Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide comments and policy-oriented analyses of significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

Strengthening Intelligence as a Component of Japan's National Power

The agreement document of 12 items announced upon the establishment of the coalition government between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin) includes the item: "Strengthening national intelligence functions and comprehensive reform." This commits the government to implementing the following measures:

1. Upgrading the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) and the Director of Cabinet Intelligence (DCI) to the "National Intelligence Agency" and "Secretary General of the National Intelligence Agency," respectively, placing them on par with the National Security Secretariat (NSS) and its Secretary General.
2. Dissolving the Cabinet Intelligence Council in an evolutionary manner and establishing the "National Intelligence Council."
3. Establishing an External Intelligence Agency by the end of Fiscal Year 2027.
4. Creating an organization for the training of intelligence officers across different ministries and agencies.
5. Reviewing and formulating/enacting legislation related to the prevention of espionage.

Intelligence is a part of national power and a part of statecraft--the political and diplomatic art of converting national power into actual influence. It is often said that Japan's political and diplomatic culture has historically and traditionally undervalued intelligence. In recent years, however, the national functions related to intelligence have gradually been expanded. With the establishment of the National Security Secretariat in 2013, which centralized the policy side, it is believed that the sense of unity within the intelligence community has also been growing. This paper aims to provide a discussion of several points and identify challenges regarding this agreement by the new coalition government.

Point 1: Status Upgrade and Access Rights

Firstly, the upgrading of the Director of Cabinet Intelligence (Vice-Ministerial level) and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office to the "Secretary General of the National Intelligence Agency" (Parliamentary Vice-Ministerial level) and the "National Intelligence Agency," respectively, holds little substantive meaning in itself. Even without placing them on par, the Secretary General of the NSS and the DCI, as well as the NSS and CIRO, have been assessed as cooperating closely in recent years.

There is a view that, to substantially strengthen the functions of the National Intelligence Agency compared to the CIRO, it should be granted the same information access rights as those given to the NSS and its Secretary General (the authority to compel other ministries/agencies to provide information, and the obligation for those ministries/agencies to provide it). While it is true that intelligence will naturally gather if a person who has the Prime Minister's trust and frequent opportunities for meetings is appointed as the DCI or "Secretary General of the National Intelligence Agency"--making Prime Minister's trust the source of his/her power--granting access rights would institutionally guarantee the intelligence aggregation function.

However, even if the information gathered by the "National Intelligence Agency" improves in both quantity and quality compared to the CIRO era due to the "Secretary General of the National Intelligence Agency" obtaining access rights, he/she alone could be overwhelmed by the sheer flood of information. To avoid such a situation, it would be necessary to expand the aggregation and evaluation system, including the number, term limits, and support structure for the Cabinet Intelligence Analysts who are currently assigned to CIRO and "responsible for particularly sophisticated analysis concerning specific regions or fields."

Point 2: The Role of the External Intelligence Agency

Secondly, regarding the "External Intelligence Agency," concepts have been proposed, for instance, for creating an organization specialized in the collection of external "secret" intelligence (information unobtainable through open sources or diplomatic channels), structured separately from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Minister, similar to the UK's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) or the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS).

While some countries worldwide engage in operations and intelligence warfare, including assassinations and government overthrows (which I do not assume Japan would contemplate), there is an issue as to whether Japan should limit itself to the collection of external secret information or not, and how far it should go to impose its national policy and will upon target countries. This also concerns the very nature of Japan as a state. The institutional design will need to be considered with this positioning in mind.

Point 3: Collection and Analysis

Thirdly, according to its public organizational chart, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office currently conducts both analysis and information gathering abroad within its international section. It will be necessary to clarify the relationship between the "National Intelligence Agency"'s own information-gathering activities--if any, while its main duties focus on aggregation, analytical evaluation, and briefing the Prime Minister--and the information-gathering duties of the "External Intelligence Agency."

A key reason for separating analytical and evaluation organizations from collection organizations is that humans tend to overvalue information they have collected by their own organizations when conducting analysis and evaluation. The relationship between Australia's Office of National Intelligence (ONI) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), which clearly distinguishes between intelligence analysis/aggregation/evaluation and collection, could offer a suggestive model. It should also be noted that while CIRO currently handles both external and internal intelligence, organizations handling foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence are separated in the UK and the US.

Point 4: Prioritization Amidst Constraints

Fourthly, given the financial difficulties and population decline, Japan must consider prioritization amidst limited budgets and human resources. The means of intelligence collection and analysis are diverse. Aside from human intelligence (HUMINT), there is also the issue of the positioning of Information Gathering Satellites (IGS). While commercial satellite imagery is available, and the US provides satellite imagery, there are advantages to expanding the functions of Japan's independently owned IGS. This is due to the difference in resolution, the ability to possess "shutter control" or not, and the fact that the complete provision of information from the US is not guaranteed--though satellite imagery cannot read the conversations or inner thoughts of foreign leaders.

Furthermore, with recent advancements in AI and automated translation, the usefulness of collecting and analyzing open-source information, particularly in cyberspace, has significantly increased. I believe that how to reallocate and restructure limited budgets and personnel, considering the advantages, limitations, and costs of various methods--such as open-source intelligence (OSINT), cyber intelligence, satellite intelligence (GEOINT), and human intelligence--and how to organically link them to produce high-quality, policy-relevant outputs is a matter requiring substantial deliberation.

Conclusion: Key Understandings for Reform

Finally, since the beginning of this century, numerous proposals for intelligence reform have been published, including the "First and Second Machimura Reports," which recommended upgrading the DCI and establishing an external intelligence agency. It is fair to say that the main points and difficult issues have all been raised. Regardless of how the intelligence community is reformed, at least the following two points are crucial to be understood:

First, in all matters, there is no perfect ideal, and "intelligence failures" will sometimes occur. It takes at least several years for a single organizational structure (especially an external secret intelligence agency) to get on track and produce high-quality outputs. Therefore, cross-party consensus and commitment over a long-term time span--not limited to a single cabinet or coalition government--are necessary, and it is also desirable to gain the public's understanding and support by fulfilling accountability to the people.

Second, whether high-quality intelligence is utilized depends not only on the community's institutions, operations, and personnel but also on the awareness and attitude of the policy side. This is particularly true for the policy decision-makers, including the Prime Minister, who must demonstrate appropriate interest and allocate time, such as through active participation in the newly established "National Intelligence Council." It goes without saying that an autonomous foreign and security policy requires autonomous intelligence and situational judgment.

This is English translation of Japanese paper originally published on November 21, 2025.