments, and a large number of units. These visits, his speeches, and personal meetings with key PLA officers, all addressed the various institutional and sub-institutional needs of the PLA—thus astutely building an inner-PLA bureaucratic coalition of support.(9) Within a short period of time (by 1993) Jiang's influence with the military had grown and he had won the support of various constituencies in the PLA. Many of the regional commanders he had met on his tours were transferred to Beijing. Hu Jintao needs to take a leaf out of Jiang Zemin's book in order to cultivate and build his own independent base of support in the military. Jiang's continuation as CMC chair could work both ways—it could help or hinder Hu's ability to build this base.

As a group, the PLA officers of the new CMC display several notable characteristics:

- Their average age is 61. Only Cao Gangchuan is 67. This means that all the others will be members for the remainder of this decade.

- Their career paths are collectively diverse, but each has worked an entire career in different functional systems in the PLA. This provides a kind of division of labor among them. Three have commanded military regions (Guo Boxiong, Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong), two come from GPD backgrounds (Xu Caihou and Li Jinai), and one (Cao Gangchuan) is a veteran of the military-industrial establishment. None have "helicoptered" to the top, and all have meticulously climbed the career ladder in their respective service or department.

- Several have commanded particularly important military regions and have overseen particularly sensitive operations, during which they have proved their political loyalty to their military superiors and the Party: Guo Boxiong was commander of the 47th Group Army during the anti-separatist operations in Xinjiang between 1990-1992; Liao Xilong commanded the forces that quelled the rebellion in Lhasa, Tibet in 1989; Liang Guanglie reportedly commanded the 54th Group Army to suppress the uprising in Beijing in 1989; and all three (particularly Liang Guanglie) have served as commander or deputy commander of military exercises directed against Taiwan.(10)

- The CMC membership continues to be dominated by the ground forces, although arguably the air, naval, and missile forces are now more important in the PLA's orientation and potential missions. Li Jinai does have a background in the strategic and tactical missile forces (Second Artillery), but it was as a political commissar rather than as a technician or base commander.

- These are professional military men, with proven careers and a clear sense of mission. In addition to lengthy experience at the command level, they have all had some advanced professional military education (PME).

The trend towards professionalism, PME, and command experience is also mirrored at lower levels of the new PLA leadership.

(2) *The Second Echelon*

While we do not possess extensive biographical data on those officers beneath the CMC, it is also important to note that a number of changes in leading PLA personnel took place in the military regions, general departments, and services in the year prior to the Congress. While some of these personnel changes were precipitated by the promotion of other military officers or illness (Air Force Commander Liu Shunyao), leaving vacancies, others were the result of regular rotations. In these appointments a relatively consistent pattern of promotion emerges, whereby officers are elevated progressively to the next level of command—from Group Army commander to MR deputy chief of staff to MR chief of staff to MR deputy commander to MR commander. In a few cases officers leapfrogged two positions up the hierarchy,[11] but, for the most part, the promotion pattern was incremental.

In the Beijing, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs there was a very clear pattern of officers moving directly up into the next billet (or two in the case of Zhu Qi).[12] It is also clear that, more than ever in the past, commands of divisions and group armies are a prerequisite for higher military region assignments. A similar pattern of incremental promotion is seen in the services and general departments (particularly the GAD).

The second echelon military leadership is as follows:

Table 2

Military Regions

Military Region	Commander	Political Commissar
Beijing	Zhu Qi	Fu Ting'gui
Chengdu	Wang Jianmin	Yang Deqing
Guangzhou	Liu Zhenwu	Liu Shutian
Jinan	Chen Bingde	Liu Dongdong
Lanzhou	Liu Quanyuan	Liu Yongzhi
Nanjing	Zhu Wenquan	Lei Mingqiu
Shenyang	Qian Guoliang	Jiang Futang

Table 3

The General Departments

Department	Director	Deputy Directors
General Staff	Liang Guanglie	Ge Zhenfeng, Wu Xuanxu, Qian Shugen, Xiong Guangkai, Zhang Li
General Political	Xu Caihou	Tang Tianbao, Yuan Shoufang, Zhang Shutian,
General Logistics	Liao Xilong	Zhang Wentai, Sun Zhiqing, Wang Qian
General Armaments	Li Jinai	Li Andong, Zhu Fazhong

Table 4

CMC Affiliated Educational Institutions

Institution	Commandant
National Defense University	Pei Hualiang
Academy of Military Sciences	Zheng Shenxia
Science & Technology University for National Defense	Wen Xisen

Table 5

Service Commands

Service	Commander	Commissar
PLA Navy	Shi Yunsheng	Yang Huaiqing (replaced by Zhang Dingfa in June 2003)
PLA Air Force	Qiao Qingchen	Deng Changyou
PLA Second Artillery	Jing Zhiyuan	Jia Wenxian
People's Armed Police	Wu Shuangzhan	Zhang Yuzhong

One sees similar incremental promotion patterns in these institutions, although in the PLA acad-

emies/universities some interesting precedents were set. The new NDU president, Lieutenant General Pei Hualiang, was transferred from his post as Deputy Commander of the Jinan Military Region. Given the importance of the NDU in training group army commanders, it is appropriate that someone of Pei's service background head up the NDU. Another precedent was set with the appointment of a Vice Admiral Zhang Dingfa as President of the Academy of Military Sciences (the PLA's top research organ). This is the first time that someone of a naval background (or non-ground force) has served in this AMS capacity or *any* leading PLA institution for that matter, as the ground forces have had a stranglehold over senior appointments to date. This still remains the case, despite Admiral Zhang's appointment. In June 2003, following the purge of the senior naval brass in the aftermath of the sinking of a PLAN conventional submarine, Admiral Zhang was promoted from the AMS presidency to become Commander of the PLA Navy, and was succeeded by Zheng Shenxia. General Zheng previously served as Chief of Staff of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Shenyang MR deputy commander, and commandant of the PLAAF Command College.

2. Implications for Civil-Military Relations

Taken together, the personnel changes in the PLA High Command have been sweeping. The Congress triggered some of the changes, but most were mandated by new standards and regulations (*gangyao*) that have been promulgated in recent years. This cohort not only represents the "fourth generation" of PLA leaders, but also the fifth. It is from this pool of officers from which the senior military leadership will be drawn in the years ahead.

The new military leadership continues to be predominated by the ground forces, have had substantial field command experience at the group army level and below, possess university-level educations and have attended at least one military educational academy, and have methodically climbed the career ladder. However, they are not is well-traveled abroad, cannot be considered to be very cosmopolitan or global strategic thinkers, nor have they had actual combat experience (other than limited action along the Vietnam border).

While the failure to promote naval or air force officers to senior levels outside of their own services follows traditional patterns, it is also odd considering the increased importance attached to these services for potential peripheral conflicts and "limited wars under high technology conditions."

Collectively, their policy proclivities can be expected to fully push ahead with the comprehensive modernization of the PLA—hardware, software, command and control, force structure, finance, logistics, science and technology, military education, reconnaissance and intelligence, etc.[13] Above all, they are professional soldiers who are steadily professionalizing the PLA with every passing day. They are not likely to intervene in high-level politics, nor do they wish to be pulled into performing internal security functions (which are to be left to the PAP). They have a singular focused mission of comprehensive military modernization, and the PLA is being given the necessary resources to fulfill that mission. A quarter century from now, when the fourth and fifth generation officers again change the guard and retire, the PLA will be a far more modern and capable force for their efforts.

In terms of the evolving nature of civil-military relations, the turnover in the military leadership described above reflects several trends that have been noticeable in recent years.

First and most important, we are witnessing the further institutional "bifurcation" of party and army. This can be seen in a number of ways. The military played no apparent role in the civilian leadership succession before or at the 16th Congress and vice versa, i.e. the civilian Party leaders played no apparent role in the selection of the new military leadership (and that includes, in my view, Jiang Zemin). There was no praetorian impulse to intervene in politics and the military was left to make its own succession choices. Furthermore, not a single senior party leader has one day of military experience—while none of the new military leaders have any experience in high-level politics. This is a trend that has been noticeable for the past decade, during the "third generation" of leaders, but is a marked departure from the former "interlocking directorate" that symbiotically fused together the civilian and military leaderships. The continuing decline of military representation in the CCP Central Committee is yet further evidence of the bifurcation.

Secondly, this tendency towards bifurcation reinforces the ongoing trend towards corporatism and professionalism in the PLA. This is to say that the PLA as an institution is now exclusively, and more than ever before, concerned with purely military affairs. It is not

involved in domestic politics, has withdrawn from its former internal security functions in favor of an exclusively externally-oriented mission, has largely divested itself of its commercial assets and role in the civilian economy, does not play a role or have much of a voice in foreign policy, and even its influence on Taiwan policy has become very circumscribed. To put it simply, the military in China today is concerned with military affairs. Just as importantly, the PLA is being permitted to look after its own affairs by the Party—and it is being given the resources to pursue its program of comprehensive modernization.(14)

Third, and related to the above trends, one sees few signs of politicization in the military. Except for the "Three Represents" campaign (which in the military is really more about increasing Jiang Zemin's stature than educating the military about recruiting entrepreneurs into the Party), one sees few indications of political indoctrination in the ranks of the PLA. The General Political Department today is far more concerned with improving the living standards of officers and their dependents than in indoctrinating the rank and file with ideological dogma. This is yet another signal of increased professionalization in the military. Along with the divestiture of commercial assets and involvement, the military is now exclusively focused on training and other professional activities.

While it must still be considered a party-army, as long as the CCP rules China and the institutional mechanisms of Party penetration of the armed forces exist,(15) the PLA as an institution is clearly carving out its own corporate and professional identity. It is not yet a "national military," but is incrementally moving in that direction.(16) The new PLA leadership promoted around the 16th Party Congress is further evidence of these macro trends in the Chinese military today.

Notes

∗ An expanded version of this paper appears in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael Marti (eds.), *China in Transition and the People's Liberation Army* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2003).

1. N.A., "Military Representatives to the CCP Central Committee are 60% New Faces—Cao Gangchuan, Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou Step Up to the Plate," *Ming Bao* (Hong Kong), November 15, 2002, in FBIS-China (hereafter FBIS-CHI), November 15, 2002.
2. "Profile of Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin," *Xinhua News Agency*, March 15, 2003, in FBIS-CHI, March 15, 2003.
3. Ibid.
4. For one Hong Kong media account of how Jiang maneuvered and managed to keep the CMC portfolio, see Lo Ping, "Jiang Zemin Maneuvers to Hold on as Central Military Commission Chairman," *Zhengming* (Hong Kong), December 1, 2002, in FBIS-CHI, Dec. 31, 2002.
5. For studies of how Jiang has interacted with the PLA see You Ji, "Jiang Zemin's Command of the Military," *The China Journal*, No. 45 (January 2001), pp. 131-138; Tai Ming Cheung, "Jiang Zemin at the Helm: His Quest for Power and Paramount Leader Status," *China Strategic Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 167-191; and my "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in C. Dennison Lane et al, *Chinese Military Modernization* (London and Washington, D.C.: Kegan Paul International and AEI Press, 1996).
6. For an excellent and careful analysis of this propaganda campaign see James Mulvenon, "The PLA and the 'Three Represents': Jiang's Bodyguards or Party-Army?" *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 4 (Fall 2002), at www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org
7. N.A., "Jiang Zemin to Stay on as Chairman of Central Military Commission for Another Five Years," *Kaifang* (Hong Kong), February 1, 2003, in FBIS-CHI, February 5, 2003.
8. See Lin Jie, "Liao Xilong's Accession to the Central Military Commission Will Help Hu Assume the Reins of Military Power," *Xin Bao* (Hong Kong), November 21, 2002, in FBIS-CHI, November 21, 2002.
9. This process is detailed in Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief," op cit.
10. I am indebted to James Mulvenon on this point. See his "The PLA and the 16th Party Congress: Jiang Controls the Gun?" *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 5 (Winter 2003), at www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org
11. Zhu Qi moved up from Beijing MR Chief of Staff to Beijing MR Commander; and Zhu Wenquan did the same in the Nanjing MR.
12. See "PRC Makes Pre-CCP Congress' Military

Region Personnel Changes," *Ming Bao* (Hong Kong), February 9, 2002, in FBIS-CHI, February 9, 2002.

13. These and other aspects are all discussed in my *Modernizing China's Military* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2002).
14. The one (important) qualification to this trend is the increased role by the government (State Council) in monitoring and auditing the PLA's financial affairs.
15. These include the General Political Department, the CCP's Discipline Inspection Commission, Party committees and branches down to the company level within the military, and the fact that all PLA officers above the rank of colonel are Party members.
16. See my "Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?" *The Copenhagen Papers in Asian Studies* (Fall 2002).

The People's Liberation Army Modernisation: An Assessment

By Srikanth KONDAPALLI, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)

Introduction

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has launched a comprehensive modernisation programme of its armed forces (PLA) in the mid-1980s. While the PLA made efforts in this regard from the 1950s, recent phase of modernisation has been wide-ranging and has the effect of changing gradually the traditional image and contents of the PLA in the coming decades. After the 1979 Vietnam War China has experienced a relatively peaceful external environment, China made most of this situation by launching modernisation programme. In the recent period, the Central Military Commission (CMC) reportedly projected in the early 1990s a three-stage modernisation programme for the armed forces - viz., an initial modernisation of the three branches from 1992 to 1996; a second phase of "fundamental modernization" by 1998; and a third phase of "basic advanced Modernisation" to be completed by 2001.(1) Further blueprints were drawn by the new "fourth generation" of the Chinese leadership after the 16th Party Congress for modernising the PLA in the coming years.

China's armed forces have been unique in several aspects as compared to their counterparts in other parts of the globe. The development of the PLA was conditioned by the political vagaries of the socialist system with its guiding principles of modernisation, revolutionisation and regularisation, which differed in importance in the last five decades. Modernisation efforts of the PLA involved streamlining and reorganising its force structures, raising elite troops, restructuring of command and control mechanisms, restoration of the rank system and grades, emphasis on professional military education, revamping curriculum and upgrading the defence technological capabilities of the personnel. These are meant to enhance military capabilities of the country so as to overcome the perceived challenges of the state. Several factors influenced such modernising efforts, viz., changes in the nature of warfare, technology, ability to divert precious budgetary and human resources, political leadership's choices and outlook, and the like.

The paper explains in brief broad features of the PLA modernisation efforts in the last few decades in aspects of strategy, force structures, equipment up gradation, professional military education, training and the changes these brought about in the military exercises. This is followed by a brief assessment of these modernisation efforts.

1. PLA modernisation in PRC

The discourse on the PLA modernisation has been vibrant in the last five decades of the PRC. These are partly influenced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s changing political emphases as with other considerations dependent, as it were, on military challenges to the country, technological and budgetary considerations. The actual modernising efforts of the PLA, nevertheless, were carried by different defence industrial, staff and other related military establishments.

After the establishment of the PRC, the new leadership sought to introduce certain modernising influences to its armed forces in the light of its low-level of modernisation during the agrarian wars, civil war and as the Korean War was looming large over the horizon. Mao Zedong advocated transforming the PLA. In 1951, in the midst of the cooperation with the Soviets, he observed:

> We must never be arrogant or complacent. We must learn every bit of the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union in order to change our armed forces from their condition of backwardness and construct our armed forces into a most superior modernized military force [in the world], so as to be able to assure ourselves of the ability to defeat, in the future, the invasion of the imperialists' armies.(2)

Mao elaborated further on this aspect in 1952 in his address to the first graduates of the Military Academy in the midst of the Korean War. However, by this process he meant transforming the then PLA's

> …simple and low quality equipment …absence of regular organization and systematization …lack… [of] strict military discipline, …decentralized and nonunified [combat leadership and]…guerilla characteristics'(3).

The modernising agenda and efforts of Peng Dehuai and others, of course, were far-reaching. According to

Peng, the PLA in this period needed to import and learn from the modernising trends of the advanced countries. He said, addressing the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in 1956,

> When we began our army's modernization, we insisted that all the advanced experience of the Soviet army should be thoroughly learnt. This was correct, and during the past few years we have made very considerable achievements in this respect. There is no doubt that the Soviet army's advanced experience will still be the chief object of our study, because the Soviet army is the most advanced, modernized revolutionary army in the world, commanding a superior military science, a first-class military technology, and a rich store of experience in commanding modernized armies in battle.(4)

The nine CCP congresses, held after the establishment of the PRC, from 1956 to 2002, have emphasised the need for China to modernise its defence sector. As appendix 1 elaborates, such modernisation efforts, however, were subsumed under the overall development of the economy. A majority of the 156 industrial units established in the 1950s with the Soviet assistance are in the civilian sector, with about 40 catering to the defence needs of the country. Budgetary allocations for modernising defence sector were relatively low, though by the 1990s such allocations have shown an upswing, even in official figures, with two digit increases. Additional constraints on any full blown modernisation of the PLA include "red and expert" discourse, self-sufficiency after the Soviet technicians' withdrawal in 1960, technological factors, export controls by Western countries based on politico-strategic considerations, and the like.

Post 1970s CCP congresses reflect urgency in reform and modernising the PLA even as the political leadership counted economic modernisation as the top most priority. Subsumed under the concept of "comprehensive national power" (as also reflected in the 16th CCP Congress resolve to lead to a "well-off society") PLA modernisation is placed after the first three of the four modernisations, viz., agriculture, industry and science & technology, even as it acknowledged that "Strengthening our national defense is a strategic task in our modernisation drive".(5) Within the defence sector, emphasis was placed on "revolutionizing, modernizing and standardizing the military" with its obvious stress on obeying the Party's hold on the gun.(6)

In addition to the CCP congresses, another crucial indicator of the stance of the civilian leadership on PLA modernisation may be seen in the four White papers released from 1995 to 2002 as appendix 2 indicates. The common refrain in these papers is the emphasis on quality rather than quantity, up gradation of the weaponry to hi-tech aspects, introducing professionalism, etc.

The main objectives set forth for the PLA modernisation programme are to be able to deter the adversary which differed in the last five decades but mainly included the US forces in East Asia (1958 and 1996 Taiwan Straits crises, Korean War, trade embargoes, etc) and territorial and sovereignty issues. Extension of the security perimeters in February 1992 further enlarges the scope of the PLA modernisation.

The net results of these early modernising trends, in brief, are extensive adoption of the Soviet model of development of the armed forces, viz., the general departments, rank system (which was in force from 1955 till 1965 and resurrected later from 1980s modernisation), translation and implementation of the Soviet training manuals and procurement of modern equipment and systems from different sources. Yet the PLA forces in 1979 war with Vietnam showed glaring deficiencies in its modernisation.

2. Modernising Strategy

Modernising strategic principles have implications to the entire armed forces of a country. It influences the direction of the military organizational set-up, the procurement patterns and quality of military equipment, professional military education and training, besides indicating the direction in which the country responds to others in the region and beyond. A simplified broad brush of the trends in PLA strategy in the last eight decades since it evolved from 1921 indicates to three aspects of People's War (*renmin zhanzheng)* (PW), People's War Under Modern Conditions (*renmin zhanzheng zai xiandai tiaojian xia*) (PWMC) and the Local War Under High-tech Conditions (*jubu zhanzheng zai gao jishu tiaojian xia*). To this may be added the recent emphases on revolution in military affairs (*xin junshi geming*) (RMA) and asymmetric warfare (*bu duichen zhanzheng*).(7)

In the PW strategy, in general, the PLA forces emphasised quantity [*shuliang*] rather than quality [*zhiliang*] of the troops. Hence the 'inferior' [*lieshi*] level of

technology of the PLA continued to haunt it given the hi-tech nature of weapons that its adversary possessed.[8] Modernisation and adoption of recent strategies of PWMC or local war or RMA have implications in shedding quantity and shifting towards qualitative indicators.[9]

In the first modern and large-scale warfare that China fought against the US-led forces in Korea, modernising influences on the PLA are clearly seen specifically in the air force and artillery areas. Out of a count of USAF aircraft losses mounting to nearly 1,986, Chinese lost only 976 aircraft. Quick adoption of Soviet air battles like the employment of the Luftwaffe tactics to attack bomber formation is an innovation, though most of the Chinese Air Force actions were reportedly guided by the Soviet pilots. On the fire front, the Chinese People's Volunteers' artillery units in September 1952 fired nearly 45,000 rounds in a single day to flatten the US positions. Artillery fire accounted for nearly 35 percent of the of the total US/UN casualties along with the 75 percent wounded.[10]

Implementation of aspects of Soviet defence strategy, training and organisational patterns meant at least certain influences of the Clausewitzian principles in the PRC as different from the traditional PLA war fighting principles practised in revolutionary base areas.[11] To some extent these contradicted the traditional PLA warfare aspects and were soon to become a heart-burn in the CCP debates. Mao criticised in a late June 1958 meeting those who had 'blind faith' in USSR. He contended that the Soviet doctrine was entirely offensive in nature and suitable to the European conditions where the USSR had a large conventional advantage. Mao said that the Soviet model had made no provision for defensive war. As the technological level of the Chinese weaponry is still inferior compared to the advanced countries, in the event of a war with a superior force, the Soviet model as applied to the Chinese conditions would be problematic.[12]

Mid-1980s witnessed soul-searching in the PLA after the losses suffered in the Vietnam War of 1979.[13] To overcome the problems in the PLA, a 'strategic transformation' [*zhanlue zhuanbian*] was initiated at the May-June 1985 CMC enlarged conference, aimed at not only demobilising soldiers, but also improving the command system, and upgrading technological level of its weaponry. The Gulf War of 1991 also came as an eye-opener for the PLA in terms of the importance of multi-dimensional combat, rapid-response, in-depth and precision attacks, cruise missiles, and electronic warfare effects on destroying the C3I systems in all spheres of the battlefield.[14]

The modern hi-tech wars and debates within the PLA impacted on several aspects of war preparations, flexibility, from strategic surprise attack to operational, tactical and technological surprise attack, paralysing enemy's will to fight, to aim at a quick war with overwhelming force, command, control and communications, computers, intelligence operations, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), importance of precision-guided munitions, air-strikes, improvements in logistics support, information warfare, and development of stand-off weapons.[15] Towards attaining these capabilities, China has undertaken several measures in the direction of developing elite forces, theatre-command posts, mechanisation of the striking force and armoured corps, amphibious capabilities, advanced weapons programme, including long-range aviation, air-refuelling, AWACS-capable aircraft, aircraft carriers, and force multipliers such as mobile ballistic missile systems, land-attack cruise missiles, and advanced surface-to-air missiles. China is seeking to procure state-of-the-art multi-role fighters, beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles, direction finding and jamming equipment to upgrade its ground-based, ship-borne and air-borne forces.

Soon after the Asian financial crises and Kosovo bombings, the PLA proposed building of a "multi-field three-dimensional security system" with defense security as its core and including other aspects like information security, network security, and financial security.[16] Within the defense sector, importance was accorded to computer technology in automation control, precision guidance technology, laser technology, detection technology, space technology, stealth technology, and electronics technology.[17] According to Zhao Zhicheng, in order to overcome wars like that in Yugoslavia, space and air-based weapons instead of ground air defense networks should be acquired.[18] The then CMC Vice-Chairman, Zhang Wannian in 1999 argued that the "period from now to the early 21st century is an important period in which armaments of the Chinese armed force will become increasingly mechanized and information-based…"[19]

3. Force Restructuring

The process of force structure reorganisation took

place in various forms, including demobilisation of troops (mainly infantry), or transfer of personnel, reduction in the number of Military Regions (MR), merging of the traditional Field Armies into Group Armies (GA), or carving out of elite units (Rapid Reaction Forces and Special Operations Forces) as large-scale reorganization of the ground forces is a time consuming issue.(20)

Several reorganisations of the structure of the PLA took place in order to further the modernisation process. Broadly, the restructuring took place in terms of enhancing professionalism among the personnel, rationalisation of battle order, revamping control and command structures, enhancing combat capabilities, training, administrative and logistics reform and so on.(21) New bodies were created while some structures were abolished in this process of streamlining. From 1949 till present, demobilisation of the troops took place in ten instalments. (22) In September 1986 under the policy of "Simplified Administration Reorganisation," (23) the structure was revamped to suit the needs of modern battles. As a part of these efforts, troop reductions of the order of about one million were announced. In 1997 another announcements indicated demobilisation of about 500,000 troops to be completed by 2001. The 1998 White Paper claimed that reductions in the PLA's ground, naval and air forces accounted for 19 percent, 11.6 percent and 11 percent respectively.(24) In 2003, China is in the process of conducting another troop's demobilisation process.

Rank system was re-introduced in the 1980s. In December 1998, the PRC has amended its military service law enacted in 1955 but amended in 1984. Relevant provisions of this law include reducing the military service period, improvement of the reserve system and so on.(25) With these measures, conscription service was reduced to three years for technical personnel and two years for non-technical personnel. By these amendments, the proportion of "volunteer soldiers" is expected to be increased to about 35 percent by 2000.(26) To enhance professional trends, the PLA leaders also took measures to strengthen the administration and selection procedures of the Officer Corps and recruit directly professional civilians at sergeant level.(27)

In 1971, the number of MRs [*jun qu*] was reduced from 13 to 11. In the mid-1980s reorganization process, these 11 MRs were further reduced to the current seven. In such a reorganization process, some of the units, for example the tank unit and the anti-chemical warfare unit, which were under the Armoured Forces Command and the Anti-chemical Warfare Command respectively, will now be subsumed under the General Staff Headquarters and their actual command is placed in the hands of the area commands. As for the strength of the combat units within these MRs, there was a change in the configuration of the numbers and composition of the infantry, tank, artillery and Air Borne divisions. The nearly 121 infantry divisions that existed in the 1970s were reduced to 84 in 1992 to about 46 by 2000 and 44 in 2002. A further reduction of these divisions is expected in the coming years, while the armoured and artillery divisions are being strengthened.(28)

About 36 Field Armies [*yezhan jun*] of the country were reorganized into 24 Group Armies (GAs) (*ji tuan jun*) based on the US "Air-Land Battle" concept in preparation towards forming theatre command posts and proper coordination between the armed services of the country.(29) A further reorganization took place to reduce the 24 GAs into 21.

The PLA also began in 1999 to reorganize six of its 21 GAs by 2001- viz., two in Shenyang Military Region (MR), and one each in Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Jinan and Nanjing MRs.(30)

To fight local wars, the PLA needed Rapid Response Forces (RRF) [*kuaisu budui*] capable of operating independently or in joint operations. Currently it is engaged in the training of 40 RRF units, 20 of which have already reportedly been commissioned or redesignated in different regions and units of the PLA with varying levels of development and capabilities. These RRFs are to be developed in each of the seven Military Regions, in each of the 21 Group Armies and also by the service arms of the PLA in the coming years.(31)

The C3I system [*sanxi xitong*] has received considerable attention from September 1982 when the PRC has ordered all the armed services to introduce and improve the rapid transmission of battle commands.(32) Developments in modern military communications of China are reportedly seen in six areas: analogue technology is being replaced by digital technology, electrical cables by optical fibre cables, electro-mechanical switches by computer-controlled switches, single-purpose terminals by multipurpose terminals, single-tasking networks with multitasking networks, and manual management is being replaced by automated and intelligent management. These have reportedly contributed to the digitisation of the ground forces.(33)

The manifestation of the modernisation drive of Chi-

nese naval structure and fleet followed the pattern of quantitative and qualitative enhancement of ships' capabilities, high-speed boats of enduring capability, quick deployment and coordinated activities.(34) China has also begun the process of modernising its naval bases. Efforts in this direction include technological renovation; up gradation of docks, supply of water, and energy at Qingdao, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Zhanjiang ports; and restructuring of Lushun, Zhoushan, Wenzhou and Sanya military ports into different quarters for anchoring, living, logistics and recreation.(35) Another aspect of the reform process is the gradual change in the responsibilities of various aspects of the navy to suit the changing strategic perceptions of the navy.(36)

In order to overcome the problem of replenishing technical forces and enhance the rapid mobilisation of reserves, Chinese Navy has introduced, belatedly, the system of reorganising reserve professional technical forces into squads in different combat, logistics and marine units.(37)

Modernisation of Chinese Air Force structures involved renewal of its various components, reduction in the size of the structure and cutting down in the number of administrative levels, simplification of the pyramidal command levels, introduction of "a highly flexible multi-system composite formation", integration of various organizations, and so on.(38) Specific aspects included development of the Airborne Corps, building specialized forces like the Class-A combat regiments, command automation of missile battalions and antiaircraft gun companies.(39) Before the 1980s, Chinese Air Force had 12 air corps, 36 fighter divisions, 7 bomber divisions, six attack aircraft divisions and two transport aircraft divisions. After the 1980s, a majority of the air corps headquarters was abolished or transferred to MR Air Force (MRAF) Headquarters or placed as strategic reserves.(40) Further revamping took place in the 1990s with a three-layered unified command structure at Beijing, MRAFs and Air Division levels. For furthering the quick response of the airborne troops, RRFs were commissioned. Reorganisation also involved reduction of the obsolescent aircraft in the inventory of the PLAAF. Several of the J-5s, J-6s, J-7s fighters, Hong-series bombers and Yun-transports were retired from service in the last two decades.(41) Several PLAAF academic institutes were clubbed together, "closed, downgrad[ed], or merge[d]" with other units in the recent period.(42)

4. Hardware Modernisation

One of the most concrete indicators of military modernisation is visible in the hardware aspects. China has carried forward modernisation drive in its defence acquisitions either through indigenous sources or through purchases from abroad. [See Appendix 3]. Modernising influences were mainly reflected in the form of reform of the defense industrial structure, acquiring advanced weaponry or systems while at the same time withdrawing obsolete equipment from its active inventory. Since large-scale reorganisation is a time consuming process, selective, hi-tech, modernisation and priority funding of "elite" projects became the norm in China. The "863" Programme started impacting on the modernisation of specific weapon systems in the recent period. Specific areas include computer technology in automation control, precision guidance technology, laser technology, detection technology, space technology, stealth technology, and electronics technology.(43)

In 1984, the PRC made a decision to reform the system of procuring armaments and introduce a contract system for procuring arms, albeit under the state instruction plans. In 1998 China began reorganisation of the five-defence industrial divisions—viz., nuclear, space, aviation, shipping and arms—into companies. Major themes of this reorganisation are a transition from corporations to that of forming enterprises with guiding principles of market-oriented competition, improving management and macro-control and the like.(44) The Fourth Plenum of the 15th CCP Congress reportedly proposed a five-year plan and a ten-year target for army building including development of "three generations"—viz., "upgrade a generation of weaponry, develop a generation of weaponry, and test a generation of weaponry." It proposed a ratio outlay of 4:3:3 in this programme.(45) The General Armaments Department (GAD), formed in 1998 to properly coordinate and develop the R&D programme, established branches at the MR and GA levels in early 1999 for modernising logistics and weapons development programme. China also reportedly concluded a major arms-deal agreement spanning five years with Russia worth $20 billion in October 1999.(46) [See Appendix 3 for arms acquisitions from Russia].

5. Ground Forces

In general, the ground forces equipment modernisation involved improvement in the battlefield survivability of the armour, enhancing firepower, targeting systems,

crosswind sensors, third-generation night sights, computerized fire control systems, mobility of the vehicles, and provision of the Global Positioning Systems. Drawing lessons from the 1979 war with Vietnam, China emphasised the guiding principles, in the spheres of armour and artillery equipment, of "firepower, synchronisation, and economy of force".(47) The 16th Party Congress decided that the PLA needs to give more thrust in mechanising its equipment and spread information technology applications in the armed forces of the country.(48)

Modernising influence in light and main battle tanks are seen in the development of composite armour panels for enhanced battlefield survivability against small arms fire and shell splinters.(49) The latest models of MBTs (from Type 85II) are made of welded steel instead of the previous versions of cast steel turrets. In addition, the Type 90 II indicates explosive reactive armour. Secondly, the power-to-weight ratio has been enhanced over a period of time from 14.44 hp/t in the Type 59 to 25 in Type 90II. Speed has been increased from 40-50 kmph powered by a 520 hp engine of the Type 59 MBT to about 62.3 kmph of the 1,200 hp engine of the Type 90II with enhanced fuel capacity for longer duration operations. Other modernising influences include improvements in infrared night vision equipment, gun stabilizers, and provision of GPS from the Type 85 III model onwards, laser range finders etc. The Type 90II, for instance, boasts of 71 percent hit probability in engaging a target whether in stationary or in moving position.

Improvements in Armoured Personnel Carriers include steel armour and 320-360hp diesel engines that provide higher power-to-weight ratio.(50) Regarding artillery, the NORINCO has also developed various self-propelled guns and howitzers (tracked as well as towed versions) of different calibres (ranging from 203mm, 155mm, 152mm, 130 mm, 122 mm, etc.). The latest models display qualitative improvements in power-to-weight ratio despite a progressive increase in the weight of the guns from the Type 54 to that of the latest 155 mm gun.

6. Aviation

China revamped its aviation industrial structures and in 1999 the Aviation Industries Corporation (AVIC) was further bifurcated in to two organisations (I & II). In addition, China has commenced simultaneous design and development of advanced fighter aircraft. Six reported versions of fighter aircrafts/fighter-bombers include FC-1, F-10 (developed from 2001 with Israeli technology), F-11 (a version of the re-designated Su-27 fighter aircraft), FBC-1 (JH-7 twin-engine strike fighter for long-range air cover missions), XJ-1 and a stealth aircraft. The then PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao stated:

> We shall focus our efforts on applying new sophisticated technology to raise combat effectiveness of the troops while importing some high-tech weapons which have accuracy in hitting the target…Over the next few years, the Chinese air force will enhance its deterrent force in the air, ability to impose air blockades and launch air strikes, as well as ability to conduct joint operations of ground forces, navy and the air force.(51)

Major innovations attempted by China are related to multi-functional long-range air superiority with advanced fire control systems, beyond-vision air-to-air missile systems, rapid reaction, electronic warfare, and resistance to electronic jamming and for real time aerial combat and air-to-ground assault systems. Other areas in which China has shown keen interest are AWACS, in-flight refuelling, anti-missile defences, and automatic command and control facilities.

7. Navy

Admiral Liu Huaqing is considered as a major modernising influence on the Chinese Navy. (52) He established four goals in this regard, including electronisation, automation, ballistic missile-equipment and nuclearisation. In modernising its naval equipment, China emphasized on increasing the numbers of surface combatants in comparison to their ratio with that of the subsurface naval vessels. While several obsolete submarines were either decommissioned or put into reserves, the number of destroyers and frigates increased over a period of time. Acquisition of two Sovremenny class destroyers in 1996-99 (and more ordered) with advanced naval guns, radars, tactical missile systems furthers this process. Another significant feature is the increase in the number of amphibious vessels, thus indicating importance given to Marine Corps landing operations for Taiwan and South China Sea Islands operations in the future.(53)

Qualitative improvements like enhanced firepower, endurance capabilities and reach of the naval vessels and

weapon systems have been made. The mobility of the ships has also increased noticeably, thanks to the gradual transition into gas turbines and nuclear propulsion. The endurance capability of the submarines was also enhanced. Acquisition of a large number of Kilo-class submarines, and, possibly, some of the Amur-class with air independent propulsion, could definitely alter naval capabilities of China in the future. The firepower of the destroyers, frigates and submarines (54 Moskits, Gadfly's, HQ & YJ-series SAMs & SSMs, etc) show substantial improvement, though still not up to the level of a full-fledged blue navy. Automation of SAM launchers is another significant advance.

8. Strategic Weapons

Changes from minimum to limited nuclear deterrence with its impact on enhancing nuclear stockpile, developing miniature versions, long-range, solid propellant, accurate and MIRV capabilities are broadly the modernising aspects of strategic weapons of China.(54) These were highlighted by Taiwan Straits missile crisis of 1996, Wen-ho Lee spy case at the Los Alamos Laboratories in the US and the alleged transfers of W-88 miniaturised nuclear weapons technologies to China, the Loral & Hughes transfers of satellite guidance systems to China (that could be instrumental in enhancing the accuracy of the Chinese missiles) and the US plan to deploy ballistic missile defence system in East Asia.

The liquid fuelled and silo-based older-generation Dong Feng 3 and 4 missiles are giving way to mobile and solid-propellant strategic and tactical missiles. The development of the Dong Feng-31 started from the 1980s as a replacement of China's older versions of missiles. This new generation DF-31 three-stage solid-propellant inter-continental-range ballistic missile was test-fired in August 1999 and reportedly deployed in the southern regions of China.(55) Two flight tests of the DF-31 were reported during the year 2000. While the first one was not publicized, the second one, conducted on November 2, 2000, was reported to be successful and may have used decoy warheads. Launched from the Wuzhai Missile and Space Centre, the test may not have included its full range of 8,000 km.(56) DF-31's sea-based version, the Julang-2 SLBM is slated to be deployed on the Type 094 SSBN under-development. The first of the JL-2 submarine-launched IRBM is expected to be operational with the PLA Navy. The CMC has reportedly decided that the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine patrols be made a matter of routine by 2005.(57) It was reported that China is in the process of modernising its missile capabilities by making agreements with Russia, including SS-18/19 ICBM technology in 1997-98 to be incorporated in the up gradation of the Dong Fang-31/41 missiles and testing with Russian cooperation of an ABM in the Tibetan Plateau in 1999. MIRV capabilities are another area China is reportedly working at the moment.(58) The Second Artillery Forces have formed a new "technological support group" in May 2000.(59)

The PLA is in the process of developing and deploying several ground-to-air-missile systems (including LY-60, KS-1, FM-80, and FM-90, QW-1, QW-2, S-300 PMU1 and Tor-M missiles; FT2000 anti-radiation SAM to counter electronic fighter planes; C701 TV-guided missiles; meter-wave radars to counter infiltrating weapons. In 1998 it was reported that the PLA troops carried out the first field trials of a new SAM system, believed to be the long-range FT-2000, during exercises. According to the official Beijing Evening News, the missiles "hit their target every time".(60)

9. Logistics

Logistics modernisation is another area the PLA has been stressing to meet future warfare needs. According to the 2000 White Paper, logistics modernisation are geared to provide

> …flexible and effective field facilities for logistical supply, sustainment support, medical aid and emergency repair, surface replenishment, air refuelling and manoeuvrability support for the Second Artillery Force."(61)

The PLA in this regard has introduced three major reforms to their logistics units: "linking the logistics work of the three services, carrying out socialized logistics support, and improving the ability of field operation mobile support."(62) In early 2000, China introduced the system of joint logistics by integrating facilities at the MR and local levels; contract system was introduced; and instituted military insurance system among the ranks. Mention here should be made of the roads and railway networks that China has been planning or developing in various regions of the country. From 1951-95 the PLA built about 100 highways in Tibet. Construction of the first expressway on the Tibet-Qinghai Plateau of about 217 km from Xining to Lan-

zhou was started in 1999 with a cost of Yuan 4.5 billion ($540 million).[63] A railway line of about 1,000 kilometres is being planned for linking Qinghai with Tibet by 2007.

10. Software Modernisation

More invisible, as compared to the hardware modernisation, are changes in the software aspects of the PLA. These modernisation efforts in professional military education (PME), training, exercises and using simulated methods are, nevertheless, crucial and have been underlined by the PLA for further revamping. China's PME is in the throes of modernisation and reorganisation. Intended to inculcate professionalism among the officer corps, PME has been emphasised in the recent period.[64] The military academies and schools are broadly divided into two main types and four levels based on the intake of these academies. The two main types include the "command" schools and the other the engineering and technical institutes. The "command" type of schools is divided into high, medium, and entry levels and the technical schools into mid- and high-level schools[65]. Currently the most important military academies that train high-level commanders include the National Defense University (NDU) at Beijing. The University of Science and Technology at Changsha, the Army Staff Officer Institute at Shijiazhaung, and the tri-services institutes, viz., the Air Force Academy at Beijing, the Naval Academy at Nanjing and the Armoured Infantry Academy at Changxindian cater to the needs of the PLA's specialised academic activities[66]. Those entering these "senior command academies" are already division or army-level cadres, while a few are also recruited from the regimental command level. Normally, graduates are promoted one level, most after two years of study and a few after only one.

The second-level institutes, called as the "middle command academies", serve mid-level commanders, including engineers, military doctors and logisticians. These are recruited from cadres at the company, battalion or deputy regiment level. They are promoted one rank after a one or two year course of studies.

The third level of the military institutes, called as the "junior command academies", train low-level commanders, while the fourth level is for non commissioned officers (NCOs). The "junior command academies" recruit students from among local senior middle school graduates and they will focus on providing a basic military, political and cultural education[67]. The 76 administrative and technical posts such as company quartermaster, radio station director and various technical jobs formerly filled by the army officers are assigned to the NCOs[68]. The army academies and technical institutes serving various military branches in the seven military regions do the training of the entry-level commanders.

This process of structural reform of the PME included not only reducing the number of these military schools and academies in certain sectors and giving impetus to other categories, but also revamping the curriculum of these academies. In the mid-1980s, when this drive was intensified, Han Huaizhi was appointed the director of the "Military Academy Systems reform task force" established on November 14, 1984. In 1986, the CMC, according to the recommendations of this task force, passed a resolution on reforming the education in the military academies, broadly encompassing the improvements to be made in the system, direction of teaching and training systems at lower, middle and upper levels, and improving middle and upper level vocational and technical schools and faulty structures[69]. From 1986, the CMC planned to establish new-style schools to include army officer training schools, military educational academies, military economy academies, information and engineering colleges. In the 1990s, Yang Baibing the then Secretary of the CMC, maintained the status of the NDU as a primary military region, while the status of all academies serving individual branches of the military were lowered from the army group level to the army level.[70] These reforms, however, were short-lived. In 1998, the existing military academies were reduced by about 30 percent in the "command" category but those among technical category have to be "readjusted" and "consolidated"[71]. The 1999 reform of the PME has been the most significant in merging, reducing or reforming institutions of higher learning. According to the 2000 White Paper issued by China,

> …the original two categories of institutions for training commanding and technical officers have been replaced by two categories of institutions for training officer candidates and in-service officers. Five universities have been established—the universities of national defense science and technology, information engineering, science and engineering, naval engineering, and air force engineering….. The

PLA is making an effort to have all officer candidates receive higher education by 2010[72]

China has also modernised the teaching equipment of the military academies. Efforts are on to teach the students with computational methods, simulation programme and so on. The leaders have stressed the use of computers in these academies. However, most of the equipment in the military academies, other than the high-level ones, remains outdated and the libraries poorly stocked. Though the teaching methods were to include computers and other advanced equipment their availability is less than the expectations.

11. Training

In order to overcome the contradictions between personnel and technology [*ren he jishu maodun*], as PLA started receiving hi-tech gadgets of late, modernising training of the personnel is crucial. The real test of the equipment in warfare is also seen in the level of the training. Several measures were undertaken in this regard. In the 1960s, the PLA followed the training principle of "taking our side as the dominant factor". At the beginnings of the 1970s camp and field training was followed and training units were established. From April 1972 to 1973 about 310,000 officers were trained in rotation.[73] In 1974, Deng Xiaoping equated training as among the strategic issues to be reformed.[74] Subsequently, the mid-1980s strategic transformation of the PLA has also affected in modernising the training methods. Between 1993 and 1995 the PLA launched a reform programme of the training system. This three-year reform programme singled out about 100 ground force units for training in the science of campaigns, tactics and grouping. [75] In 1995 the General Staff Department, the nodal organ for military training, has put forth a "Military Training Outline" which broadly revised the armed forces training from "fighting" a local war to "winning" a local war under high tech conditions.[76] Changes in the training methods are aimed henceforth at a transition from:

- extensive labour-intensive training to high-quality, high-efficiency and technology-intensive training;
- meeting the needs of fighting a local war under ordinary conditions to meeting the needs of winning a local war under the conditions of modern technology and particularly high technology. [77]

Subsequently a three-year "high-tide" of training was launched in 1997. In 1998 Jiang Zemin, while addressing a training session for intermediate and high-ranking cadres of the PLA, urged the gathering to find ways to "increase the ability to control a modern war".[78] Jiang Zemin reportedly issued "Essentials of Combined Operations of the first generation" in 1999.[79] After assessing the previous cycle of training reform and to aim at "formidable enemies", a new project of "innovation in four aspects" was launched as a guideline for the early part of the 21st Century in which it is predicted that there would be a "fierce quality competition" among different militaries.[80]

A "five combat abilities" [*wuzhong zuozhan nengli*] campaign was launched by the PLA to train its troops "under modern conditions". These include cooperative combat ability by including all branches of the armed forces; rapid response ability to attack and eliminate the enemy; electronic countermeasure [ECM] ability to engage in effective electronic monitoring, interference and destruction and ECMs; logistics assurance ability in supply of materials, medical treatment and rescue, equipment maintenance and transportation and; field warfare survival ability.[81]

According to the "two adaptations, three keeping paces, four transformations" [*liange shiying, sange tongbu, sige zhuanbian*] the reserve forces were ordered to adapt to the current strategic changes and the objective requirements of war-time mobilisation; to keep pace with modernisation, regional economic reforms, organisation building and upgrading and deployment of weaponry among militias; transform from training of reserves to specialized technical training, from haphazard and miscellaneous training to specific orientation, from emphasis on quantity to quality, and from low-calibre training of "everyone can fire a rifle and toss a grenade" to base-oriented training.[82] In the Chinese joint operational training, officers of various armed services were urged to "widen" their field of vision about other services and develop joint formation, joint tactics and joint training.[83]

12. Military Exercises

China has conducted more than 300 military exercises in the last five decades with their numbers increasing after the modernisation programme was launched in 1978. Though the military exercises of the earlier period were either by single service or are confined to limited

geographical area or subject, after the modernisation drive was launched, combined arms exercises became the norm. Subjects dealt with in these training programmes included the so-called "three-changes"—change from technical training to tactical training, from training on a single type of airframe to multiple air frames; and from operation by a single arm of the service to operation by combined arms of the service.

In early 1970s, a new policy of "three attacks and three defences" was initiated to train troops in "attacking tanks, aircraft and paratroopers and defending against atomic bombs, chemical warfare and biological weapons." Military exercises conducted from 2000 stressed the same principles of "three attacks and three defences" of the early 1970s albeit with changed contents of "attacking stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters; defending against precision strikes, electronic interference, and reconnaissance and monitoring".(84) In addition, from the recent period China has initiated joint military exercises with other countries, including with Russia, Central Asian Republics, Pakistan and India, though the scale of such operations have been limited in scope and extent to include counter terrorism, and search and rescue operations.(85)

13. Simulation

Simulation exercises include a careful and critical study of an imaginary opponent's combat skills, relative evaluation of equipment on both sides, awareness of the opponent's tactics, actual operational requirements, and so on. At the end these simulated exercises are expected to augment one's own combat capabilities, overcome weaknesses, and, given current Chinese inventory backwardness, "overcome the superior with inferior equipment."(86) The other advantages of such simulated exercises are easy adaptability to veritable environments, cost-effectiveness, scientific inputs, ability to carry out high-quality exercises at any time.

To raise the tactical training levels of the forces, "Red Army" to counter the "Blue Army" system was introduced. The PLA has set up its first simulated foreign unit in the Nanjing MR in the 1980s. A "black panther unit" (*heibao budui*) was established in this region for simulated electronic warfare and other combat aspects.(87) In 1984 a large simulation centre was established at Beijing.(88) On October 16, 1996, a military training simulator exhibition was held at Changping, suburbs of Beijing for all the three services and the Strategic Rocket Forces.(89) The PLA newspaper for the first time acknowledged in September 1999 the creation of a permanent combined-force "Blue Army" in the Shenyang MR to undertake the opposition role in the military exercises and to raise these exercises "to a higher level".(90) It was reported that a "distributive-interactive operation simulation system evolved during a military exercise in Lanzhou MR in late 1998.(91) It was resolved that the simulated training exercises be made available to all army units by 2000.(92) In addition, in order to provide simulated logistics training, the PLA developed a tactical logistics command simulation training system in 1999.(93) The Beijing and Shenyang MRs used many areas of logistics including military supply, sanitation, oil supply and transportation in conducting logistics guarantee training.(94)

14. Assessment

The PLA is in the process of modernising its doctrinal principles, inventory, force structures, PME and training. Progress in the last two decades has been higher than compared to the previous period, given the concerted efforts after launching of the Four Modernisation programme from the late 1970s. Extension in the security perimeter of China in 1992 further added to this modernisation drive.

Modernisation of the PLA affected the power projection forces like the air, naval and missile forces, while less emphases was placed on the ground forces which were actually downsized. PLA's journey towards elitism is reflected in the process. Additionally, professional trends were introduced with younger profile and retirement age limits, rank and grades, reforming curriculum in the academia, emphasis on technical cadre, etc. Nevertheless, one frequently comes across the phenomenon of lack of initiative and innovation of PLA troops in the training programme.

Conventionally, more modernisation efforts lead to more professionalism among the ranks and may lead to less hold of the CCP over the PLA. Reflecting such phenomena, the PLA newspaper called for a review of the situation and emphasised carrying forward the PLA tradition of obeying the CCP. It said:

> At present, our military is at a historical turning point, with significant changes in the international and domestic environment, in the purpose and tasks for army building, in the form of wars, and in the

structure of military professionals. Old comrades who have made great contributions to the creation of excellent traditions of the military have retired one after another. None of the cadres currently in the military services joined the armed forces during wartime. The number of cadres who joined the armed forces in the 1950s is also very small now.(95)

Hardware modernisation made progress with indigenous efforts and acquisitions from abroad, mainly Russia, France and Israel, though with these two sources, China faced problems such as high technology development, integration of different systems, export controls, and budgetary constraints. Earlier efforts at reverse-engineering, that consumed more than a decade, are giving way to joint design and development or licence-manufacturing agreements and selective systems imports from abroad. Shifts towards 21st Century warfare technologies, RMA, IW and space technologies may be seen in the R&D process with strategic frontiers as focus. The early 2003 accident involving an indigenously-built Ming class submarine No. 361 near Neichangshan Islands has been a set back, though.

One effect of the modernisation drive is that defence spending increased to double-digit figures throughout the recent period. Western estimates on China's actual spending on defence sector to be four times that of the official figures to make it the second largest defence spender in the world after the US and displacing that of Japan.

Modernisation of the PLA forces has highlighted the significance of challenges for the neighbouring countries, though current military build-up indicates to their orientation towards Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyutao, and South China Sea Islands. Possible military action by China in Taiwan Straits include six different ways viz., SRBM pre-emptive strikes; attacks to paralyse electronic and C4I systems; air strikes; deployment by airborne forces; conducting submarine blockades; and amphibious landing operations.(96) In addition, the resolve to fight and win local wars on borders poses a challenge to regional stability.

Notes

1. See *Cheng Ming* March 1, 1992, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, China (*hereafter *FBIS-CHI) FBIS-CHI-92-045*, March 6, 1992 p 37. See also David Shambaugh, *Reforming China's Military* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); C. Dennison Lane, et. al Eds. *Chinese Military Modernization* (Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996); Ng Ka Po, "A Review of Chinese Military Modernization Since 1977" in *China News Analysis* (Taipei) No 1511, (June 1, 1994) pp1-9.
2. See Mao's Comment on "A summary of the relationship between the various Departments of the Military and the Soviet advisors" of January 1, 1951 in *Ziliao xuanbian* reprinted in *The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976 Vol. I September 1949-December 1955* (edited by Michael Y M Kau and John K Leung) (Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe Inc., 1986) p 157
3. See Mao's "Address to the First Graduating Class of the Military Academy" of July 10, 1952 in *Dahai hangxing* in Kau and Leung 1986 p 272.
4. See Peng Dehuai's speech, *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* Vol. II (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1956) p 41. See also Wang Zhenzhu et. al. (eds.) *Peng Dehuai Zhuan* [Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1995) pp. 501-07 and Zhang Wenhuan "Chief Peng's great contributions to the building of our Army in the 1950s" *Junshi Lishi* [History of Military Affairs] (Beijing) No.6 (1988).
5. For a recent emphasis of this phenomenon, see "Making Contributions for Attaining New Objectives of Struggle—Seventh Commentary on Studying, Implementing the Spirit of 16th CPC National Congress" *Jiefangjun Bao* January 15, 2003 in *FBIS-CHI-2003-0115* January 17, 2003. The writer argued: "National defense and army building, as important parts of national construction, are consistently of crucial relevance to the existence and development of a country. Only when a country is rich can its military be strong. To enrich a country, its military must be strengthened.".
6. See "Clearly Defining Objectives, Striving For Practical Results" *Jiefangjun Bao* January 10, 2003 in *FBIS-CHI-2003-0110* January 14, 2003. Hideya Yamamoto: "With Jiang Staying in Power, Military Will Increase Position and Influence" *Sankei Shimbun* January 4, 2003 *in FBIS-CHI-2003-0107* January 10, 2003 has argued that this congress would

result in the strengthening of the PLA and further expansion of China on the territorial and maritime issues in the coming period.

7. See Michael Pillsbury ed. *Chinese Views of Future Warfare* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1998) first published 1997; Pillsbury ed. *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (National Defense University, 2000) available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/pills2.htm>; for a full length discussion on different strands in the military strategic issues as perceived by the Chinese strategic community. See also See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999) translated at *FBISOW2807114599*; Jia Weidong, "Asymmetric war…." *Liberation Army Daily* p. 6 April 17, 1999 in *FBIS-CHI-1999-0510* May 11, 1999 and Tadao Inoue, "Chinese military strategy toward the 21st Century" Defense Research Center (Tokyo) at <http://www.drc-jpn.org/AR3-E/inoue-e.htm>.
8. See Chinese Academy of Military Science, *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junyu* [Chinese People's Liberation Army Military Terminology] (Beijing: PLA Soldiers' Publications, 1982) p. 18.
9. On the characteristics of modern war and PWMC see Zhu Yida, ed. *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Haijun fence* [*Chinese People's Liberation Army Officers Handbook: Naval Forces Part*] (Qingdao: Qingdao Chubanshe 1991) pp. 377-78.
10. See Spencer C. Tucker Ed. *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Sociological and Military History* (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-Clio Inc., 2000) pp.122-26, 50-56 and 267**.**
11. On Mao and Clauswitz see, Lin Lijiang and Zhu Jianzhong's article in National Defence University Science Research Bureau ed. *Mao Zedong junshi sixiang zai zhongguo de xingli yu fazhan* (Beijing: NDU Publications, 1994) pp. 149-54. See Phillip S. Melinger, "China and Clauswitz" *Defense Analysis* (Lancaster) vol. 17 no. 3 December 2001 pp. 325-26 for the importance of the topic in a post EP-3 incident context.
12. See for Mao's speech carried by *Jiefangjun Bao* July 1, 1958 in Frederick Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950-1965* (New York: M.E.Sharpe,1993) (2nd edition) p.294. According to the Military Science Academy History Research Bureau ed. *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun liushi nian da shiqi* [Chronology of the major events of the sixty years of the Chinese People's Liberation Army] (Beijing: Military Science Publications, 1988) p.569 nearly 1,000 'high level cadres' participated in this meeting to review the direction of the national defence construction work, including the defence strategic issues.
13. The 1979 Vietnam War showed the weaknesses of the PLA's arms, fighting ability, and lack of experience in directing battles. Deng Xiaoping on March 12, 1980 candidly agreed that 'If a war breaks out, we will find it difficult even to disperse our forces [due to 'bloatedness'], let alone direct operations'. See *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984) p.269 and Central Military Commission General Office ed. *Deng Xiaoping guanyu xinshiqi jundui jianshe lunshu xuanbian* [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping concerning army building in the new period] (Beijing: August First Publications, 1993) p. 111.
14. See Zhang Yihong, "How did the Persian Gulf War affect the Chinese Army?" December 28, 1998 at <http://www.kanwa.com/english/981230b.html>.
15. See Feng Haiming, "*Dangdai gaojishu jubu zhanzheng zhanlue zhidao fazhan de xin dongxiang*" [New trends of development in strategic guidance in contemporary hi-tech local wars] *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* [Chinese Military Science] (Beijing) vol. 45 no. 4 1998 pp. 162-64; Kan Hui, "*Gaojishu jubu zhanzheng de tedian*" [Characteristics of hi-tech local wars] *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* vol. 45 no. 4 1998 pp. 151-55. Ma Ping, author of several books on strategy, has identified six "laws" of such hi-tech wars: the laws of political domination and limitation, of strength decision, of initiatives, of the form change of time and space, of defensive and offensive operations, and of coordination in operations at various levels. See his "*Gaojishu zhanzheng guilu chutan*" [Explorations in the laws of hi-tech wars] *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* vol. 45 no.4 1998 p. 130. Aspects emphasised in the information warfare methods include information dismemberment, information interdiction, information "pollution" (through virus and fraud) and information attacks. See Chen Hua and Geng Haijun in "Launching a

war against the central information system" *Liberation Army Daily* January 2, 2002 p.11 in *FBIS-CHI-2002-0130* February 5, 2002.

16. See "Military puts forward five-azimuth three-dimensional security concept" *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong) July 7, 1999 in Selected World Broadcasts: Part 3 Asia-Pacific [hereafter *SWB FE*] *SWB FE/3581 G/7-8* July 8, 1999.
17. See Qi Huajun, "High-tech military technology in the future" *Sichuan Ribao* October 26, 1999 in *SWB FE/3678 G/13* October 29, 1999.
18. "Three topics on anti-air raid operations" *Liberation Army Daily* April 27,1999 in *SWB FE/3529 G/8* May 8, 1999.
19. Zhang cited in Army prioritizes training in high-tech weapons" *Xinhua* October 22, 1999 in *SWB FE/3674 G/7* October 25, 1999.
20. For a latest review of developments in this field see James C. Mulvenon and Andrew ND Yang eds. *Seeking Truth From Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era* (Santa Monica: RAND Corp, 2001) pp. 51-86.
21. See J.V.P. Goldrick and P. D. Jones, "Far Eastern Navies" *US Naval Institute Proceedings* vol. 114 no. 3 (March 1988) pp. 80-87 (p.80).
22. On demobilisation efforts see Srikanth Kondapalli, *China's Military: The PLA in Transition* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999) pp.54-76.
23. See Keith Jacobs, "China's Military Modernization and the South China Sea" *Jane's Intelligence Review* June 1992 pp.278-81 (p.278).
24. "China's National Defense" at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/32223.html#2>.
25. For one of the best considerations of the subject see Mayama Katsuhiko, "Amendment of the "Military Service Law" and reformation of the national defense system in China" *NIDS Security Reports* (Tokyo) No.2 March 2001 pp. 35-52.
26. See John Wu, "China claims increase the proportion of volunteer soldiers" October 28, 1998 at <http://www.kanwa.com/english/981128c.html>.
27. See for Fu Quanyou on Officer Corps, *Xinhua* September 4, 1999 in *SWB FE/3633 G/9* September 7, 1999. For Jiang Zemin's decree of June 30, 1999 on issues of recruiting civilians and pay rise, *Xinhua* July 11, 1999 in *SWB FE/3585 G/8* July 13, 1999.See also *Xinhua* report of August 17, 1999 in *SWB FE/3617 G/5* August 19, 1999. On professional trends in the PLA in general see Ellis Joffe "Reforming the PLA: Professionalism First" in his work, *The Chinese Army after Mao* (George Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1987) pp 119-48.
28. For changes in the composition of the combat units see *Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo* vol.2 pp. 47-56 and the various annual assessments of International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: various years) and "*Junshi Kongjian*" at <http://www.tl.ah163.net/personalhomepage/aaa/aaa/lj/s-lj.htm>.
29. According to one report in a Chinese website, of these 24 GAs, seven are of rapid response [*kuaisu fanying*] type and forming the "main" aspects of the Chinese ground forces' combat capabilities. These seven are the numbered GAs of 1, 13, 21, 27, and 38, 39 and 54- all designated as Type A GAs. See "*Junshi Kongjian*" at <http://www.tl.ah163.net/personalhomepage/aaa/aaa/lj/s-lj.htm>; and International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 139.
30. According to reports these GAs will be converted from a division-based structure to a brigade-based structure. See Robert Sae-Liu, "PLA reorganises group armies" *Jane's Defence Weekly* September 15, 1999 p.33.
31. See "China's Rapid Reaction Force and Rapid Deployment Force" at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/chinacamf.htm>; and Dennis J. Blasko, "PLA Ground Forces Lessons Learned: Experience and theory" in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel Eds. *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2003) pp. 64-87 (pp. 76-78). Though the RRFs were created in the recent period, the roots of the development of such forces can be traced back to the close confident of Deng Xiaoping, Marshal Liu Bocheng's dichotomy in the force levels. Liu advocated, while teaching at the prestigious Nanjing Military Academy in the 1950s, that "The normal forces and extraordinary forces are a dialectical unity, of which all generals must have a grasp. Extraordinary forces contain normal ones, and normal, extraordinary. There should be unpredictable changes in them… What are the normal forces?

Generally speaking, forces which fight in a regular way according to usual tactical principles [,] are normal forces. *Forces which fight otherwise and move stealthily and attack by surprise are extraordinary ones*". Marshal Liu Bocheng cited in Tao Hanzhong, 'Extraordinary and Normal Forces' in his edited volume, *Sun Zi: The Art of War* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1993) 1995 reprint p.41 (emphasis added). Liu's influence was seen in the PLA in terms of the early efforts to build such modern elite forces in the 1950s, though in vain.

32. See the Editorial Committee of Inside Mainland China, *A Lexicon of Chinese Communist Terminology* 2 vols. (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1997) (Bilingual edition) [hereafter **The Lexicon**] vol.2 pp. 62-63.
33. See Li Xuanqing and Ma Xiaochun, "Armed forces' communications become 'multidimensional" *Xinhua* July 16, 1997.
34. See *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Haijun fence* p.299.
35. This is based on the report "Modern naval bases" *China Daily* April 28, 1997 p.3.
36. See Srikanth Kondapalli, *China's Naval Power* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001) and Han Xiaohu, "*Fazhan zhongguo haijun yuanyang zuozhan nengli*" [Ocean operational capabilities of the Chinese Navy] *Xiandai Jianchuan* no. 110 February 1995 pp. 36-37.
37. "Officers and men from a naval mobile radar emergency squad install radar antennae" *Jiefangjun Bao* January 13, 2003 in *FBIS-CHI-2003-0113* January 14, 2003.
38. See Peng Feng, "Drastic Changes To Take Place in Form of Battlefield" *Liberation Army Daily* January 9, 1996 p. 6 in *FBIS-CHI-96-061* March 28, 1996 pp. 27-28; Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel and Jonathan D. Pollack, *China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1995) (MR-580-AF) and Kenneth W. Allen, "The PLA Air Force: 1949-2002 Overview and Lessons Learned" in Burkitt et.al eds. *op.cit*. pp. 89-156.
39. Rong Qingxiang, Zhang Dongfeng and Hong Heping, "Flying Toward a New Century-Summary of Air Force Modernization" *Liberation Army Daily* November 11, 1994 p. 1 in *FBIS-CHI-94-232* December 2, 1994 pp. 23-24 (p. 23) and Xin Ming (chief ed.) *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Hangkong fence* [Chinese People's Liberation Army Officers Manual: Air Force Part] (Qingdao: Qingdao Publications, 1991).
40. This is based on You Ji, *The Armed Forces of China* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1999) p.122.
41. According to Lewis and Xue by 1988, 48.8 percent of aircraft, 53.9 percent of aircraft engines, 42 percent of radar systems, 50 percent of HQ-2 SAMs, and 42 percent of HQ-2 missile guidance sites were not in PLAAF operation. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, "China's Search for a Modern Air Force" *International Security* vol. 24 no. 1 Summer 1999 pp. 64-94 (p. 74).
42. See Chai Shanwu, "Rectification facilitates air force reorganization" *Xinhua* December 22, 1985 in *FBIS-CHI-85-249* December 27, 1985 pp. K18-19.
43. See Qi Huajun, "High-tech military technology in the future" *Sichuan Ribao* October 26, 1999 in *SWB FE/3678 G/13* October 29, 1999 and Mark A. Stokes, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the US National Security* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1999).
44. For details see *Xinhua* April 27, 1999 in *SWB FE/3522 G/8* April 30, 1999 and Zhang Aiping, "*Heping shiqi de guofang jianshe*" [China's National Defense in the Peace Period] *Zhanlue yu Guanli* Vol.4 No.35 1999 pp.13-18.
45. See for the Plenum's proposals, *Tai Yang Pao* September 29, 1999 in *SWB FE/3652 G/10* September 29, 1999.
46. See *Tai Yang Pao* November 1, 1999 in *SWB FE/3681 G/3-4* November 2, 1999; *Sing Tao Jih Pao* October 12,1999 in *SWB FE/3668 G/9* October 18, 1999.
47. See Susan Puska, "The People's Liberation Army Logistics Department: Toward Joint Logistics Support" in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew ND Yang Eds. *The PLA as Organization: Reference volume v1.0* (Santa Monica: RAND Corp, 2002) pp. 247-72 (p. 255).
48. "PLA Deputies at NPC Panel Discussion Pledge to Mechanize, Modernize Through IT" *Xinhua* March 17, 2003 in *FBIS-CHI-2003-0317* March 18, 2003.
49. This is based on *Jane's Armour and Artillery 2000-2001* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2000) (relevant pages) and "*Junshi Kongjian*" at <http://www.tl.ah163.net/personalhomepage/aaa/aa

a/lj/s-lj.htm>.

50. This is based on *Jane's Armour and Artillery 2000-2001* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2000) pp. 4-8; 269-77 and 417-19.
51. Liu Shunyao interviewed by Xinhua as cited by *Agence France Presse* April 15, 1997 in *FBIS-CHI-97-105* April 16, 1997.
52. "*Youguanhai—jun zhanlue wenti de tantao*" [On naval strategy] *Haijun Zazhi* [**Naval Force Magazine**] June 1986 p.3.
53. This section is based on Srikanth Kondapalli, *China's Naval Power* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001).
54. See Richard D. Fischer, Jr., "China's Missile Modernisation and Space Warfare Plans" in K. Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli Eds. *Asian Security and China 2000-2010* (New Delhi: Shipra Publications & IDSA, 2004) pp. 152-81.
55. "China tests DF-31 for third time" *Jane's Defence Weekly* December 20, 2000 p. 5; Paul Beaver, China flexes muscles in missile exercise" *Jane's Defence Weekly* August 4, 1999 p.5; Sofia Wu, "Premier says China's missile build-up justifies need for arms" *Central News Agency* March 16, 2001 in *SWB FE/4097 F/1* March 17, 2001; Sofia Wu, "Official says Chinese missiles targeting Taiwan to reach 650-800 by 2005" *Central News Agency* March 16, 2001 in *SWB FE/4098 F/1* March 19, 2001; Huang Shaohu and Sun Zhaozhen, "Sun Yafu points to so-called 'military threat' as an excuse for military sales to Taiwan" *Zhongguo Xinwen She* March 16, 2001 in *SWB FE/4098 F/1* March 19, 2001; **Chris Cockel**, "Mainland's ballistic missile accuracy improving: report**" *The China Post* at** <http://www.chinapost.com.tw>.
56. See for the assessment of the US Department of Defense on this test, "China tests DF-31 for third time" *Jane's Defence Weekly* December 20, 2000 p. 5.
57. Paul Beaver, China flexes muscles in missile exercise" *Jane's Defence Weekly* August 4, 1999 p.5.
58. James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, "One arrow, three stars': China's MIRV programme" *Jane's Intelligence Review* May and June 1997 in 2 parts.
59. Xinhua cited by "PLA forms missile support group" *Jane's Defence Weekly* May 10, 2000 p. 15.
60. *Beijing Evening News* cited by Paul Beaver, "China flexes muscles in missile exercise" *Jane's Defence Weekly* August 4, 1999 p.5.
61. "China National Defense in 2000" at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/32221.html#2>
62. See *Xinhua* June 14, 1999 in *SWB FE/3564 G/10* June 18, 1999.
63. See Beijing Radio bulletin details of September 16, 1995 at *FBIS-CHI-95-199* October 16, 1995 p. 45 and "Tibet-Qinghai Plateau builds first expressway" *People's Daily* December 31, 1999 at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/199912/31/1999….>.
64. James C. Mulvenon, *Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).
65. See Guan Chajie, "Military Reforms downsizes military academies and schools by 30 percent" *Wide Angle* (Hong Kong) March 1998 pp. 8-9 excerpted in *Inside China Mainland* (May 1998) pp. 31-34. See p 34 for details of this process.
66. This is based on the account of Liu Mingzhi, "Chinese Communist Military Academies" *Trend* (Hong Kong) August 1997 pp. 24-27 excerpted in *Inside China Mainland* (October 1997) pp. 35-41. See pp. 37-38.
67. See "Major reform in Chinese Military Academies" in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly* June 23-29. 1986, p 4.
68. See "Chinese PLA to adopt NCO system" *Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly* July 14-20 1986 p 3.
69. See Xu Xiangqian, "*Guanyu jundui yuanxiao jiaoyu gaige qingjian zhengbian wenti de jidian yijian*" [Concerning Military Academies' educational reform, reorganization problems] in his *Xu Xiangqian Junshi wenxuan* [Selected Military Works of Xu Xiangqian (Liberation Army Publications, Beijing, 1993) pp 386-387.
70. See Liu Mingzhi 1997 p 38.
71. See Guan Chajie, "Military reform downsizes Military Academies and Schools by 30 percent" *Wide Angle* (Hong Kong) March 1998 pp. 8-9 excerpted in *Inside China Mainland* (May 1998) pp. 31-34.
72. "China's National Defense in 2000" at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/322221.html#2>.
73. Details on the history of training are derived from *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun* [Chinese PLA] 2 vols. (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994) vol.1 pp.403-74; Han Huaizhi ed. *Dangdai Zhong-*

guo jundui de junshi gongzuo [China Today: The Military Affairs of the Chinese Army] 2 vols (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1989) vol.2 pp. 220-305.

74. *Deng Xiaoping guanyu xin shiqi jundui jianshe lunshu xuanbian* 1993 pp. 167-90.
75. "Successful exercises by PLA 'proof' of reform success" *Xinhua* March 19, 1996 in *FBIS-CHI-96-054* March 20, 1996.
76. For changes in the training requirements see "Magnificent and mighty armed forces demonstrate their majestic appearance." *Xinhua* July 30, 1997 in *FBIS-CHI-97-211* July 31, 1997.
77. Ma Xiaochun and Zhao Xiujuan, "Report on PLA's training reform achievements" *Xinhua* December 8, 1998 in *FBIS-CHI-98-348* December 15, 1998; and *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Hangkong fence* p.194.
78. Jiang cited by Chen Hui, "New military training developments noted" *Xinhua* April 8, 1998 in *FBIS-CHI-98-099* April 10, 1998.
79. "Military chief stresses need for joint forces" *Xinhua* February 17, 2000 in *SWB FE/3773 G/6-7* February 25, 2000.
80. These four innovations are in the fields of military theory, training content, training forms and means and finally training systems. See for details about these plans, "Deepening military reform-Third comment on implementing Chairman Jiang's important instructions, strengthening military training with aid of science and technology" *Liberation Army Daily* March 26, 2001 p.1 in *FBIS-CHI-2001-0326* March 29, 2001.
81. See **The Lexicon** vol.2 p.173.
82. **The Lexicon** vol.2 pp.277-278.
83. He Jiasheng, "New train of thought vital to joint operations" *Liberation Army Daily* May 8, 2001 p.6 in *FBIS-CHI-2001-0508* May 10, 2001.
84. Chen Hui, "New military training development noted" *Xinhua* April 8, 1998 in *FBIS-CHI-98-099* April 10, 1998 and Chen Hui, "Chinese military conducts training to fight high-tech wars" Xinhua August 11, 2000 in *FBIS-CHI-2000-0811* August 11, 2000.
85. See Xu Zhuangzhi and Fan Qing, "*Lianhe 2003: Yanxi qinli*" [Joint 2003: Personal experiences of Operations] *Shijie Junshi* [World Military Affairs] (Beijing) No. 130 October 2003 pp. 21-25; Zha Chunming, "*Zhongba haijun shouci haishang soujiu yanxi*" [Sino-Pak first naval search and rescue operation at sea] *Bingqi Zhishi* (Beijing) Issue 194 December 2003 pp. 28-29; Li Haiyuan: "Special Plan: China's Counter Terrorism Repairs House Before It Rains and Has Heavy-Fisted Hand." *Renmin Ribao* September 29, 2003 in *FBIS-CHI-2003-0929* October 3, 2003.
86. See "Mainland China's air force units undergo simulation training with F-16 fighter as imaginary target" *Lien Ho Pao* (Hong Kong) March 22, 1995 in *FBIS-CHI-95-057* March 24, 1995 p.35.
87. Hsiang Chiang, "Black Panther Unit- China's first simulated foreign unit (Opposition force)" *Ta Kung Pao* March 16, 1998 p.c10 in *FBIS-CHI-98-075* March 17, 1998.
88. "*Beijing fangzhen zhongxin"* [Beijing simulation center] *Xiandai Junshi* vol.17 no.5 issue 201 October 1993 pp. 4-6.
89. See Liu Shihua, "*Quanjun xunlian moni qicaichengguo zhanlan xunli*" [Visit to China's Military Training Simulator Exhibition] *Xiandai Junshi* vol. 21 no. 3 Issue 242 March 1997 p. 19.
90. *Liberation Army Daily* cited in Robert Karniol, "PLA unveils army to act as aggressor" *Jane's Defence Weekly* October 27, 1999 p.13.
91. "High-tech military exercise in Gobi" *Zhongguo Xinwen She* October 26, 1998 in *FBIS-CHI-98-307* November 5, 1998.
92. "Zhang Wannian urges modern training for PLA" *Xinhua* May 18, 1997 in *FBIS-CHI-97-138* May 20, 1997.
93. *Xinhua* quoted in "PLA develops logistics training system" *Jane's Defence Weekly* January 13,1999 p.18.
94. "Army develops logistics simulation software" *Xinhua* December 15, 1998 in *FBIS-CHI-98-358* December 28, 1998.
95. "Setting Example in Carrying Forward Excellent Traditions" *Jiefangjun Bao* January 8, 2003 in FBIS-CHI-2003-0108 January 10, 2003.
96. This is based on the statement of former defence minister of Taiwan, Gen Tang Fei. (Interactions with Taiwanese scholars in Washington DC on June 29, 2001).

Appendix: 1

Key directives of the CCP Party Congresses on/related to PLA Modernisation

CCP Congresses	Details
8th Congress September 27, 1956	"It is the task of the Communist Party of China to develop the national economy in a planned way, to bring about as rapidly as possible the industrialisation of the country, and to effect the technological transformation of the national economy in a planned, systematic way so that China may possess a powerful modernized industry and agriculture, modernized communications and transport, and a modernized national defense."
9th Congress April1, 1969	"[The PLA has] taken part in the work of "three supports and two militaries" (i.e., support industry, support agriculture, support the broad military training)…We must …strengthen the building of the militia and of national defense and do a still better job in all our work."
10th Congress August 24, 1973	"Our heroic People's Liberation Army and our vast militia must be prepared at all times to wipe out any enemy that may invade."
11th Congress August 12, 1977	"We must be ready at all times to wipe out any enemy that dares to invade…. [There is a] need for enhancing our national defence capabilities and getting prepared against aggression by imperialism or social-imperialism…..The current tasks facing the People's Liberation Army are….pushing army building and preparations against war and taking further steps to revolutionise and modernize the army…. We must intensify military training… We must run schools of all types and levels well…we must do our utmost to strengthen research in science and technology and increase armament production for our national defense, so that the army's equipment will attain a new level."
12th Congress September 1, 1982	"The People's Liberation Army has achieved marked successes in improving its military training and its ideological and political work…It has further enhanced its military capability…The general task of the Communist Party of China ....[is to] achieve…modernisation of our industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology….We must work hard to turn the People's Liberation Army into a regular, modern and powerful revolutionary armed force and enhance its defence capabilities in modern warfare."
13th Congress October 25, 1987	"The People's Liberation Army has scored major successes in its reorganization and reform. While reducing its size by one million, the army has achieved fresh progress in its endeavour to become modernized, regularized and more revolutionary and has improved its defense capability….Modernization of national defense is an important component of the overall drive for socialist modernization."
14th Congress October 12, 1992	"Nowadays the competition among the various countries is, in essence, a competition of overall national strength based on economic, scientific and technological strength….we must create the best armed forces that our conditions permit, turning the PLA into a strong, modernized, revolutionary regular army and constantly increasing defense capabilities….We have already cut the size of the army by one million men. From now on, it must work hard to meet the requirements of modern warfare, pay attention to quality and enhance its overall combat effectiveness….The army must strengthen and reform itself, giving education and training strategic importance…To gradually improve weapons and equipment we must recognize the importance of scientific and technological research for national defense and that of the defense industry."
15th Congress September 12, 1997	"We should press ahead with the army building and reform so as to make the People's Liberation Army a more revolutionary, modernized and standardized army….It should adhere to the strategy of active defense, improve its quality and take the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics. …the army should intensify its education and training, and upgrade its defense capabilities under modern technology and especially high-tech conditions. We should strengthen the army by relying on science and technology…gradually upgrade weapons and other equipment."
16th Congress November 8, 2002	"Competition in overall national strength is becoming increasingly fierce. …Efforts have been redoubled to make the People's Liberation Army more revolutionary, modernized and regularized. Our national defense capabilities and the army's defense and combat effectiveness have further improved…. [The PLA should] take the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics… It should meet…. adequate logistical support… Strengthening our national defense is a strategic task in our modernisation drive… We must uphold the principle of coordinated development of national defense and the economy and push forward the modernisation of national defense and the army on the basis of economic growth….[In addition to adhering to active defense and science and technology, improving professional military education and training, this Congress emphasised mechanization and IT application], thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of our army."

Source: Ravindra Sharma, **China from Marxism to Modernisation: Post-Revolution Documentary History of the CPC (1956- 2002)** (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2003) (various pages)

Appendix: 2
China's White Papers on PLA Modernisation Aspects

White Papers	Details
1995	"China's modernization program is an important component of the cause for the common development and progress of mankind….In May, 1985, China solemnly declared that the PLA would reduce military personnel by one million. This was the most representative of China's many unilateral moves to disarmament…."
1998	"The modernization program of China's national defense work is entirely for self-defense, and arises from the need to safeguard the country's modernization drive and security…. only be improved gradually along with the increase of the country's economic strength. The Chinese government insists that economic construction be taken as the center, that defense work be subordinate to and in the service of the nation's overall economic construction and that the armed forces actively participate in and support the nation's economic construction…. During the new historical period, the Chinese army is working hard to improve its quality and endeavoring to streamline the army the Chinese way, aiming to form a revolutionized, modernized and regularized people's army with Chinese characteristics. Reducing quantity and improving quality is a basic principle upon which the army is to be modernized. The Chinese army strengthens itself by relying on science and technology, and strives to make the transition from a numerically superior type to a qualitatively efficient type, and from a manpower-intensive type to a technology-intensive type. In view of the characteristics of modern wars, no effort will be spared to improve the modernization level of weaponry, reform and perfect the army system and setup, and improve the training of troops and curricula and teaching methods of military academies. …"
2000	"China's efforts in defense modernization are purely for self-defense…. However, in view of the fact that hegemonism and power politics still exist and are further developing, and in particular, the basis for the country's peaceful reunification is seriously imperiled, China will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means…. the Chinese armed forces strive to strengthen their overall development and form a revolutionized, modernized and regularized people's army with Chinese characteristics. China adheres to building the armed forces by enhancing their quality, strengthening the armed forces by relying on science and technology, and managing the armed forces according to law, and is endeavoring to transform its armed forces from a numerically superior to a qualitatively superior type, and from a manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive type, as well as to train high-quality military personnel and improve the modernization level of weaponry in order to comprehensively enhance the armed forces' combat effectiveness….[The PLA is geared towards] transforming semi-mechanized and mechanized weapon systems to automatized and informationized systems as soon as possible…"
2002	"The form of war is becoming increasingly information-oriented. All major countries have made adjustments in their military strategies and stepped up the modernization by relying on high technologies… the Chinese military persists in taking the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics, pushes forward the various reforms in response to the trend in military changes in the world, and strives to accomplish the historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of the military. "

Source: PRC's White Papers at <www.fmprc.gov.cn>

Appendix 3
Acquisition of weapons by China, 1975-2003

Supplier	Weapons	Remarks
Canada	Challenger 601 Transports	2 ordered in 1988 and delivered in 1988-89. 3 acquired before
France	AS-332 Helicopter	4 ordered for Navy in 1987 worth $183 million including 4 SA-365 Fs
France	R-440 Crotale Naval Ship to air missile (ShAM) and launcher	2 ordered in 1986 and delivered in 1990 for arming 2 Luda DDG; 36 launchers delivered. Nearly 336 delivered by 2002.
France	SA-342L Gazelle helicopters	8 ordered in 1987 and delivered in 1988-89 with about 96 HOT-2 anti-tank missiles
France	Rasit-319oB surveillance radar	Ordered in 1986
France	Super Frelon Helicopters	11 ordered in 1980 and delivered in 1984-89. Licence manufacture continues
France	Q-5K Kong Yuan fighter/ground attack upgrade	Upgrading of avionics terminated after Tiananmen Incident
France	AS-365N Helicopter	Licence manufacture from 1980
France	Castor-2 Fire control radar	14 ordered in 1986 and delivered in 1994-2002 for modernising Luhu and Luhai DDG, Jiangwei frigates
U.K.	RB 168-225 turbofan engines	Ordered from 1975 and licence manufactured at Xian
U.K.	Westland WG helicopters	34 ordered from 1978
U.K.	Harrier VTOL aircraft	Agreement with Hawker Siddeley
U.K.	Laser sight systems and missiles	-
U.K.	Searchwater AEW radar	
West Germany	Bolkow Bo-105 helicopters	104 ordered for military and oil prospecting
Israel	Mapats anti-tank missile	From 1986. Unconfirmed.
Israel	PL-8H air-to-air missiles (AAM)	Licence manufacture from 1989
Israel	EL/M-2032 combat ac radar	Reportedly ordered in 2000 for FC-1 fighters
Italy	Aspide surface-to-air missiles (SAM)/ShAM	85 ordered in 1989
Italy	Electronic guidance systems	Deal with Company Aeritalia, Electronica San, Girgio, Selenia, Siemens
Italy	A-5M fighter/ground attack	Avionics upgrade from 1986
Italy	76/62 AA and AM guns	-
USA	Learjet-35A maritime patrol/transport	5 ordered from 1987 and delivered.
USA	MIM-23B Hawk Landmob SAM	-
USA	CH-47D Chinook helicopters	6 ordered in 1989 but suspended
USA	L-100-30 Transports	2 ordered in 1987 and delivered
USA	AN/TPQ-37 tracking radar	2 ordered in 1987, delivered in 1993
USA	Phalanx CIWS	2 ordered in 1987 for new class of destroyers
USA	BGM-71 A TOW anti-tank missile	Agreement in 1984
USA	F-7M Airguard fighter	Agreement with Grumman in 1988 suspended in 1989
USA	Y-8C transport	Collaboration with Lockheed in 1988
USA	Bell-212 helicopter	-
USA	J-8II fighters	Up gradation under Peace Pearl programme. Suspended
USSR/ Russia	Il-28 Beagle bombers	1 ordered in 1992 and delivered
Russia	Il-76 Candid Transports	4 ordered in 1993 and delivered
Russia	Il-76M Candid B Transports	1 ordered and delivered in 2002
USSR/ Russia	Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters	24 ordered in 1990
USSR/ Russia	MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter	40 ordered in 1991
Russia	MiG-31 Foxhound fighter	24 ordered in 1992
USSR/ Russia	Su-24 Fencer fighter/bomber	12 ordered in 1990
USSR/	Su-27 SK Flanker fighter	24 ordered in 1991, 28 delivered up to 2002

Supplier	Weapons	Remarks
Russia		
Russia	AA-8 Aphid AAMs	Nearly 300 ordered in 1992
Russia	SA-10b SAM system	1 ordered in 1992 with 100 SA-10b Grumble SAMs
Russia	SA-10e/S-300PMU-2 SAM system	4 reportedly ordered in 2001
Russia	Su-27 Fighter	Licence manufacture of nearly 150 at Shenyang from 1994
Russia	Su-30MKK fighter	38 ordered and 19 delivered up to 2002
Russia	A-50U Mainstay AEW&C aircraft	5 reportedly ordered in 2000
Russia	AA-11 Archer/R-73 SRAAM	Nearly 4000 ordered for Su-27s and Su-30s
Russia	AA-12 Adder/R-77 BVRAAM	Nearly 100 ordered in 2000
Russia	T-80U main battle tanks	Acquired 200 in 1993-95
Russia	Fire-control systems of the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle and 4 Km. range laser-guided anti-tank missile	Ordered in 1997 and acquired in 1999. To be used with the 100mm-armed T-69II MBT
Russia	Zhuk Combat ac radar	100 ordered in 2001 for modernising J-8 fighters
Russia	Zmei/Sea Dragon airborne MP radar	1 ordered in 2002 for use on balloons for surveillance
Russia	AS-17/Kh-31 A1 anti-ship missile	Ordered probably in 1997. May have licence production
Russia	AS-17/Kh-31P1 anti-radar missile	Nearly 20 ordered
Russia	SS-N-27/3M54E1 Anti-ship missile	64 ordered in 2002
Russia	Kilo-class/Type 636E submarines	8 ordered in 2002
Russia	Sovremenny-class destroyers	2 ordered and delivered. 2 more ordered in 2002
Russia	SA-17 Grizzly/9M38M2 SAM	Nearly 132 ordered in 2001
Ukraine	Kolchnya Air surveillance system	4 ordered in 2000 and delivered in 2002
Ukraine	AA-10a/b Alamo/R-27 BVRAAM	Nearly 2000 ordered in 1995, 700 delivered by 1996-2002

Note: Figures reported and rounded up

Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks: 2003 (pp.484-86); **2002** (pp. 419-21); **2001** (pp. 369-70); **2000** (386-88); **1999** (461-62); **1998** (329-30); **1994** (p.518); **1993** (p.499); **1992** (p.334); **1991** (p.235); **1990** (pp.257,300); **1989** (p.232); **1988** (p.224); **Jane's All the World's Aircraft** (Jane's Information Group, Surrey, various years); Jane's Fighting Ships(Jane's Information Group, Surrey, various years); **Jane's Infantry Weapons** (Jane's Information Group, Surrey, various years); **Jane's Armour & Artillery** (Jane's Information Group, Surrey, various years); **Asian Security, 1980** (Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1980) p.95; Harold C Hinton "Recent Chinese/European Commercial transactions" in Ray Bonds (ed) **The Chinese War Machine** (Salamander Book, London, 1979) p 62

China's Perception of Threats

By Ryo ASANO, Himeji Dokkyo University

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyze China's perception of military threats after the Iraq War (March-April, 2003). The relative importance of military security in China's external affairs has decreased. The Chinese leaders perceived that China's possible involvement in limited wars (limited both in scale and in political implications), but such conflicts would not be serious threat to China's security as a whole. The emphasis is presently shifted to non-military security such as economic security (e.g. monetary policy, food and energy) and ecological security (e.g. water and air).

However, Chinese strategy has not neglected military security though its priority in Chinese strategy has been decreased. Clearly, several limited wars, particularly the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War, influenced the recent major change of China's perception of threats and its national security environment.

In section I, I will examine China's perception of threats and its efforts to search for a new role in the international society. In section II, I will analyze China's perception of the U.S. in the unipolar world order. In this section, I will also discuss the impact of the Iraq War on China's military construction. In section III, I will briefly analyze the implications of China's perception of threat in the Sino-Japanese relationship.

1. China's Threat Perception and Search for New Role

(1) *Perception of Global Power Balance*

Jiang Zemin （江泽民）expressed his optimistic perception on China's national security environment that a full-scale war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. He argued in his Report at 16th Party Congress in November 2002:

> Peace and development remain the themes of our era. To preserve peace and promote development bears on the well-being of all nations and represents the common aspirations of all peoples. It is an irresistible trend of history. The growing trends toward world multipolarization and economic globalization have brought with them opportunities and favorable conditions for world peace and development. A new world war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. It is realistic to bring about a fairly long period of peace in the world and a favorable climate in areas around China.

In spite of this optimistic observation on the global strategic trend, the Chinese held a cautious view on it own security. The Chinese has identified hegemonism of the U.S. with the principal source of instability in international politics and the threat to China's national security. They regarded the U.S. as the only power which can defeat China by itself.

The term multipolarization which Jiang used in the Report at the 16th Party Congress meant a transformation of global power structure from the uniploar system toward a system of balance of power in which no single nation holds a dominant power to control others. The Chinese expected that the world in which nations mutually check each other was safer for China.

Another implication of multipolarization was the increase of China's own power. But some analysts in China had more cautious and prudent assessment than Jiang. They argued that evolution of multipolarization was not linear and smooth, but a long and winding process. It is almost certain that their realistic assessment on China's national security environment, rather than Jiang's political statement at the Party Congress, constituted the basis of China's decision making on security affairs. The Chinese term "one superpower and many big powers" (一超多强) which has been used in China's academic circle on international and security affairs ever from the Gulf War (and the collapse of the Soviet Union) to the Iraq War was a clear evidence of China's pessimistic perception that mulipolalrization was stagnated(Zhu Feng(2003)).

(2) *New Role of China in World Politics at the Stage of "Well-Off Society"*

A major new strategic factor in the new leadership is the relative increase of China's power. Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, the Chinese were still very cautious on the power calculation though the nationalistic call for China's bigger role was increasing in China at the latter

half of Jiang's era (1997-2002). Under the new leadership of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), the Chinese became much more confident. However, the new leadership is not eager to play a bigger role in international scene.

A keyword for the analysis of perception of China's international role under the new leadership is *Xiaokang* (小康). Jiang Zemin in the Report of the Party Congress of November 2002 argued that China had entered into the era of *Xiaokang*. If we can say that the era of *Xiaokang* started in Jiang's era, Hu Jintao's era would be in the midst of era of *Xiaokang*.

The word *Xiaokang* is usually translated into "well-off" in English, and "maamaa" in Japanese. It surely means a moderate and comfortable level of life, just high enough to have meals every day without fear of starvation. But it has a special implication that *Xiaokang* is only a second best scenario. The original source of this word is one of the main Chinese classics, *Liji* (『礼记』). This classics argues that *Xiaokang* is only a second best choice since the rulers have to govern the people with a device of Li(礼), a sort of exogenous and binding measures, to maintain order of society during the period of *Xiaokang*, while you only depend on people's indigenous moral to maintain the social order during the period of *Datong*(大同), the ultimate ideal society. Well-educated Chinese prople who found *Xiaokang* in the formal document of CPC could presume that CPC would accept the existing world order to maintain the social and economic welfare of the Chinese and would not pursue the construction of ideal world of Communism through drastic and sometimes violent means any more.

However, China's external policy in *Xiaokang* period does not mean China's passive approach to international politics. On the other hand, China's role in international community has been bigger with the sustained rapid economic growth since 1992. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China basically maintained low-profile attitude. Jiang Zemin also maintained this line of low-keyed diplomacy, though he realized the increase of China's power. On the contrary to its fierce rhetoric in diplomatic negotiation and propaganda, China has almost always sought to make compromise with big powers particularly with the United States in order to avoid major military confrontations.

Becoming aware of increase of its power and rising status in international society, Chinese people have begun to claim that China has to increase its contribution to the international community. China under Hu Jintao's leadership is in a transitional period from passive power to more assertive and responsible power.

In spite of intensifying call for playing more active role in international politics, it remains unclear whether China has already prepared a detailed blueprint on how to behave in the transitional period. It seems that China has accumulated decisions in respective functional fields such as trade without a well-coordinated grand strategy. WTO was an exceptional case which was considered carefully by the top leaders of China such as former Premier Zhu Rongji.

(3) *Consistency of China's Strategic Behavior*

In the transitional period, China watchers occasionally cannot observe a consistency in China's foreign policy.

However, seemingly inconsistent behavior of China is consistent in China's strategic framework. We understand that China has a difficulty in its strategic assessment since China is becoming stronger than before, but it is not strong enough to gain a strategic initiative and advantageous position with its rivals. For instance, some assertive Chinese often requested the Chinese government to take a harder line to arrogant Japan which had forgotten the history of invading China, but China's sophisticated diplomats and researchers on international affairs are very careful in maintaining the Sino-Japanese relationship. They seemed to judge that it was not China's interest to cause a serious confrontation with Japan at this moment under the unfavorable power balance for China (for instance, China's GDP is approximately one-fourth of that of Japan)

Recently, a Chinese media introduced an article of *Tokyo Shimbun* (a Japanese newspaper) that estimated China's military power was the second biggest among the four big powers in Asia (China, the U.S., Japan and India) only next to the U.S., and bigger than those of India and Japan("A Comparison of Military Power of Four Countries—China, the U.S., Japan and India: China's Defense Power is the Second Largest," *Liaowang Dongfang, Weekly*, January 23, 2004). However, realistic scholars on international and security affairs made a more cautious assessment on China's national power(Hu Angang(2003)). The Chinese government occasionally had to take a firm attitude to Japan in order to appease nationalistic public opinion, but had to maintain the Sino-Japanese relationship at the diplomatic scene.

The non-committal attitude of China between North Korea and the U.S. in regard to North Korean nuclear issue had a similar logic. China put the highest priority to maintain a stable strategic environment in East Asia. The second priority of China in this issue was to improve its image in international society by playing a constructive role in the settlement of this problem. China which regarded the U.S. as a principal source of global instability could not lean to the U.S., but could not openly resisted to the U.S. policy toward North Korea, since China wanted to avoid a serious confrontation with the U.S.

At the same time, China could not support North Korea's brinkmanship either, since the Chinese were anxious that it would invite a military confrontation between China and the U.S. China also did not welcome the collapse of North Korean regime. The collapse of authoritarian regime in North Korea would be a source of domestic instability in China, and pro-U.S. integrated Korea which would be very close to China's principal area was not welcomed by the Chinese strategists. This is a roughly sketched logic why China has employed a non-committal policy in the North Korean nuclear issue, and accepted diplomatic negotiations on the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue in the framework of six-party talk.

China's seemingly inconsistent behavior mainly depended on perception of its intention-capability gap, but also depended on the characteristic of international strategic game. While military affairs are more or less a matter of simple zero-sum game, economic security is closely related to a complicated and dynamic zero-sum game which is much more difficult to make a strategic calculation.

China has to find a balancing point (if not point, very narrow area) between competition and co-existence with its rivals. Sometimes China has to pursue these two strategic objectives— victory in the competition and coexistence with its rivals—simultaneously which are occasionally contradictive with each other. For instance, China's energy policy is not compatible with its friendship with neighboring big power. China wants to maintain stable relationship with Japan, but Japan is the toughest competitor over Russian oil and gas. Some Chinese analysts consider these two objectives are not compatible for the moment.

(4) *"New Security Concept" and Military Security*

"New Security Concept" (新安全观) appeared for the first time in an *official* document in April of 1997. China and Russia in their joint statement asserted to establish a new security concept instead of old thinking of the Cold War, and to promote mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and consultation, and to pursuit peace and security through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In July 1997, the Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, argued that new security concept was needed under a new international situation. In December 1997, Chi Haotian (迟浩田)(Defense Minister and the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Party and State)) formally referred to "New Security Concept."

In the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Jiang again referred to "New Security Concept."

> In the area of security, countries should trust one another and work together to maintain security, foster a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and settle their disputes through dialogue and cooperation and should not resort to the use or threat of force. We oppose all forms of hegemonism and power politics. China will never seek hegemony and never go in for expansion.

In 1996, "New Security Concept" was nothing more than rhetoric without any theoretical framework. Theoretical framework of this concept gradually evolved. It took four years from 1996 to 1999 for the Chinese leaders to formulate a strategic framework. The highlight of this evolution was Jiang's speech in Geneva in March 1999. He said that the core of "New Security Concept" was mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination (互信、互利、平等、合作(协作)).

However, PLA's role in "New Security Concept" was not clear (Takagi(2003)). PLA has accepted "New Security Concept" rather reluctantly. Theoretically, distinct threat, deterrence and military conflict among nations are major prerequisites of traditional military security. On the other hand, "New Security Concept," like cooperative security, is principally applicable to a strategic situation with relatively low level of threat among nations and threat of non-governmental actors such as terrorists.

These Chinese analysts also argued that after the col-

lapse of the Soviet Union, the relative importance of non-traditional security such as economic security, computer security, ecological security, biological security, and transnational crime has increased. A theoretical article in *PLA Daily (Jiěfàngjūn Bào* 『解放军报』) argued that "New Security Concept" is primarily applied to the non-traditional security matters (*PLA Daily* November 24, 2003)[(1)]. Anti-terrorism exercise with the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (上海合作组织), China's exercises of ocean rescue operations with Pakistan and India respectively, and other bilateral military exercises with foreign countries were regarded in the article as the major activities conducted under the concept of "New Security Concept."

We can make a tentative conclusion that activities of PLA related to "New Security Concept" include China's anti-terrorism cooperation with foreign countries, exercise of rescue operation, military exercises with foreign countries and some other low-threat activities of China's military force.

2. China's Perception of the US in the Unipolar World Order

(1) *Perception of the Sino-US Relationship after "September 11" and the Iraq War*

The strategic situation of China after "September 11" is rather contradictory. China has had a fear that unipolar world order under the leadership of the U.S. is dangerous to China's security. However, the Chinese considered that the Sino-US relationship was greatly improved after "September 11". Zhang Tuosheng, a leading strategic analyst in China remarked that the Sino-US relationship was in "the best condition after the President Nixon's visit to China in 1972" (Zhang Tuosheng(2003)).

This was a big change of perception on its strategic situation. Before "September 11," the Chinese considered that the Bush administration was much more antagonistic to China than the Clinton administration.

Of course, other analysts were not as optimistic as Zhang. They thought that the Sino-US relationship was improved, but they could not predict how long the good relationship could be sustained. In other words, they did not think that the improved relationship was unconditionally sustainable. This "cautious optimism" was the mainstream of strategic assessment on the Sino-US relationship in China.

The Chinese tend to see the impact of "September 11" on international affairs mainly from the traditional framework of nation-to-nation politics and power balance. For them, the increasing importance of non-governmental player in international affairs and the emergence of asymmetrical conflicts between nation-states and "terrorists" was only a matter of partial concern.

China observed the emergence of unipolar world under the leadership of the U.S. China learned through the Iraq War that no country and international organization could stop the U.S. A Chinese diplomat argued that China had to maintain low-profile and flexible diplomacy in a present strategic circumstance in which any power including China would not strong enough to overcome the U.S. in a foreseeable future and big powers would pursue their own respective interests through frequent change of partners(Yang Yuebin(2003)).

China reluctantly accepted the uncomfortable reality. However, the Chinese leaders thought the strategic situation was not the worst for China since the U.S. needed stable relationship with China to get access to the Chinese market and to maintain strategic stability in East Asia.

In sum, the Chinese tend to analyze the strategic situation mainly from the viewpoint of power politics among big powers even after "September 11." The increasing role of non-governmental actors such as terrorists is not the matter of major concern for the Chinese. They basically accepted the *status quo* and kept its low-profile diplomacy.

(2) *Implication of the Iraq War with China's Military Construction*

A leading Chinese analyst on international affairs observed that though the short-term goal of the Iraq War for the U.S. was to prevent terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in order to secure its homeland security, the long-term and main goal was to prevent the military challenge of newly rising powers against the U.S.(Zhu Feng(2002.6.17)). He did not mention the names of newly rising countries which would challenge the leadership of the U.S., but it was clear that China was one of them.

The Iraq War had a tremendous influence on PLA. Before the Iraq War, the simultaneous accomplishment of mechanization and IT application was the main framework of military construction of PLA. Jiang Zemin stated in the Report at the 16th Party Congress that efforts had been made to accomplish the historical tasks of

mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of PLA[(2)]. He also stated that it was necessary to innovate and develop military theories in his speech. The emphasis in his speech on the necessity of military theories as the basis for military construction and operations indicated that there was a disagreement over the priority of distribution of military resources in PLA which could not be settled in the fall of 2002.

The disagreement on military construction was primarily due to debate between the supporters of traditional mechanized wars and the supporters of IW (Information Warfare). The debate within PLA over the form of future wars and military operations has continued after the Gulf War. After the War, Jiang Zemin reportedly proposed to promote preparation for the emerging new type of war, and he called the war "Limited War under High-tech Conditions."

The name was given, but the content and program for the preparation for the future warfare was rather vague. PLA planners thought that PLA was on the way of mechanization while IW, a new type of warfare was emerging. The core problem of PLA was how to overcome the backwardness. PLA leaders were seeking the way of defeating the adversary with advanced weapons while promoting military modernization. In 1999, the debate seemed to come to an end since a *de facto* military doctrine was published under the name of Zhang Wannian (张万年)'s name. He was the top officer of the uniform of PLA, and was the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Party and State), member of CPC Political Bureau, and one of the secretaries of the CPC Secretariat. His report was not a formal document of PLA, but in substance was a basic one on military affairs in China. His report was distributed among the students of the Central Party School in 2000. He argued that the PLA would have to promote mechanization and IT application simultaneously because the future warfare would be a combination of fire warfare and information warfare. Zhang's argument of the future warfare was incorporated in Jiang's Report at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002.

But political authorization of Zhang's argument did not mean the end of debate over the military warfare. The Kosovo War in 1999 was a great shock to the Chinese since Yugoslavia with relatively inferior weapons could not wage successful campaigns against the US military force with advanced weapons. Most of the PLA officers were not convinced by several case studies on success stories of the Yugoslavian force which appeared in *PLA Daily*. Zhang's argument was challenged before it was politically authorized.

The major reason of the semi-chronic disagreement over military construction after Zhang Wannian's argument of future warfare and military doctrine in 1999 was the hyper-speedy change of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). From 2000 to 2002, several IW supporters elaborated an idea to make a leapfrog development by non-physical measures of cyber-war such as computer viruses, but this radical idea was not accepted by PLA leaders. After Jiang stressed the leapfrog development of military construction at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, PLA leaders and some planners of IW occasionally referred to this idea, and they were rather pessimistic about the feasibility of leapfrog military development. Generally, PLA officers were skeptical about feasibility of leapfrog military development while civilian strategists were more optimistic(*PLA Daily*, January 6, 2004). The main point of their debate on the feasibility of leapfrog military development between uniformed personnel and civilian was whether the advantage of latecomer is attainable for PLA when the U.S. was pursuing absolute military dominance in the age of RMA.

A military analysts in PLA once complained that before PLA applied the lessons of the previous high-tech war to its military construction, a new high-tech war would break out(*PLA Daily*, December 9, 2003). His statement appeared eight months after the end of the Iraq War, therefore we can suspect that PLA was trying to learn the lessons of the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the Afghan War, but analysts in PLA found new important lessons in the Iraq War, which compelled them to rearrange the doctrine again.

In sum, they thought that PLA had a great difficulty to reach the high level of preparation for the most advanced high-tech war while it was thought to be practically impossible for PLA to win the high-tech war with their out-of-date weapons. Some military theorists in PLA began to consider that there would be no fixed military theory in the era of IW and that PLA had to accept the permanent and dynamic change of military theories as a given condition and set it in the procedure of inventing new military doctrine in China(*PLA Daily*, October 28, 2003; December 9, 2003).

(3) ***Perception of the Causes of Emergence of the Unipolar World Order***

During and after the Iraq War, a fierce debate why unipolar world order was built has arisen in China. In general, at the first stage of debate, the main theme of debate was the cause of the war. On this issue, some argued that the U.S. resorted war because it wanted to get the crude oil of the Middle East mainly for its domestic consumption, and others suspected that the U.S occupied Iraq because the U.S. was pursuing the global hegemony through the control of Iraqi oil. Both had a hypothesis that the U.S. was a rational entity. We can see this type of opinion throughout 2003 and even in February 2004.

By the summer of 2003, the observation in which psychological and political factors of the U.S. were stressed as the cause of the Iraq War prevailed. Some analysts asserted that the U.S. was forced to employ extreme measures to recover from the psychological shock, since "September 11" was the attack not only to the homeland of the U.S. but also to the core value and national pride of the U.S. Other analysts paid attention to the intention of the leaders of the Bush administration. They argued that the course to the war was already set before "September 11" by the leaders of "neo-con," and "September 11" was only a catalyst to trigger the war.

After the debate over the causes of the Iraq War cooled down relatively by the fall of 2003, the focus of the debate on security affairs shifted. The main topic of the debate was the cause of emergence of unipolar world order. Theory of "America as an empire" which prevailed also in China after the Iraq War was an attempt to explain the emergence of unipolar hierarchy in the international system in which the U.S. sat on the top.

In fall of 2003, it was widely believed in China that the unipolar world order was formed as the direct result of the Iraq War. Given this, some scholars on security affairs in China argued that the unipolar world order was not the direct product of intention of the U.S. to make it, but basically only a result of its persistent pursuit of its own security. In other words, the unipolar world is only a by-product of behavior of the U.S. which just intended to secure its own security. This logic does not necessarily implies the over-extension of the U.S., but analysts in China seemed to have expectations that as the result of building of unipolar world order as a by-product of security policy of the U.S., the U.S. would be caught and exhausted in the trap of attrition in the future, because the U.S. would use up its power in order to maintain the world order beyond its capability. This sort of expectation that the U.S. would be exhausted in the future can be found in the speech of Qian Qichen, the former Vice Premier in charge of foreign affairs, in the Foreign Affairs University in 2003(3).

3. Implication of China's Threat Perception with the Sino-Japanese Relationship

To China, Japan is one of the most important neighboring countries in East Asia, but it is not the source of primary concern. In the Chinese security priorities, the U.S. is much more important than Japan, therefore the Chinese mainly regard Japan as a political lever to stabilize the Sino-US relationship. To the Chinese, the U.S. is a global partner, but Japan is only a regional partner. The Japanese who tend to see the Sino-Japanese relationship only within the bilateral framework usually do not stress Japan's subordinate position in Chinese diplomacy. The Chinese predict that China will be able to become stronger than Japan in the future (about twenty years ago, it was just a dream but nowadays the confident Chinese believe that is a feasible scenario) but they also think that China has to be very cautious at this moment not to provoke any serious conflict with Japan while China can not expect its victory in coming conflict with Japan.

This is the realistic power calculation behind the recent proposal of "New Thinking on the Sino-Japanese Relationship" initiated by Ma Licheng (马立诚) a commenter of *People's Daily* at that time, and supported by Shi Yinhong (时殷弘: Professor at Renmin University of China) and some other scholars. As is well known, Ma's claim to maintain good relationship with Japan mainly through diplomatic concessions provoked a fierce debate among the Chinese.

It is interesting to note that the main supporters of "New Thinking on the Sino-Japanese Relationship" in China are not the scholars on Japanese affairs but the analysts on international and security affairs. This implies that the future of Sino-Japanese relationship was mainly analyzed in the global framework of power balance in China.

Shi Yinhong proposed a policy of "double track system of balance of power" (shuāngchóng liánxì zhìhéng 双重联系制衡) in East Asia. In this system, China pursues a stable relationship with the U.S. and Japan, with the U.S. globally and with Japan in East Asia, and

gives Japan a role as a stabilizer between China and the U.S. Shi probably considered that Japan would not lean to the U.S. in the Sino-U.S. conflict in the future. But it remains unclear whether he still regards Japan as a regional stabilizer even after Japan's dispatch of Self Defense Force to Iraq in February 2004.

In a foreseeable future, China would maintain a comparatively accommodative attitude to Japan in order not to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance in the U.S-China-Japan triangle.

Notes

1. In May 2002, China's Foreign Ministry has submitted a position paper on the promotion of cooperation in the field of non-traditional security to ARF. In July 2002, FM submitted a position paper on "New Security Concept" to ARF. There is a tendency that Foreign Ministry was mainly involved with ARF, while PLA was mainly concerned with SCO.
2. There is a slight difference between the original expression and English translation. The original sentence emphasized the *two* historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, but the English version of the report dropped the word *two*. The original Chinese word for "two" here was 双重 (shuāngchóng) which means "double" and "twofold."
3. He argued that though it would be possible for the U.S. to reduce its military force in Asia mainly because of the decreasing threat in this region and the rapid development of long-range guided weapons. He also argued that the rapid deployment of the U.S. military force in case of a crisis in this region would be possible but would cost a great deal both for the U.S. and its junior partners in Asia.

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Biography

Ryo Asano

Ryo Asano is Professor at Himeji-Dokkyo Univeristy, Hyogo, Japan. His specialty is strategic issues of China. He is a writer on Chinese military affairs in Chugoku Nenkan (Yearbook on China) since 1993. He is an editor of special edition on China's security affairs, Kokusai Anzen Hosho (The Journal of International Security) 30:4 (March 2003). He is co-editing a book on Chinese security affairs which will be published this November. He usually writes articles for Japanese periodicals such as Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs, JIIA), Toa (East Asia, Kazan-kai) and Mondai to Kennkyu (Japanese version of Issues and Studies) and for some books related to Chinese security affairs. He is currently writing a paper on China's response to the US military doctrine of preemptive attack for Kokusai Anzen Hosho 31:4 (March 2004).

Chulacheeb Chinwanno

Chulacheeb Chinwanno is Associate Professor and Head of the International Relations Department of Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand.
He received his Ph.D. in Political Science at Stanford University. He was Executive Director of Institute of East Asian Studies at Thammasat University and recently appointed Specialist of the Committee on International Affairs, House of Representatives in Thailand. His academic interests are Thai Foreign Policy, South East Asian Affairs and Security Issues in East Asia.
His publications include Sino-Thai Relations: Past, Present and Future (International University of Japan Research Monograph, Japan 1998) and "Thailand's Perspective on Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific," in Tan See Seng and Amitav Achraya (ed.) Evolving Security Approaches in the Asia-Pacific , (New York: M.E.Sharpe, forthcoming 2004).

Jae Ho Chung

Jae Ho CHUNG is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies at Seoul National University, Korea. Professor Chung is also a policy advisor for the National Security Council, Non-Resident Fellow of the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), and China consultant for the Federation of Korean Industries and the POSCO Group. Professor Chung was formerly the head of the research team on Korea's Long-Term Strategies toward China for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and CNAPS Fellow at the Brookings Institution during 2002-3. Professor Chung is the author of editor of six books, including Central Control and Local Discretion in China (Oxford 2000) and serves on the editorial committees of China: An International Journal

(CIJ), China Perspectives, and Provincial China. Dr. Chung is currently working on two book manucripts entitled Between Dragon and Eagle: South Korea-China Bilateralism and the United States and China's Internal Governability: Challenges from the Local, Rural and Cyber Spaces, in addition to a pilot interview project on "Chinese Policy Elite's Evolving Views on the Korean Peninsula."

Srikanth Kondapalli

Dr Srikanth Kondapalli is working at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi

for the last decade, currently as a Research Fellow. He specialises on strategic issues related to China. With M.Phil and Ph.D. degrees in Chinese studies in 1989 and 1995 respectively, and a post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow at People's University in Beijing in 1996-98 period, he wrote two books, a monographs, an edited work and several articles on China. He has presented several seminar papers and lectured at national and international fora. He is a guest faculty member at Indian defence, paramilitary, academic and media establishments. He has evaluated M.Phil., Ph.D., and post-Doctoral theses at Indian universities. He is currently writing a book-length work on Chinese Air Force. In addition, he has organized international conferences related to East Asia.

Hongyi Lai

Research fellow at East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore B.A. (1987) in international politics at Beijing University; M.A. (1993) and Ph.D. (2000) in political science at the University of California at Los Angeles.
He has researched on China's political economy, central-local relations, western development, WTO entry, foreign policy, and legislative politics. He has published on Third World Quarterly, Modern China, Issues & Studies, American Asian Review, and China Review. His articles are also forthcoming on Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies and Provincial China. His co- edited and co- translated books include Analysing China, Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2002; The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization in China: Mao, Deng Zihui and the "High Tide" of 1956, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 1997. He writes commentaries on China's diplomacy, politics, and society on the Chinese newspaper in Singapore, some of which have been widely received by the Chinese media and policy circles.

Chisako T. Masuo

Ms. Masuo is Research Fellow at JIIA who is in charge of the issues related to China, Taiwan and Korean Peninsula. Before coming to JIIA last July, she has studied international relations and Chinese diplomatic history at Peking University for two years (1996-97 and 2001-2002) as a special student, and worked for Japan Defense Agency for a half year as a researcher. Currently she is preparing to write a dissertation on the transformation of Chinese diplomacy around 1980 which is to be submitted to the University of Tokyo in a few years. By publicizing the paper on Chinese policy change toward Korean Peninsula during Deng Xiaoping period, she became the first recipient of the "excellent thesis award" established by the Japan Association for Asian Studies in 2003.

Gilbert Rozman

Gilbert Rozman is Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1970. He graduated from Carleton College with an independent major in Chinese and Russian studies after spending his junior year in the Critical Languages Program at Princeton. His PhD dissertation, also at Princeton, compared the development of pre-modern cities in China and Japan. Many of his writings look at bilateral relations: Sino-Russian ties before and after normalization; Russo-Japanese ties in the search for normalization, Sino-Japanese ties after the cold war, and, recently with study of the Korean language. South Korean-Japanese ties since Kim Dae Jung's breakthrough visit in 1998. His forthcoming book covers for the period 1989 to 2003 "Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Disputes in the Shadow of Globalization" He is currently researching the reintegration process in Korea, including debates in China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea

about the nuclear crisis and its consequences.

David Shambaugh

David Shambaugh has been Professor of Political Science & International Affairs in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University since 1996. He directed the Sigur Center for Asian Studies from 1996-98, and since that time has directed the China Policy Program, in the Elliott School. He has also been a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program, and Affiliated Fellow in the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, since 1997. He previously taught for eight years at the University of London's School of Oriental & African Studies, where he also served as Editor of *The China Quarterly* (1991-1995), directed the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1986-87). He has been a visiting scholar numerous times in China, as well as in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the former Soviet Union, Japan, and Germany. He has received numerous research and project grants from various private foundations, including Smith Richardson, Ford, Rockefeller, W. Alton Jones, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the British Academy, the U.K. Economic & Social Research Council, and others. He has published widely—having authored or edited 15 books, about 100 articles and book chapters, and many opinion-editorials. He is a frequent commentator on Chinese and Asian affairs in the international media, sits on the editorial boards of several scholarly journals, and has served as a consultant to several governments, research institutes, and private corporations.

Seiichiro Takagi

Dr. Seiichiro Takagi is a professor at the School of International Politics, Economics, and Business, The Aoyama Gakuin University. He obtained Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. After teaching at Saitama University and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies for over 20 years, he became Director of the Second Research Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies in April 1999. He moved to his current position in April 2003. He is a specialist on Chinese foreign relations and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. His recent publications in English include "The Asia-Pacific nations: Searching for Leverage," in Ramon H. Meyers, Michel C. Oksenberg and David Shambaugh (eds.), Making China Policy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), and "In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan-China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era," in Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol.13, No.1 (Spring 1999).

Xu Xin

Xu Xin is Associate Professor of International Relations at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan. He received his doctorate in government from Cornell University. He was formerly Associate Professor of International Relations at Peking University in China. His specialty is Chinese foreign policy and East Asian international relations. His current areas of research interest include the new Taiwan issue, East Asian security politics, multilateralism, and Asian regionalism. He is co-translator of Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Chinese People's Public Security University Press, 1990), coeditor of History of PRC's Foreign Relations, 1949-1989 (Peking University Press, 1994), and author of China and East Asia: Reshaping Power and Identity in the Post-Cold War Era (under review).

(In Alphabetical Order)