[Japan’s Voices No. 22] Political Forecasts Are No Better Than Weather Forecasts: Will PM Takaichi’s Golden Era Last Until Summer 2028?

Thanks to advances in meteorological satellites and artificial intelligence, weather forecasting has become remarkably accurate when it comes to the very short term. Predictions for today or tomorrow now achieve a level of precision that would have been unimaginable only a few decades ago. Beyond a week, however, forecasts begin to lose reliability. By the one-month mark, they become considerably less dependable, while predictions three months or more into the future are usually little more than educated guesses.

On February 24, the Japan Meteorological Agency released its seasonal forecast for the coming summer, predicting that temperatures would be higher than average nationwide. What happened? While western Japan did indeed experience many sunny days and above-average temperatures, eastern Japan saw a substantial number of cooler days and enjoyed a more comfortable summer than usual. The forecast missed the mark entirely.

Political forecasting is much the same as weather forecasting. Short-term predictions can be surprisingly accurate but, once one ventures three months or more into the future, success becomes exceedingly rare.

This is hardly surprising. If even weather predictions, supported by a vast array of precise data gathered through satellites and analyzed by AI, remain difficult, how much harder are forecasts about the decisions of flesh-and-blood politicians? Their choices are shaped by constantly changing international developments, economic conditions, public sentiment, and countless unforeseen events. Predicting such decisions months in advance is close to impossible.

Nor should one expect miracles from generative AI. Asking AI to forecast the future is almost guaranteed to end in disappointment. It does not know what lies ahead any more than we do. 

In January of last year, I published a book entitled「大予測2025年　高市早苗が日本を取り戻す！」(The Great 2025 Prediction: Sanae Takaichi Will Restore Japan!) (available only in Japanese). As events unfolded, Takaichi did become prime minister, just as I had predicted. It would be tempting to boast that my forecasting ability surpassed that of AI, but in truth it was nothing more than a lucky guess.

Nevertheless, if I may indulge in another prediction, I would assign a 99 percent probability to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi remaining in power until the summer of 2028. The reason is simple: no national elections are scheduled before that year’s July House of Councillors elections.

Although unified local elections will be held nationwide next April, there are no gubernatorial or mayoral races in politically pivotal areas such as Tokyo or Okinawa that could significantly influence national politics. Moreover, the reduction of the consumption tax on food products, scheduled to take effect that same month, is likely to provide a tailwind for the governing coalition.

The opposition, meanwhile, remains fragmented. Plans for a merger of the Centrist Reform Alliance, the Constitutional Democratic Party, and Komeito by the end of August have collapsed. As a result, parliamentary politics are likely to proceed at the government's pace, a prospect that anyone could foresee.

The Liberal Democratic Party presidential election scheduled for next autumn presents little danger for Takaichi either. Her prospects of securing re-election as party leader are, in my view, also close to 99 percent.

In the more than seventy-year history of the LDP, no sitting prime minister who had recently led the party to victory in House of Representatives elections has subsequently been defeated in a party leadership contest. Potential challengers, including Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, who contested the previous race, have shown little enthusiasm for another bid. Even if figures such as Internal Affairs Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi or fiscal conservative Yuko Obuchi were to run on an anti-Takaichi platform, her re-election appears all but certain.

The remaining one percent reflects a modest concern about her health, given her publicly acknowledged lack of sleep. There are no other significant concerns beyond that.

In other words, Takaichi is poised to enjoy what may be called a "golden two years" through the summer of 2028. What, then, is she likely to seek to accomplish during this period?

Although she is frequently criticized by China as representing a form of "new militarism" and is often portrayed domestically as a hawkish populist, Takaichi is unlikely to translate unpredictable policy ideas into government action. Whether on revising the Imperial House Law, reducing the consumption tax, or introducing penalties for desecrating the national flag, she has simply been implementing measures already incorporated into the coalition agreement concluded with the Japan Innovation Party last October. The two major goals that remain are constitutional revision and the enactment of an anti-espionage law.

Of these, the latter appears considerably more achievable. Eighty-one years after the end of World War II, Japan still lacks a comprehensive legal framework explicitly targeting foreign espionage activities. The enactment of such legislation could finally mark a turning point, enabling Japan, long regarded as a “paradise for spies”, to become a "normal nation."

Her greatest challenge, however, lies in the House of Councillors elections scheduled for the summer of 2028. Takaichi would undoubtedly like to center campaign messaging on constitutional revision, a goal that was also the long-cherished aspiration of her political mentor Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Political realities are unlikely to cooperate.

The ruling coalition still lacks a majority in the current House of Councillors even with the addition of the Japan Innovation Party's seats. Should it win the upper house elections two years from now, securing an overall majority would be about the best it could realistically hope for. The reason is straightforward: the LDP performed exceptionally well in the 2022 elections for the upper house, whose seats will be contested again in 2028. Significant additional gains will therefore be difficult to achieve.

Complicating matters further, 2028 will be the final year of President Trump's term in office. The inevitable "lame-duck" phenomenon would reduce the value of Takaichi's close relationship with the US president and deprive her of an important diplomatic asset.

An even more delicate issue concerns the reduced consumption tax on food products, which is almost certain to become a central election issue. The tax reduction set to begin next April is scheduled to expire at the end of March 2029, and the prime minister has already made clear that she does not favor renewal. It is easy to imagine opposition parties, many of which once opposed the measure, suddenly championing an extension of the tax cut as a campaign pledge in the 2028 upper house elections.

Takaichi would likely avoid trouble by signaling that, rather than immediately restoring the consumption tax on food products to eight percent, she would either extend the current one percent tax break for a limited period or phase in a return to the original rate over several years. Such a compromise would almost certainly provoke strong resistance from fiscal conservatives within her own party.

Calling simultaneous elections for both houses of the Diet might also be considered as a means of improving electoral prospects. However, political conditions two years from now are impossible to know. Such a gamble could just as easily end in defeat in the House of Representatives elections and force the ruling party from office.

In any event, it is clear that 2028 will be the next decisive year for Takaichi.

Inui, M. (2025) 大予測2025年　高市早苗が日本を取り戻す！(The Great 2025 Prediction: Sanae Takaichi Will Restore Japan! ) (available only in Japanese). Tokyo: Business-sha Co., Ltd.

Masato Inui graduated from the College of Comparative Culture at the University of Tsukuba and subsequently joined the Sankei Shimbun. Over the course of his career, he has held a number of senior positions, including Chief of the Political News Department, Managing Editor, and Chairman of the Editorial Board. He currently serves as Senior Editorial Writer.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not reflect those of JIIA CGO.