JIIA Strategic Comments (2026-11) Changes and Challenges for the EU: Four Years Since the Ukraine Invasion

Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide comments and policy-oriented analyses of significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

Introduction

On 24 February 2026, four years after Russia commenced its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations General Assembly held an Emergency Special Session and adopted a resolution entitled ‘Support for lasting peace in Ukraine’ by a majority in favour. While countries such as Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic states voted in the affirmative, Russia voted against, and the United States abstained. As evidenced by this, Ukraine has faced difficulties in securing support from the US since the inauguration of the second Trump administration¹. Although tripartite ceasefire and peace negotiations mediated by the US continue, there is no end to the war in sight. The 28-point peace proposal presented to Ukraine by the Trump administration in November 2025 was also pro-Russian in nature, including concessions regarding eastern territories. The primary lifelines for supporting Ukraine among Western nations has thus become the EU and the UK. Over the course of its four years, the Russia-Ukraine war has brought about various changes to the EU and its surrounding environment.

1. Changes in defence and security

The most significant change in the EU’s security landscape resulting from Russia’s invasion is the NATO accession of EU member states Finland and Sweden². In addition to the Baltic states, which border Russia and were already members of NATO, the accession of bordering Finland and nearby Sweden represented a seismic shift for both Russia and the West.

The defence industry has also undergone a structural evolution. The ‘European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS)’, proposed in 2024 by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (hereafter ‘EU High Representative’), set targets for EU member states to achieve by 2030: (i) to procure at least 40% of defence equipment in a collaborative manner; (ii) to ensure that the value of intra-EU defence trade represents at least 35% of the value of the EU defence market; and (iii) to make steady progress towards procuring at least 50% of defence procurement budgets within the EU³. The post of European Commissioner for Defence and Space was newly established within the European Commission that same year, and Kaja Kallas, the former Estonian prime minister known for her hardline stance against Russia, was appointed to the position of EU High Representative. Prompted in part by concerns over the decline in US defence commitments following the start of Trump’s second term, the EU in 2025 produced its first-ever Defence White Paper, firmly establishing a policy to strengthen defence capabilities within the EU framework⁴. There is a stark contrast between the US National Defence Strategy (NDS) published in early 2026, which describes Russia as a ‘manageable threat’, and the EU’s Defence White Paper, which characterises the country as a ‘fundamental threat’⁵.

Ukraine is no longer a country that simply receives aid. The Russia-Ukraine war has seen new methods of combat employed that go beyond conventional warfare using tanks and missiles, including interception, surveillance, and ‘suicide’ drones, wired drones that can fly even if radio guidance is jammed, unmanned vehicles, electronic warfare weapons to counter unmanned systems, and spoofing⁶. In other words, the nature of warfare is changing. These new combat methods are also being extensively utilised by Iran in its counterattacks against Israeli and US strikes. Ukraine possesses a wealth of experience regarding the ‘Shahed’ drones used by Iran and has dispatched specialist anti-drone air defence teams to countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. While the Ukrainians lack Patriot missiles, their technology for developing and manufacturing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has reached a considerably high level through feedback from actual combat, and they have already begun sharing technology for detecting and intercepting attack drones with Europe and others. This is not irrelevant to Japan; on 14 March, it was revealed that Japan has begun considering adoption of Ukrainian-made drones for the Self-Defence Forces⁷. Through Ukraine’s experience, countries can acquire knowledge based on empirical evidence regarding Russian attacks and how to counter them. Furthermore, the emergence of these new methods of combat is deeply relevant to the security environment surrounding Japan. The fact that China is already making steady progress in manufacturing and developing unmanned systems, and the possibility that Russia may transfer or coordinate technology with North Korea in the future, pose a threat to Japan. While increasing its defence budget and focusing on the Japan-US alliance, Japan needs to bring together expertise from industry, government, and academia to consider how best to deal with these new combat methods from a medium- to long-term perspective and respond promptly. Japan and the EU announced the ‘Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership’ in November 2024, advancing cooperation in this field. Meanwhile, European countries have been seeking to strengthen relations with China, particularly in the economic sphere, since Trump returned to office in 2025, and there is a possibility that dependence on China may increase in the future⁸. The era in which one could feel secure simply by siding with traditional allies is coming to an end. In an age where ‘peace through strength’ is championed, we must explore dialogue and relationship-building with regional communities and countries with which we previously had little contact, in areas where mutual interests align.

2. De-russianisation in the energy sector

The greatest change in the energy sector over these four years has been the drastic reduction of energy dependence on Russia. Through ‘REPowerEU’, launched in May 2022, the EU has dramatically lowered its reliance on Russian oil, gas, and coal (for example, dependence on gas fell from 45% before the invasion to 13% as of 2025, and coal from 50% before the invasion to 0% by 2025)⁹ . Looking ahead, the EU intends to cease all imports of Russian pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) by the end of 2027, and to stop oil imports by taking measures against the ‘shadow fleet’. In February 2026, a regulation to phase out imports of natural gas from Russia (EU/2026/261) came into force, and de-russianisation in the energy sector has reached an irreversible stage. To compensate for shortfalls, the EU has increased imports of oil and natural gas from the US and is procuring energy resources from countries such as Norway and Algeria. Additionally, it is prioritising investment in renewable energy and accelerating its deployment. Due to the gradual transition to alternative energy necessitated by circumstance, Europe’s carbon dioxide emissions are decreasing. On the other hand, Hungary and Slovakia continue to import crude oil from Russia. Some observers have suggested that the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets decided at the EU Environment Council meeting late last year have regressed due to pressure from the business community, yet energy supply sources are most certainly being diversified. Whether the Green Deal actually recedes in Europe will also need to be observed over a medium- to long-term period.

Following its recent attack on Iran, the US announced it would temporarily permit the purchase of Russian crude oil, while European leaders—most prominently French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council President António Costa—expressed concern and indicated that Europe intends to maintain sanctions against Russia. Depending on the outcome of the situation in Iran, however, some EU member states may be forced to take measures such as easing sanctions or may come to desire such a move. Indeed, Prime Minister Bart de Wever of Belgium, where the EU is headquartered, called in mid-March for normalising relations with Russia and resuming the procurement of cheap energy.

While the EU continues to de-russianise its energy supply, private Japanese companies have maintained their investment in the Russian natural gas (LNG) development project ‘Sakhalin-2’ since 2022, and Japan continues to import LNG from Russia¹⁰ . Given Japan’s energy situation, it is forced to rely on Russia; however, efforts should be made to find solutions that allow for the diversification of supply sources, including the procurement of other energy resources, rather than simply staying this course. This would, conversely, help bolster Japan’s energy security. With the rapid spread of AI, power demand is expected to increase further, making the fundamental strengthening of energy security an urgent task for Japan.

 3. Restarting EU enlargement

The hitherto stagnant movement towards EU enlargement has restarted in response to Russia’s invasion, and accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova formally commenced in June 2024. This marked the first application for membership since the EU experienced a reduction in member states following the UK’s withdrawal in January 2021. Both countries are aiming for early EU membership but there is no clear prospect for accession due to issues such as corruption in Ukraine and opposition from Hungary. EU High Representative Kallas also stated at the Munich Security Conference in February that EU members were ‘not ready to provide a specific date¹¹ ’ for Ukraine’s accession. However, keeping both countries, particularly Ukraine, within the ‘European’ framework could serve as a powerful countermeasure against Russia. Regardless of whether accession is realised, progress in implementing domestic reforms towards membership will help boost both countries’ resilience. This also presents an opportunity for the EU to reaffirm its raison d’être to the international community¹².

Conclusion

Four years into the war, support fatigue for Ukraine is casting a shadow. Despite dramatic changes in the international situation over these four years such as the re-election of Trump and the intensification of Russian attacks, however, Ukraine continues its resistance, and the EU, the UK, and Japan continue to provide support. Japan is also focusing on supporting Ukraine in non-military areas through grant aid and other means. Most recently, letters were signed and exchanged in February of this year regarding a 6.2-billion-yen grant aid package titled the ‘Programme for Emergency Recovery (Phase 5)’ for support in the healthcare, agriculture, and infrastructure sectors. Separate from such bilateral support, Japan is also vigorously assisting Ukraine through international organisations. For instance, Japan is the largest donor to UNDP Ukraine and has provided support totalling 241 million US dollars. Through UNDP projects, high-voltage auto-transformers, portable power supplies, and generators have been sent as energy infrastructure support, which has been highly acclaimed for enabling 6.5 million Ukrainians to access vital services more stably. Furthermore, Japanese contributions have accounted for nearly 40% of the total funds mobilised by UNESCO since the invasion for supporting Ukraine in the fields of cultural heritage and education¹³. Preventing Russia from achieving a change in the status quo by force continues to hold significant meaning not only for the EU but also for Japan, Russia’s neighbour across the sea. Precisely because Japan is providing such vast amounts of aid, though, it is necessary to carefully consider the multifaceted significance for Japan of supporting Ukraine beyond humanitarian reasons and acting as a check on Russia, and to deliberate on future methods and amounts of support.

Meanwhile, the EU has not been monolithic in its support for Ukraine, as demonstrated by the difference in sentiment between countries that border Russia—such as the Baltic states, Poland, and the Nordic countries—and those that do not. Late last year, the EU failed to reach an agreement on floating a ‘reparations loan’ that would utilise frozen Russian assets within the EU to financially support Ukraine. Although an agreement was somehow reached to raise 90 billion euros for loans to Ukraine by using the EU budget as collateral, the approval from the Foreign Affairs Council required for implementation has not been obtained due to opposition from Hungary, and there is no prospect that the loans will commence anytime soon¹⁴. Additionally, corruption in the Zelensky administration has become the target of criticism even from staunch supporters among EU members; the large-scale corruption case involving state-owned enterprises that came to light in 2025 shows that corruption in the public sector remains deep-rooted. Neglecting countermeasures will raise questions about the propriety of continued support from donor countries.

The Hungarian general election is scheduled for next month, along with state parliament elections in five German states¹⁵  and Sweden’s first general election since its NATO accession. Their results could have either a positive or negative impact on the EU’s support for Ukraine. Particularly noteworthy will be the outcome of the Hungarian general election, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who opposes sanctions against Russia, is up for re-election. Furthermore, a public opinion poll conducted last November on next year’s French presidential election showed that Jordan Bardella of the far-right National Rally (RN) enjoyed the highest support¹⁶. Additional collaborative efforts between major EU nations are expected, and there are many hurdles to overcome to maintain EU unity in supporting Ukraine. 

(Manuscript completed 23 March 2026)
(This is an English translation of a Japanese paper originally published on 31 March 2026.)

1. US support to Ukraine has been suspended since April 2025. Kiel Institute, https://www.kiel-institut.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker. (Last accessed 19/03/2026).
2. These countries joined NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively.
3. European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1321. (Last accessed 23/03/2026).
4. Regarding the changes in European security following the start of the second Trump administration, please refer to the Strategic Comments ‘The 62nd Munich Security Conference’ by Tomoyuki Yoshida, Chief Executive Director, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/report/2026/03/strategic_comment_2026-10.html).
5.  Regarding the 2026 NDS, please refer to the Strategic Comments ‘Reading the 2026 US National Defense Strategy: Focusing on Nuclear Policy and Deterrence’ by Nobumasa Akiyama, Director, Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/report/2026/01/strategic_comment_2026-3.html).
6.  In asymmetric warfare, these new combat methods are being tested in actual combat to compensate for disparities in military strength.
7. In a related development, a proposal was also revealed that same day on concluding a future ‘Defence Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement’, assuming that Japan will provide defence equipment to Ukraine.
8. When asked in a public opinion poll conducted this February in the UK, France, Germany, and Canada ‘whether it is better to depend on China or on the US under the Trump administration’, the percentage of people who answered China was higher in all countries; in Canada, that number was nearly 60%. Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/15/trump-china-europe-closer-ties-00823457 (Last accessed 23/03/2026)
9. European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en. (Last accessed 23/03/2026)
10. Although such import is permitted as an exception to US economic sanctions until June this year, Japan faces a number of pressing issues, among them being the policy of overseas companies that handle reinsurance for Japan’s maritime transport to gradually ban insurance coverage for the maritime transport of Russian LNG.
11. Nikkei Shimbun, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCB160RS0W6A210C2000000/. (Last accessed 23/03/2026)
12. The government of Iceland announced earlier this month that it would hold a national referendum in August this year on whether to resume EU accession negotiations; however, it is thought that the deciding factor was the high level of US interest in possessing the neighbouring territory of Greenland rather than the Russia-Ukraine war.
13. With a new contribution of 3.8 million dollars this February, Japan’s total support has reached 29.1 million dollars.
14. At the European Council meeting held on 19 March, implementation of the loan proposal was further postponed due to opposition from Hungary, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasized the need to consider alternative plans to continue support for Ukraine.
15. Of the five state elections, two have already been held. In the Baden-Württemberg state election held in early March and the Rhineland-Palatinate state election held in late March, Alternative for Germany (AfD) failed to become the top party but did receive approximately double the votes it had garnered the previous time. However, the AfD is predicted to have a high probability of becoming the leading party in the two eastern state elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to be held in September. Daiwa Institute of Research, https://www.dir.co.jp/report/column/20260130_012379.html, (Last accessed 23/03/2026).
16. In response to the question ‘If the first round of the presidential election were held next Sunday, which of the following politicians would you be most likely to vote for?’, the highest percentage of people chose Jordan Bardella, with the difference depending on the runoff opponent: for example, 53% answered they would choose Bardella over Edouard Philippe and 74% would vote for Bardella over Jean-Luc Mélenchon. ODOXA, https://www.odoxa.fr/sondage/jordan-bardella-est-la-personnalite-politique-preferee-des-francais-et-remporterait-la-presidentielle-si-elle-avait-lieu-dimanche-prochain/. (Last accessed 20/03/2026)