- 1.The 'inalienable rights' in Article IV of the NPT ought to be interpreted as including rights to access, or to research and develop, fuel cycle technology.
- 2.The 'technology access denial' approach would have difficulties in preventing indigenous development and clandestine acquisition as well as in getting political consent.
- 3.The 'criteria-based approach' may not be perfect but, with the combination of strengthened responses to cases of non-compliance with the NPT as well as the IAEA safeguards agreement, it would play a central role in global nuclear non-proliferation.
- 4.The 'incentive approach' may be effective as a supplementary measure when it is combined with other approaches.
- 5.Support provided to emerging nuclear states for their efforts in 3S-related infrastructure development and capacity building could also be an effective approach in terms of decoupling expanded use of nuclear energy from the risks of nuclear proliferation, nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism.
- 6.Technology would be best utilized in raising barriers to proliferation and strengthening the verification of non-compliance.
- 7.Recognizing the central role of the 'criteria-based approach', the best mix of various approaches must be formulated.
- 8.Regulatory, restrictive measures alone are not able to facilitate non-proliferation values. Packaging them with incentive measures would further strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory, restrictive measures.
Strengthening Global Non-Proliferation Architecture to Facilitate Peaceful Use without Increasing the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation