Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide commentary and policy-oriented analyses on significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

As the first anniversary of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te's May 20, 2024 inauguration approaches, activities across the Taiwan Strait have intensified. On March 13, President Lai, in a speech following a high-level national security meeting, designated China a "foreign hostile force" and announced five threats posed to Taiwan by China's united front work, along with 17 countermeasures. China responded strongly, with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducting large-scale military exercises near Taiwan on April 1 and 2 featuring the participation of the aircraft carrier Shandong, while the China Coast Guard (CCG) carried out law enforcement patrols around Taiwan's main island and nearby islands. Taiwan strongly condemned these actions by China in return. US Indo-Pacific Command Commander Admiral Samuel J. Paparo stated during congressional testimony on April 9 that "the PLA escalated military pressure against Taiwan by 300% in 2024, through activities such as Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) entries and centerline crossings." He added, "Beijing's aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are not just exercises - they are dress rehearsals for forced unification."¹

Incidents involving CCG vessels and fishing boats entering the waters around Dongsha Islands have increased since the start of 2025, with China apparently seeking to establish a fait accompli. This article examines the ongoing CCG incursions into Taiwan's restricted waters around its outlying islands, which have been increasing ahead of the first anniversary of the Lai Ching-te administration, and the implications of these developments.

The Dongsha Islands- the Basics

The Dongsha Islands (English name: Pratas Islands) are a group of atolls located in the northern part of the South China Sea. Except for Dongsha Island, whose highest point is seven meters above sea level, the rest of the islands are submerged at high tide. Dongsha Island itself is only about 1.74 square kilometers in size and is home to hundreds of personnel from the Ocean Affairs Council's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) and the Taiwan Navy's Marine Corps, with no other residents reported.

The Dongsha Islands have drawn the attention of experts due to their strategic location. The Islands are approximately 200 kilometers from the Chinese mainland, 330 kilometers southeast of Hong Kong, and 400 kilometers southwest of Taiwan's main island. This puts it closer to the Chinese mainland than to Taiwan, which currently exercises effective control over the area. The Islands are located at a strategic chokepoint connecting the South China Sea to the Bashi Strait and the Taiwan Strait. A military base established here would clearly function as a "gatekeeper"² to block movements from the South China Sea toward East Asia, so the sovereignty of these islands is of great importance to Japan's sea lane defense.

Recent developments surrounding the Dongsha Islands

Incidents involving CCG vessels and fishing boats entering the waters around the Dongsha Islands have been on the rise since the beginning of 2025. According to a March 30 press release from the Ocean Affairs Council's CGA (the Taiwanese counterpart of the Japan Coast Guard) and other sources, 18 Chinese vessels have intruded in a total of 77 incidents since January of this year; Taiwanese authorities have forced most of these vessels to leave and seized six of them³. This represents a significant increase compared to the 33 vessels and 158 incidents in the same waters last year (2024) and the 11 vessels and 17 incidents in the year before (2023). Incidents from February to March this year are detailed in four press releases issued by the CGA between March 18 and 25. On February 15, a group of six Chinese fishing vessels (including up to 29 small boats) appeared simultaneously in the waters near the Dongsha Island. The CGA responding to this incursion encountered CCG vessels while attempting to expel and remove the fishing vessels. The CCG vessels allegedly violated the restricted waters designated by Taiwan (areas established by Taiwan under the 1992 Cross-Strait Relations Act to prohibit or restrict the entry of Chinese vessels, with the restricted waters around the island extending 24 nautical miles from the island), obstructed law enforcement activities, and continued to circle within the restricted waters.

Additionally, "fake news" (according to the CGA's press release) claiming that CCG vessels acceded to requests from Chinese fishermen and drove away Taiwanese CGA patrol vessels was circulated among Chinese online communities following the series of intrusions. In response, Taiwan issued consecutive press releases asserting that it had conducted legitimate maritime law enforcement activities based on its territorial claims, and the situation took on the appearance of an information war.

Simultaneous "maritime law enforcement activities"

Interestingly, on March 12, the same day as the Chinese intrusions in the Dongsha Islands, similar incidents occurred near Matsu Island and Kinmen Island, which are also under Taiwan's jurisdiction. At 8:00 pm on March 12, CCG Vessel 14517 approached the Taiwanese fishing vessel Xingdafa No. 1 and requested that it proceed to a Chinese port for inspection; however, a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol vessel intervened. Additionally, at 1:00 pm on the same day, Yangping No. 2 entered the restricted waters around Kinmen Island and deployed an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV); Taiwanese patrol vessels forced the vessel out of the restricted waters and halted its investigative activities. Meanwhile, at 3:00 pm on the same day (all times are Taiwan Standard Time), crew members from CCG Vessel 3101 boarded the Chinese fishing vessel Yue Mao Bin Yu No. 41177 in the restricted waters near Dongsha Island and implemented law enforcement measures. On this day, Chinese fishing vessels and CCG vessels engaged in unusual standoffs with CGA patrol vessels in three restricted maritime zones designated by Taiwan. It is difficult to attribute the occurrence of such incidents in three locations on the same day to mere coincidence. The view that Chinese authorities are seeking to repeatedly provoke such intrusions, using events such as the first anniversary of President Lai's inauguration on May 20 as a pretext, is prevalent in Taiwan⁴, and these "simultaneous multiple incidents" are seen by some as a rehearsal for future actions.

Observed online fixation on the Dongsha Islands

In the online space, another gray zone of the conflict, the number of mentions related to the "Dongshan Islands" in Chinese has increased. The following is a trend of social media posts and news articles mentioning both "Dongshan Islands" and "Taiwan CGA" (period: March 1 to April 10, 2025; all data in this section sourced from Japan Nexus Intelligence (JNI)).

There was a total of 473 mentions, with 460 of these being articles published on news sites or blogs. All these articles reported on the activities of the CCG from the perspective of mainland China, stating that "confrontations occurred" near the Dongsha Islands or that "Taiwan's CGA was unable to block the CCG." The following chart shows the distribution of these 460 articles by domain.

Toutiao and Baijiahao are both Chinese platforms where general internet users can post articles (including reposts of articles from state-run and other major media outlets). In reactions related to the Dongsha Islands, it appears that mentions by general bloggers rather than major media outlets were predominant in China. On March 23, information was posted on X (formerly Twitter) stating that "three Chinese fishing vessels suddenly encountered an ambush by the Taiwan CGA," and that "Coast Guard Vessel 3101 rushed to the scene, blocked the CGA, and rescued the three vessels."⁵

On Chinese-language websites, multiple unverified reports have been discovered. One of these claims that "Taiwan secretly imported radar purchased from the United States on March 10." Another example is a video - "CCG Vessel 3304 and Taiwan CGA vessels engage in intense confrontation near the Dongsha Islands"⁶ - posted on Toutiao ("Headlines") whose storyline is that Taiwan attempted to smuggle radar into the Dongsha Islands but was intercepted and blocked by the CCG. A post introduced in the Taiwan CGA's March 25 press release states, "Intense standoff occurred in the Dongsha Islands area; the Coast Guard bit into Taiwan patrol boats. (Is Taiwan trying to replace its radar with US-made radar?)" The narrative suggests that Taiwanese military personnel attempted to bring several large US-made radar systems onto the island (to replace older ones) but were firmly blocked by CCG Vessel 3304. If such large radar systems had been installed on the Dongsha Islands, they would have transmitted real-time data to the US military, potentially becoming a game-changer⁷.

Such content is also being disseminated online in an unusual manner. One such case includes an article containing the fixed phrases "only 20 nautical miles left to land" and "Taiwan authorities break out in a cold sweat." Between March 1 and April 10, 64 articles and videos matching these criteria were detected. The original article was posted by an individual purported to be a university associate professor⁸. The article claims that the Taiwanese side was unable to block CCG vessels. It further states that the Taiwanese side is "extremely fearful" of a scenario where China occupies the island as "punishment for pro-independence forces," and concludes that "the Taiwan authorities are afraid that their provocative and conflict-stoking actions will lead to the worst possible outcome." This content has been reposted by multiple users, with 35 text-based articles alone, all of which include the phrases "only 20 nautical miles left to land" and "Taiwan authorities break out in a cold sweat" in their titles or introductions. Such narratives imply that "Taiwan cannot match China in terms of military strength," and it cannot be ruled out that coordinated efforts were made to disseminate the same content.

As evident from these posts, the Chinese side also appears to view the area around the Dongsha Islands as a potential flashpoint for US-China military confrontation. An interesting article on a Chinese wartime simulation exercise was published in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post in January of this year⁹. The simulation, set up by researchers at the North China Institute of Computing Technology, posited that a US aircraft carrier strike group stationed in the Bashi Strait had launched a large-scale attack on a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group operating near the "coast" of the Dongsha Islands. The simulation involved 10 long-range anti-ship missiles fired simultaneously from different platforms, targeting one of the large destroyers escorting the Chinese aircraft carrier. The fact that a research institute under the People's Liberation Army has created such a scenario suggests that the Chinese government also considers the area around the Dongsha Islands to be a potential "war zone".

Beware of the "Kinmen Model"

The Dongsha Islands, with their highest point being seven meters above sea level, are considered by the US Department of Defense's 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) to be easily capturable by the Chinese military if it so desires¹⁰. The same report states that the occupation of Kinmen Island and Matsu Island is "within the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army." On the other hand, the implementation of such an operation could lead to the consolidation of political forces within Taiwan and provoke international condemnation, making it extremely difficult politically.

Therefore, attention should be paid to China's efforts to deny Taiwan's jurisdiction through increasing the frequency of incursions into these areas and creating fait accompli. On February 14, 2024, a Chinese fishing boat capsized near the Kinmen Islands, resulting in the deaths of two fishermen (Taiwan claimed that five CCG vessels had entered restricted waters around the Kinmen Islands during this period). In response, the Fujian Coast Guard announced on February 18 that it would strengthen its maritime law enforcement capabilities, conduct routine law enforcement patrols in the waters around Xiamen and Kinmen Island, maintain order in the relevant waters, and protect the lives and property of fishermen¹¹. One year later, in February 2025, there were 60 incidents of CCG vessels entering restricted waters near Kinmen Island¹². Given that the Chinese side refers to such actions by the CCG as the "Kinmen Model　(金門摸式)" and appears to be expanding it further, the Taiwanese side is understandably vigilant about the increase in incursions into restricted waters around the Dongsha Islands since the beginning of this year.

The following graph illustrates the extent of references to the Kinmen Model in English and Chinese (simplified and traditional characters). The period covered is from April 23, 2024 to April 22, 2025 (sourced from JNI).

The peak occurred in May 2024, coinciding with the People's Liberation Army's "Joint Sword-2024A" military exercises near Taiwan (May 23-24) and prompting Taiwanese media to sound the alarm¹³ that the Kinmen Model could be expanded to other areas. Similar concerns have been raised by English-language analysts, specifically regarding the potential expansion of the Kinmen Model to Matsu Island, Dongyin Island, and Wuchiu Island¹⁴.

It is also worth noting that there was a slight upward trend in mentions in April 2025. The graph below focuses on the period from late March to April 2025.

The peak in mentions in April was driven by Yuyuantantian, a social media platform under the China Central Television umbrella. An article published on April 3 titled "People's Liberation Army less than 20 nautical miles from islands! Military exercises against Taiwan enter 'fine-tuning' phase"¹⁵ claims that "actions against Taiwan have shifted to 'full island control,' which is an extension and development of the Kinmen Model." The peak was created by the reposting of this article.

The peak after April 20 was formed by multiple Chinese-language articles¹⁶¹⁷ stating that "a US think tank has released a report stating that the 'Kinmen Model' is the key to exercising law enforcement authority and administrative jurisdiction over Taiwan." These articles describe the Kinmen Model as a means of addressing the strategic situation without resorting to military conflict, and state that the Lai Ching-te administration is "running out of cards to play." The reference to "a report published by a US think tank" likely refers to the Global Taiwan Institute's April 18 report titled "Chinese Communist Party Lawfare and Economic Coercion Against Taiwan"¹⁸. The article contains the following statement: "The 'Kinmen Model' may serve as a case study for future Chinese maneuvers aimed at expanding legal jurisdiction and military presence in the region, further complicating cross-Strait relations"¹⁹. This article criticizes China for using the concept of the Kinmen Model to accumulate fait accompli.

As seen above, references to the Kinmen Model are frequently made on Yuyuantantian and in personal blog posts, and it is expected that such references will increase in the future, particularly if China conducts military exercises around Taiwan. On the other hand, English-language references were concentrated on the "Joint Sword-2024A" period²⁰, and no recent increase has been confirmed. It is possible that information about the Kinmen Model will in future be disseminated in multiple languages following some kind of event.

Conclusion

Japan should not dismiss this issue as someone else's problem. Japan is not only subjected to pressure from China's unilateral territorial claims in the East China Sea based on its own interpretation of history, but also benefits from the sea lanes passing through the waters near the Dongsha Islands. To prevent the Kinmen Model from becoming a fait accompli, it is necessary to take the lead in promoting international cooperation among think tanks (Track 2). Specifically, if large-scale law enforcement activities by the CCG are conducted within 12 nautical miles of the Dongsha Islands, Japan should expose China's attempts to create a fait accompli by recording and publishing the CCG's tracks and actions in cooperation with think tanks in the US and the Philippines. If China's actions go beyond coast guard activities and develop into military exercises, the Japanese government should, of course, express serious concern and convey its concerns to China. In addition, multilateral forums such as the G7 whose participating countries share relatively similar views should include in its declarations language condemning China's attempts to create a fait accompli through rampant law enforcement activities in the South China Sea in order to deter such actions. In short, it is important not to allow China to hold the mistaken belief that Western countries are not paying attention to its actions in the islands to prevent unforeseen circumstances.

In March 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended a meeting with representatives of the People's Liberation Army at the National People's Congress and stated, "We must highlight our development priorities and focus on implementing strategies and plans for building strategic capabilities in emerging fields. We must integrate planning for maritime military struggle, the maintenance of maritime rights and interests, and the development of the maritime economy, and enhance our maritime governance capabilities." He also called for linking maritime strategy with economic development, taking into account the acquisition of emerging technologies²¹. About a year after this speech, China's "preparations for maritime military struggles" have moved beyond the planning stage and entered a preparatory phase, as evidenced by the normalization of law enforcement activities in Taiwan-controlled islands noted by Admiral Paparo. Now is the time for Japan to engage in the necessary diplomatic activities and raise international awareness to counter China's moves in the East China Sea and ensure the safety of navigation in Japan's sea lanes.

(This is an English translation of a Japanese paper originally published on April 30, 2025)

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